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

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

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

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

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War and Christian Doctrine

No doubt every reader of Darrell Cole's "Good Wars" (October 2001) was struck, as I was, by its eerie timeliness, appearing as it did just a few days after the attack on America September 11, 2001. But rather than link his essay with the devastation of that day (an assault that could easily launch a war that future historians might someday be calling a new "Hundred Years War"), I would rather cast my glance backward to the same time in history that Professor Cole's essay also treated. For when I read the author's citations of Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin, with their startling claims that war can sometimes be the most charitable course of action, I thought of another voice roughly contemporaneous with Calvin's: that of the founder of the Jesuit Order, St. Ignatius of Loyola.

On August 6, 1552, Ignatius sent two letters of reflection and instruction to Jesuit Father Jerome Nadal, who was sojourning in Sicily at the time to promulgate the newly written *Constitutions* of the Order. At the end, Ignatius instructed this Jesuit delegate to add one more task to these duties: he wanted Nadal to visit the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, to convince the emperor to join in Ignatius' grandly conceived plan to sweep the Turkish navy from the Mediterranean. As the editor and English translator of these missives, William Young, S.J., notes in his *Letters of St. Ignatius of Loyola* (Loyola University Press, 1959): "The plan reveals a broad political vision and no common gifts of organization. But no less interesting are the general principles which rule the project, and *especially the supernatural motives* so familiar in the saint's spiritual outlook which are at the base of the plan" [emphasis added].

Speaking of himself (as was his habit) in the third person, Ignatius says: "Seeing all this [devastation] and the losses which the pirates are wont to inflict on the coastlands, on the souls and bodies and belongings of Christian men, he has come to understand in our Lord and to hold the firm conviction that the emperor ought to muster a great fleet and regain control of the seas. . . . [Moreover,] he would gladly devote the rest of his old age to this plan, with no thought of the labor involved in journeying to the emperor and to the prince, or of the dangers along the way, or of his bodily ailments, or any other discomfort whatever."

Then in the second letter (sent the same day), and casting a wary eye on European geopolitics and the self-interested nationalism that would soon become the hallmark of European diplomacy (at least until it came near to destroying Western civilization in the twentieth century), Ignatius ruefully points out how easily the Ottoman Turks exploited Christian divisions: "Beginning with what little is left of Christendom, they are employing the tactics which enabled them to take Constantinople; that is, playing one prince against another, and then taking what they please from both vanquished and survivor."

But for Ignatius a strong campaign to build a large imperial navy would not only help to obviate such nationalism but would also perhaps even serve as a deterrent to war: "The reputation and honor of his majesty are involved, a reputation which must be sustained among the faithful and even the infidel. This will be vastly improved by a fleet which could seek honor and reputation in foreign parts and defend them at home without effort. As it is now, much credit and authority is lost. For this authori-

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ty can be a defense in many places to one's nationals even without the backing of arms."

Needless to say, the expense of such an undertaking would have been immense. But even here Ignatius did not shirk from the implications that such a levy would have for religious houses, including those of the Jesuits: "An order could be issued," he suggested, "that many of the rich religious orders in the estates of his majesty—which could get along with much less than they have—should provide a good number of galleys. For example, . . . the Benedictines, so many [ships]; the Carthusians, so many; and so forth. Among them could be included the abbeys of Sicily and Naples which are without any religious [members]. A second source would be the bishoprics and their chapters and attached beneficiaries, which taken all together could contribute a large sum of money with which to equip a good number of ships for the benefit of Christendom."

Of course, the task of drawing exact parallels between these exhortations and today's bellicosities would be impossible. For one thing, the House of Islam hardly presents the picture of unanimity that once obtained during the heyday of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, as to Prof. Cole's basic point—that in certain circumstances war must be regarded not only as the last remaining necessary option, but also as the most *charitable* one—of that central thesis we can at least say this: St. Ignatius of Loyola would have agreed.

Edward T. Oakes, S.J.
Regis University
Denver, Colorado

Darrell Cole's argument for "good wars" shows the fundamental dishonesty in much Christian thinking about just war. I agree with Professor Cole that "the tradition" of Christian just war reasoning (from Augustine to Aquinas to Calvin) is reasonable. But I disagree with his claim that this tradition is consistent with the teachings of Jesus.

The teaching of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount is pacifist. Nowhere in the Gospels does Jesus clearly endorse the lethal use of force. To get around this evident fact, Prof. Cole adopts the traditional view that "Christ's pacific nature is . . . inextricably tied to his role as redeemer and cannot be intended as a model for Christian behavior." And yet Prof. Cole does not cite any words of Jesus to support this interpretation.

Would it not be more honest for Christians to admit that Jesus taught pacifism, but that this teaching is imprudent, and therefore we must adopt the just war argument of "the tradition" as a correction of the teachings of Jesus?

Larry Arnhart
Professor of Political Science
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, Illinois

I read Darrell Cole's article as soon as it arrived. It could not have come at a more critical moment.

Since the bombing, my local church has offered a disturbing mix of prayers and high-minded demagoguery. It has become a bully pulpit for what, to me, seems like so much moral irresponsibility. There is much pious intoning of the word "forgiveness" with no effort to distinguish between forgiveness and exoneration. Invocations of "peace," with no reference to the conditions on which peace is built, have been quite prominent.

My fear is that the American Catholic churches will be in the ranks of those exhuming the corpse of the antiwar movement of the 1960s. All candles and paper cranes for the enemy. No comprehension that a refusal to use force is a form of appeasement, an invitation to the murder of more innocents.

I have been so angry than I had to stop attending Mass. I could not bear lending myself to the sanctimonious braying, the rhetorical tightrope act that permits priests to deplore terrorism and the necessary violence of defensive force in the same breath. Moral equivalence is alive and well in my parish church.

Thank you for "Good Wars."

Maureen Mullarkey
Chappaqua, New York

Darrell Cole's article presents a picture of a Christian tradition more or less unified in its acceptance of the nobility of soldiering until the liberal/humanist/Enlightenment/pacifist cabal began to infiltrate and corrupt its thinking. The fact is, conflict over the role of soldiers and the purpose of war has been part of Christianity from early on. I notice Professor Cole omits to quote St. Basil, who was of the opinion that engagement in war and killing for any reason entailed automatic excommunication of nine years and performance of severe penance before the penitent could be restored to full communion. The Archbishop of Caesarea seems to be of the "dirty hands" school of thought. We can perform necessary acts, he reasons, that still require repentance. Sin can, at times, be inescapable; the necessity of a thing does not make a virtue of it.

But even more important than the witness of St. Basil is the witness of the early Christian soldier-martyrs who forfeited their lives because they believed in the incompatibility of their new religion with their old profession. While some of the soldier-martyrs met their end because of a refusal to engage in the obligatory cultic sacrifice of the Roman legions, others fall into a category we would have to call pacifist. The Church of the first four centuries did indeed canonize those who refused military service as violence and suffered death for their belief. Ecclesiastical documents such as the Canons of Hippolytus bear this out.

All of which is not to deny any of the excellent points made by Prof. Cole, but simply to say that the issue

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has been much more vexed, and the Church's response more conflicted, than he implies.

Mary Grace DuPree
Atlanta, Georgia

Thank you for Darrell Cole's article on just war. Growing up in America did not give me much reason or opportunity to consider anything but pacifism desirable, and it was easy to fit Christian beliefs into that mold. And how I long for an existence where peace will be a given, not an "ism"! Living in Croatia through its years of war, however, forced me to consider that war can and must be seen from other perspectives. While Christians must never be eager for war, neither must we be naive about the reality of evil and the rightness of saving lives and preserving light in a very dark world. Thank you for your willingness to go against the flow in printing this article.

Sheila Vamplin
Memphis, Tennessee

Darrell Cole replies:

I very much appreciate the kind comments by Maureen Mullarkey, Sheila Vamplin, and Edward T. Oakes. Father Oakes' discussion of Ignatius reminded me of just how many theologians contributed to the just war tradition, both Catholic and Protestant. So many names could be added to the list: most notably Vitoria and Suarez on the Catholic side, and Jeremy Taylor and Richard Baxter on the Protestant side. But not all my correspondents are happy with the tradition as I have defended it and I would be remiss in not making some sort of reply.

Professor Arnhart represents what I like to call the Niebuhrian strain in Christian attitudes toward war, a strain that has much in common with the messianic pacifism of John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas. This claim may seem unusual. After all, Yoder and Hauerwas spilled a great deal of ink exposing the moral shortcomings of Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian Realism, and there is a great deal of difference between the two positions on many points. What is not at issue between the camps, however, is how to interpret the person and work of Jesus Christ. Each camp believes that it can understand what the person and work of Jesus Christ means for the Christian by interpreting the person and work of Christ primarily (if not completely) through the Gospel writers (especially Luke).

Thus, unlike Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin, both pacifists and Niebuhr (and Professor Arnhart) fail to "see" Christ through Paul and the larger concerns of the New Testament. Because of this, both camps view Jesus' teachings as incompatible with earthly politics. This leads the pacifist camp to tend toward withdrawal or a permanent stand against all nation-state politics; it leads the Niebuhrians to deny Jesus any role in politics. Just war politics insists against both camps that Jesus is important to just war doctrine because he who has redeemed the nations makes charitable soldiering possible by his death and resurrection. The love commands, for instance, do not merely prohibit acts of personal vengeance, but, as Calvin suggests, demand the use of force for the protection of our neighbors.

Ms. DuPree is entirely correct to point out that not every Church Father viewed war the way that Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius, Ambrose, and Augustine did. I could easily reply that the list I give is enough to show that the bulk of the tradition, as well as the most important Western Father, represent a unified view of warfare that became the orthodox view. This orthodox view is upheld and greatly expanded upon by Aquinas, arguably the greatest philosopher/theologian in the medieval West, and is co-opted to a very large degree by Reformers such as Calvin who were known to be hostile to Aquinas in many other areas. Luther, of course, wanted to go back to Augustine, but much of what he says in "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved" is also perfectly compatible with Aquinas' view. The orthodox view remained inviolate until Enlightenment assumptions began to corrupt it.

But I do not wish to leave it at that. First of all, Ms. DuPree's examples of the Canons of Hippolytus and Basil are not as clear-cut as she assumes. The Canons of Hippolytus warn the Christian that if he sheds blood, then he should "stay away from the mysteries at least until he has been purified through tears and lamentation. He should fulfill his obligation without deceit and fear of God" (Canon XIV). Basil writes: "Our predecessors did not consider killing in war as murder but, as I understand it, made allowances for those who fought on the side of moderation and piety. Nonetheless, it is good to admonish those whose hands are unclean to abstain just from communion for three years" (*Letter* 188.13).

Hippolytus represents a strain of early Christian thinking that bloodshed is intrinsically wrong, but not so wrong that it is forbidden absolutely. Thus, we do not have here the sort of pacifism we find in the Radical Reformers and their modern heirs. If one kills, one must only forgo the "mysteries" until "purified." Exactly what counts as being "purified" and how long it takes to be "purified" is not specified. Basil is more specific, demanding that those with "unclean hands" abstain from communion for three years. This does not amount to excommunication nor is the penance to last more than three years. Nevertheless, it is not so clear what constitutes "unclean hands" for Basil. He does not say expressly that all bloodshed needs penance, which might indicate that those who need penance—those whose hands are "unclean"—are those who do not fight "on the side of moderation and piety." Such a view certainly accords with Basil's declaration elsewhere

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that he had "become acquainted with a man who demonstrates that it is possible even in the military profession to maintain perfect love for God and that a Christian ought to be characterized not by the clothes he wears but by the disposition of his soul" (*Letter* 106).

The early Christian debate on this subject has a medieval parallel. Alain of Lille, for example, cited a canon that enjoined penance for killing even on command of princely authority, but Hugh of Saint Cher argued that soldiers could exercise their office without sin when they did so with right intention and out of necessity. For Hugh of Saint Cher, only those who killed for vainglory or other vicious desires were guilty of sin. He represents the overwhelming majority of medieval theologians who followed Augustine and Aquinas in maintaining that there is nothing inherently wrong with using force.

Music and the Soul

If it is not inappropriate for someone criticized in a book to review it, perhaps it is not inappropriate for the book's editor to respond.

Michael Linton disagrees with Carson Holloway's argument in *All Shook Up: Music, Passion, and Politics* that music has a natural power to move the soul (October 2001). To illustrate, Professor Linton draws an analogy to fire, observing, correctly, that music does not act on the person "inevitably," "predictably," and "regardless of circumstances" as fire does, and concluding that music does not have the power that Holloway asserts.

Yet consider that there are many who smoke heavily, but never contract lung cancer; and there are health nuts who die of lung cancer nonetheless. To borrow Prof. Linton's words, "the effect is not universal," yet I doubt anyone would commend inhaling cigarette smoke as a healthy activity. On the contrary, most, including many smokers, discourage it.

Prof. Linton errs in demanding to be shown the empirically verifiable link between bad music and moral corruption. We are dealing with the soul, and no such link exists. Those who will be satisfied only with a material demonstration are unwilling, or perhaps unable, to credit the formal argument that Holloway presents. But they have adopted, without warrant, a fundamentally mechanistic view of the subject, thus narrowing the inquiry in a way that settles the argument in their favor from the start. Music cannot have natural power in the way that Prof. Linton understands the term, but his understanding is incomplete.

It is not a question of material causality, but of necessary potentiality. The human lung is capable of being corroded by cigarette smoke, though in any particular case it may not be, at least not enough to undermine or even perceptibly damage the health of the body as a whole. Likewise, the human soul is capable of being affected by music, though the effect may be mitigated or counteracted by other influences or by the qualities of a particular soul.

Holloway nowhere attempts, as Prof. Linton implies (and appears to believe the argument requires), to isolate music as the determinative influence on the person. Holloway argues that we are unavoidably influenced by the music we listen to, and therefore our choice of music is not a matter of moral indifference. Holloway would no doubt agree with Prof. Linton that "there is no piece of music that will itself cause any person to choose virtue over vice." But this observation is trivial, and to conclude from it that "the emperor has no clothes" is a non sequitur.

Mitchell Muncy
Editor-in-Chief
Spence Publishing Company
Dallas, Texas

Michael Linton's review of *All Shook Up: Music, Passion, and Politics* by Carson Holloway has all the intelligence and grace of a John Cage performance in which the "artist" hoists a piano to the fly-in zone above the stage then lets the instrument fall and smash to a pile of rubble on the floor.

Holloway has carefully laid out the argument that enculturation in good music during the formative years is conducive to the development of rational thinking and moral character, while music that excites the emotions and stimulates the libido is likely to encourage the kind of behavior associated with rock stars. This idea is intuitively obvious and it has as much history as plausibility, but Professor Linton doesn't seem to grasp even the rudiments of Holloway's analysis of the historical sources. Plato is, of course, the original exponent of this idea, but Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Nietzsche have dealt extensively with the issue of art and public morality.

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Prof. Linton says that he has changed his mind several times on elements of Plato's thought. His present opinion is that the philosopher was merely a "social conservative" and "nativist reactionary" with prejudice against new or foreign music (Socrates, a social conservative!). After about three paragraphs of avoiding any engagement with Holloway's research or his sources, Prof. Linton produces the argument that for music to have any "natural power" to influence character development, its effect must be as inevitable and pronounced as the effect of holding one's hand to a flame. This tone-deaf reasoning is as about as helpful as the idea that since immoral behavior does not immediately and consistently lead to pain and suffering there can be no moral law. Of course, many people are now arguing just that, but even Hollywood types seem to have responded to recent events with recognition that some acts are evil.

The question of causality as opposed to influence is probably legitimate. But Prof. Linton doesn't seem to think there is any way music can have one sort of influence as opposed to any other. He allows that the opening chorus of the *St. Matthew Passion* may convey profound grief to some listeners, but since some "might be simply bored" there is no meaning in the music.

This is familiar stuff. It is akin to the argument that all readings of literary texts are interpretations. One might think Prof. Linton has skimmed over the history of music as casually as he has skimmed Holloway's book. Having shown his limited ability to deal with philosophy, he resorts to ethnomusicology and psychology. From research in these fields he relates only conclusions, so we have no way of evaluating, for example, whether Gilbert Rouget—"one of France's leading ethnomusicologists"—is saying anything important in the contention that religious trance is induced when "the communicant has made a decision to enter into a trance."

Prof. Linton's point is that whatever leads to this altered state, it is not music. Well, okay, but weren't we talking about rational thinking and character formation? The psychological research is a bit more interesting. According to Prof. Linton, "the American Medical Association in 1989 published an advisory to physicians suggesting that they question their adolescent patients' music preferences as an early sign of possible social dysfunction." This "speculation," Prof. Linton suggests, was refuted in 1993. But the study he cites "found that youth who were already prone to hyper-sexuality and manipulative and amoral behavior, and who had low parental supervision, found heavy metal music congenial to their psychological condition." This configuration of character traits and musical preferences tends rather in favor of Holloway's thesis, but Prof. Linton concludes that "the music did not have the power to affect the youth's behavior, but it did give youth a vehicle for self-expression."

This is eerily reminiscent of assurances of the negligible effects of media violence and games simulating combat on adolescent behavior. Prof. Linton has previously made the argument in FIRST THINGS that you can't stop a riot by playing Mozart to a mob. This, of course, is only a straw man set up to ridicule the idea he is trying to refute. Holloway points out that no one has ever seriously maintained that music is the antidote to poisonous anarchy of the sort well underway in popular culture. That it could be one civilizing element in a conscientiously applied program of enduring cultural values and intelligent professorial care is the contention.

The last thread resembling an argument in Prof. Linton's review is the observation that since Holloway doesn't identify the musical repertoire that is supposed to have beneficial effects, there can be no case for good music as opposed to any other music in character formation. Iconoclasts cannot abide the idea that history and tradition preserve things of great value. Admittedly, the connection between aesthetic value and rational thinking and morality is not ironclad. But the fanatics who smashed treasures of Grecian art couldn't comprehend that there are transcendent norms by reference to which such things are created. When discovered and preserved in any culture, these ideals become part of the inheritance of the human race. The study required to understand and appreciate such things is surely conducive to rational thinking. And art can become a kind of surrogate spirituality because great art verges on transcendence.

Michael Dodaro
Seattle, Washington

Michael Linton's review of Carson Holloway's *All Shook Up* seems to validate Holloway's claim that Linton misunderstands Plato. Professor Linton takes Holloway to task on the issue that "music has a natural power to move the soul." He uses the example of fire burning to underscore what is and is not a natural effect. Thus the understanding of nature Prof. Linton uses is taken from physics: fire burns. Since one cannot apply the same cause-effect relationship to music and character, the claim that music has a natural power cannot be supported. Nonsense. This only shows how much Prof. Linton is stuck using a Newtonian and Baconian view of nature that understands "natural power" merely in terms of causality. Using that view, the argument for music's power is destined to fail—as is most argument concerning human social relations and behavior—since detecting and proving causality is virtually impossible, as David Hume and others have argued. Thus Prof. Linton's line of criticism is a straw-man argument.

Holloway's view of nature, following Plato and Aristotle, suggests that the relation between nature and hu-

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man action is not a causal relation but one of predisposition and condition. One needs only to look at studies on alcoholism to see a similar view of nature being used to examine the human condition. Nature predisposes certain people to be unable to deal with alcohol and this inability leads some to become alcoholics when they engage in behavior that reinforces that predisposition. I think Holloway, along with Plato and Aristotle, is suggesting the same about music and good character.

As to the larger charge that Holloway does not suggest what music we should listen to, that is itself not the issue. The type of music one would champion would depend upon what type of regime one was trying to produce, and what set of values (or understanding of justice) one sought to defend. Holloway's book should be primarily understood as a history of political thought that attempts to show us how some of the great thinkers of the Western tradition held music to play a very important role in the shaping of human character and thus the shaping of human political life. It seems that Prof. Linton was seeking to review another type of book, one that set forth a particular form of music education supporting a certain set of values that would produce certain traits of character in the listener. No one—not Holloway, not Plato, not Aristotle, not Rousseau, not Nietzsche—has argued for the position Prof. Linton criticizes. Clearly, he has misunderstood.

Clifford Angell Bates, Jr.
American Studies Center
Warsaw University
Warsaw, Poland

Carson Holloway and his book *All Shook Up* deserve better than Michael Linton's review. Professor Linton begins with demeaning praise for the book's "jazzy cover and hip title" and ends with an insulting dismissal of the book as "one more performance of an ancient fashion show for an emperor with no clothes." There's irony in that ending, however, because Holloway is one of the few (like the little boy in the story) whose voice goes contrary to the popular belief (or wish) that music has no power to shape the character of individuals and societies. Prof. Linton, on the other hand, is the one who here seems to be joining the crowd that shrugs off music's power by saying in effect, "What's all the fuss? It's only a song."

I doubt that Prof. Linton really means to say that. At the heart of his review is the question, "Does music indeed have a natural power to move the soul?" From reading the review one would conclude that his answer is an unequivocal "no," and that Holloway's answer is an unequivocal "yes." But the difference is not as stark as the review suggests. In an earlier piece in FIRST THINGS, Prof. Linton wrote that "while music may prod, and it may suggest, it cannot force." But prodding and suggesting can be powerful even if they are not irresistibly powerful. So it would seem that he admits at least to some power in music.

What about Holloway? Although his answer is clearly "yes," it is not as unnuanced as Linton's review suggests. What leads the reader to think that Holloway's answer is without nuance is the example—fire applied to the human hand—that Prof. Linton uses to explain "what we mean when we speak of a 'natural power.'"

But "natural" is a slippery word and what Prof. Linton's example suggests "we" mean by "natural power" is not what Holloway means nor what the ancients he follows meant. "Their emphasis," he says, "is on the impact that music has on character, and thereby on behavior, through its influence over time on the souls of the young, who are impressionable." Holloway repeatedly makes clear that music's "natural" power is not like a flame burning a hand but like water dripping on a stone—over time continual dripping will shape the stone. And like the ancients, he is most concerned about the effect of music on the young. It is the continual "dripping" of music on the soft, impressionable "stone" of youth that most concerned the ancients and now concerns Holloway. And if that ancient concern has any foundation, we have all the more reason for concern because the music in our society that is most characterized by violence, vulgarity, and lack of self-control is the music that is mainly aimed at the young. If continual dripping of music shapes character, how much more powerfully will the fire hose force of electronic media do the job?

Carson Holloway has not said the last word in this centuries-long conversation. No one ever will. But *All Shook Up* is a worthy contribution to the conversation and deserves to be taken seriously. We dismiss voices like Holloway's from the conversation to our detriment.

Calvin Stapert
Department of Music
Calvin College
Grand Rapids, Michigan

Michael Linton replies:

Golly, I can't remember the last time a book review in this journal provoked so many letters of protest. But I'm not surprised. As every pastor knows, music sparks more heated reaction than almost any other topic. Preach whatever you want, but select the hymns—and set their tempos—with fear and trembling! Obviously the issues raised by my critics deserve a more nuanced response than space allows here, but I'll try to address some of the most prominent complaints.

Plato, at least in the *Republic*, is absolutely clear when he argues that boys who combine gymnastics with listening to melodies where the final (the beginning pitch of a modal scale) is approached by tone, quartertone, quartertone, and major third will develop fortitude and endurance, while boys listening to

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melodies where the final is approached by quartertone, major third, minor second, and quartertone will develop into drunkards and sluggards. Contrary to Clifford Angell Bates, Jr., the whole point of this passage is precisely to outline an education that will "produce virtue of character in the listener." Although Plato does not say that the development of these characteristics under those circumstances is inevitable, i. e. mechanistic, he does come close (and so—see p. 162—does Holloway). I say that's nuts.

I say that's nuts because I've never seen a shred of evidence of it. I have spent my whole life with musicians and I haven't seen that people who spend a lot of time with what our culture traditionally describes as its finest music are any more prone to virtue than people who don't. Let me be brutally specific. I have never known one time in my life when music alone—nonlinguistic sounds ordered for an aesthetic purpose—has ever disposed me toward generosity when I wanted to be stingy, humility when I wanted to be arrogant, chastity when I wanted to be promiscuous, or life itself when I was on the brink of the darkest despair. To everyone who, like Calvin Stapert, believes that music does have a power to "shape the character of individuals and societies," I beg them to play for me the chord progression that will make me be a better person. Indeed, since Professor Holloway believes that the "educational use of the right kind of music" is a significant component in the "cure for our pathologies of the soul," I insist that he has a moral duty to give us the tunes that will save us. But he doesn't.

Mitchell Muncy believes that I shouldn't have to be shown evidence of an empirically verifiable link between music and morals. The influence of music, he says, is "unavoidable." I guess we're at an impasse. I want to know just what the moral fallout of a B flat instead of a B natural will be, what is its "unavoidable" influence, and how I can figure it out. Just as I think that it is reasonable to suggest that the usefulness of a teaching method should be evaluated by testing to see if the students actually learned what the pedagogy sought to teach, I think that the moral influence of music should be verifiable. I think Mr. Muncy suggests that there's no test for that and I shouldn't be worried about it.

Mr. Muncy seems to reject the theological concept of adiaphoria—the existence of things of indifference. I think that adiaphoria is very helpful when dealing with a number of things (including music), but this disagreement has been going on for a while and I don't think we're about to settle it here. He also suggests that I have a fundamentally mechanistic view of the subject. Well, of course. I deal with real music—notes, rhythms, instrumentations, dynamics, sopranos who can't sing in tune and bassoonists who are late to rehearsals. My musical world is not made up of essays by philosophers who posit make-believe repertories off which they bounce ideas for other philosophers to talk about.

Michael Dodaro and I have profoundly different views and I'll leave it at that. But he compares my essay to a piece by John Cage. I'm flattered by the comparison, since I hope that someday I might generally be as kind, generous, humble, and sweet-tempered as Cage was known to be daily. So far I'm not.

I'm disappointed that Prof. Stapert believes "jazzy" to be a pejorative. It isn't and I didn't intend it to be. The book jacket of *All Shook Up* is unusually attractive and was undoubtedly a costly investment for the publisher. I really like it. And about "hip." How else can you describe a title that intentionally conjures up memories of Elvis gyrating at his prime?

A final word. Prof. Holloway concludes his book with the comment that "the solution to our musical and moral difficulties, as we have suggested, is at hand: the musical political philosophy of the ancients that, by enthroning reason in the soul, harmonized the whole soul and provides for its truest happiness." Sorry, I don't buy it. I think that the solution to our difficulties is found in places like Amos and Hosea and Philippians and not in any tune or repertory of tunes.

Catholic Evangelicals?

James Nuechterlein chides me for excessive evangelical self-criticism in my review of Mark Noll's recent book *American Evangelical Christianity* ("Evangelical and Catholic Together?" October 2001). I confess that we academics are indeed prone to the more-sinful-than-thou syndrome. We often find perverse pleasure in the failings of our own ilk. But if Mr. Nuechterlein had daily encounters with evangelicals, as I do, he might be less enthusiastic about our often (though not always) privatized, individualistic, and nonecclesial kind of Christianity. That he fails to mention my protest against Billy Graham's three baptisms is revealing. Neither do many of my fellow evangelicals protest, since they too believe that baptism is a mere personal affirmation of faith that can be repeated as often as one desires.

Mr. Nuechterlein also complains that I want an impossibly pure evangelicalism. He fears that if we evangelicals adopt the virtues of other Christians we will lose the convincing particularity of our own witness. If he means that we should not abandon our missionary impulse, our emphasis on personal piety, our devotion to the Lordship of Jesus, our stress on upright moral living, our belief in Scripture's final authority, and our conviction that the gospel is not one among many ways to salvation, then he is surely right. But if he wants our revivalism to leave converts cut off from the Church, our decisionism to rest on sub-Christian notions of autonomy, our pietism to rob us of reverent worship, our devotion to lobot-

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omize the life of the mind, our clean living to give us contempt for those who smoke and drink, our biblicism to make us ignorant of the bi-millennial Christian tradition, and our exclusivism to convince us that Roman Catholics are not Christians, then most surely he is wrong.

To plead, as Mr. Nuechterlein does, that "all systems of thought, religious and otherwise, are partial," that they are "all package deals," and that "their distinctive strengths come together with distinctive weaknesses" is to remain content with an evangelicalism that is neither *reformata* nor *semper reformanda.* It is to be invited, alas, out of the church catholic and Catholic. It is also to despair that the Body of Christ shall ever become one, as our Lord prayed, making us evangelical and Catholic—not only together, but also at the same time.

Ralph C. Wood
University Professor of Theology
and Literature
Baylor University
Waco, Texas

James Nuechterlein replies:
Ralph Wood knows far more about the evangelical world than I do, and I readily defer to his judgment that it is in worse shape than I had thought.

The question is where we go from there. My argument was not that evangelical scholars should not be critical of their own community. All ecclesial expressions of the Christian faith are, as Professor Wood suggests, ever in need of reform, and, in the present case, I agree that evangelicals would benefit from a more catholic (and Catholic) understanding of the Christian tradition.

But I offered, and offer again, two reservations. First, if criticism of evangelicals by evangelicals is too sweeping and too severe, it will not have its desired effects. Those criticized will tend either to become defensive—and thus dismiss out of hand what the critics say—or, if they take the criticisms to heart, to become dispirited and demoralized. (As I said in my original piece, I base this argument on my own experience within Lutheranism.)

My second reservation has to do with the incapacity of any system of thought, religious or otherwise, to encompass all the virtues relevant to its situation. Authentic Christian piety can manifest itself in a variety of ways, some of them incommensurable with others. Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants of various stripes all have a variety of things they can learn from and teach to each other in theology, liturgy, and ecclesiology. Some of their virtues (and vices) will overlap. But what none of them can do is maximize all the Christian virtues all at once. Trade-offs are as inevitable in Christian thought and practice as they are anywhere else in life. Systems of faith and piety are indeed package deals in which distinctive strengths are the flip side of distinctive weaknesses.

In that sense, I cannot agree with Prof. Wood's conclusion that his community of faith can be fully evangelical and Catholic "at the same time." What it can do, and what I commend Prof. Wood in doing, is work to shape its particular Christian "package" in as faithful and comprehensive a manner as possible.

Pet Rocks and Petitionary Prayer

Philip Zaleski claims that most objections to *The Prayer of Jabez* take one of four basic forms ("In Defense of Jabez," October 2001). Mine provides yet a fifth. But it is not so much the book as the phenomenon that puzzles, more than offends, me. Why is it a phenomenon at all? Did the Church Fathers overlook the prayer of Jabez because it is a less than conspicuous prayer, in the sense that it is an echo of nearly every prayer in the Bible (Hannah's, plenty of the Psalms, including the 23rd, even the Lord's Prayer), indeed, nearly every prayer ever prayed?

After I read the book (it was given to me by someone who said, "You've never heard of it? Everyone's reading it!") I thought, "Certainly not a bad book, but why all the fuss?" Assuming that most of those who buy *Jabez* are Christians, many of them Bible-readers of long standing, one is inclined to ask, "Why do they require to be instructed thus? Don't they know this already? Are they not, these days, eminently aware that 'God really does have unclaimed blessings waiting'?"

Is the answer that people buy *Jabez*, and its audio tapes and gift items and spin-off books, for the same reason they buy the Left Behind books—which is the same reason they buy pet rocks? I am not talking about the relative value of *Jabez* and Left Behind, or *Jabez* and pet rocks, only about consumer psychology. And is God about to answer my decades-old prayer that He enlarge my territory because I have finally read a best-seller?

Then, in the same issue of FIRST THINGS, I learn that those who buy New Age books are mostly professing Christians and that the *Evangelical Studies Bulletin* has determined that Tim LaHaye was the most influential evangelical Protestant of the last quarter century. Mercy! Yep, Christians, like everyone else, are influenced in a lot of ways, for a lot of reasons—some of them very mysterious indeed.

Richard A. Riesen
Monrovia, California

"In Defense of Jabez" was appreciated since it carefully distinguished between "sin against style, not against God" and pointed out the condescension evidenced in much of what the "cultured despisers" had to say. And it is a fact that many in the Church have lost their ability to appreciate and utilize "petitionary prayer," avoiding it like the gnesio-Christian might avoid good works. If Philip Zaleski had also included Bruce Wilkinson's follow-up book, *Secrets of the Vine*, in his review, perhaps he would have moderated even his "only serious objection," namely, that

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blessings are "not won without suffering and sacrifice." As one might guess, this is the whole thrust of a meditation based on John 15 and the parable of the vine and the branches.

(The Rev.) Theodore Jungkuntz
St. Luke Lutheran Church
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Good News?

Along with Douglas Kmiec, I welcome the Supreme Court's decision in *Good News Club v. Milford Central School* holding that a Bible club has the same right as other youth organizations, such as Scouts or 4-H, to meet in a public school building following the regular school day ("Good News from the Court," October 2001). But Professor Kmiec overreads *Good News* in claiming that a Court majority has now validated direct funding for the social service activities of faith-based organizations without any restrictions on prayer, preaching, or proselytizing within the government-funded program.

The Court only recently (June 2000) revisited this precise issue in *Mitchell v. Helms*, a case that Prof. Kmiec cites. But he neglects to remind the reader that *Mitchell* decided (5-4) the question of direct-funding-of-proselytizing in the negative. Handed down a year later almost to the day, *Good News* hardly overruled *Mitchell*. So, with respect to this question, it must be asked how the two cases must have differed in the minds of the Justices.

Good News was about the government using its resources to expand the available space that is open for the expression of ideas by private citizens. But the viewpoints these citizens express remain their own, not those of the government. The distinction between government speech and that of private citizens is crucial, for the no-establishment text is a restraint on government, not a restraint on its citizens. It is for this reason that prayer and worship led by public school teachers are prohibited by the no-establishment principle, whereas students, within their Bible clubs, may engage in both of these activities at school.

Government programs of aid, whether for education, social services, or healthcare, do not have as their object creating public forums to expand the speech of private citizens. Rather, President Bush's Faith-Based Initiative ("charitable choice"), for example, is about the government using its resources to expand the available services to the poor and needy in accord with the government's welfare policies. Because these policies are formulated by and remain in the firm control of the government (not all "views" will be funded), the restraints of no-establishment are applicable and, said five of the Justices, prohibit the diversion of tax funds to proselytize. For now, *Mitchell* controls "charitable choice," not *Good News*.

We can hope for a day when the four-judge plurality in *Mitchell* is embraced by a Court majority. But, Prof. Kmiec's wishful thinking notwithstanding, that day was not ushered in with the *Good News* of June last year.

Carl H. Esbeck
Oakton, Virginia

Douglas Kmiec replies:

It is good to have Professor Carl Esbeck on the side of faith-based organizations [FBOs]. I have long admired his judgment and clarity of expression in matters of law and religion. Unfortunately, in this instance, I believe he misunderstands the good news of the *Good News* decision. It certainly is not, as he and I both agree, a constitutional invitation to offer government-sponsored religious activity. Government neither can nor should directly fund proselytization or sectarian worship. Rather, the happy tidings in *Good News*—which adds to the plurality's welcome principle of nondiscrimination against religious entities in *Mitchell*—is the implicit recognition by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor that a government-provided benefit—be it computers, a public school classroom, or money—need not be immunized by the *recipient's* expression of religious belief.

In *Mitchell*, Justice O'Connor did not join the plurality opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas because nondiscrimination of allocation of government resources was not sufficient to satisfy her carefully stated factual concerns about government funding being misperceived by hypothetical observers as impermissible endorsement of particular faith choices. But—and here is the point that seems to be eluding those misdirecting President Bush to pursue the direct funding of FBOs rather than their indirect funding through tax credits reflective of the *private* faith choices of individual citizens—Justice O'Connor stated in *Mitchell* that her concern about the diversion of public resources to a religious purpose is largely ameliorated if a private decision intervenes.

As Justices O'Connor and Stephen Breyer wrote in their *Mitchell* concurrence, "When government aid supports a school's religious mission only because of independent decisions made by numerous individuals to guide their secular aid to that school, 'no reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts . . . an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief.'" This point was implicitly reaffirmed by Justice O'Connor joining Justice Thomas to form a majority in *Good News* when the public school classroom was used explicitly for wholly religious purposes, but only after parents approved—in advance—of their children participating in the Christian Bible Club.

My point in the FIRST THINGS essay is much the same: if private citizens are directing the support to FBOs in exchange for a tax benefit, the FBOs have complete freedom to employ faith as the necessary motivation to transcend addictive behavior and the like. If FBOs get their monies directly from the government that freedom becomes more tenuous, and the en-

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tire point of the governmental exercise in involving faith communities far less patent. Justice Thomas and his plurality would sustain the freedom of FBOs to use faith in conjunction with public resources based on neutral allocations derivatively reflective of private choices (e.g., more monies would presumably go to the FBOs that were more successful and heavily used).

Justice O'Connor would likely require more, but her views in *Mitchell* and her joining of the majority in *Good News* suggest that the "more" required is not impossible. It is not wishful thinking to imagine that Congress can accommodate her constitutional concerns by reformulating the FBO idea to be premised upon private choice. Private choices will reflect the faiths of their donors, and a sincerely expressed, personally involved private faith commitment is presumably what motivates and yields the hoped-for recovery of those in need of social service assistance.

Of course, I could be mistaken about the whole point of FBOs. I thought they were built upon federalism and the related principle of subsidiarity that one should never arrogate decisions to a higher level than necessary. Apparently, however, Prof. Esbeck's conception is different. He envisions the initiative being about "the government using its resources to expand [social services] *in accord with the government's welfare policies*"—policies, he says, "that will [be] formulated by and remain in the firm control of the government." This sounds more like the Great Society than Charitable Choice.

Ukraine's Catholics

In his "Letter from Ukraine" (October 2001), Father Andriy Chirovsky insists on a new name for his ecclesiastical entity—"Catholic Church of Kyiv"—instead of the more familiar appellation of "Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church," which he deems "ethnic and therefore less proper."

Fr. Chirovsky conveniently omits from his essay two salient demographic facts: his "Catholic Church of Kyiv" comprises a minority of only five million (compared to some thirty-five million Orthodox Christians in Ukraine) concentrated in western Ukraine far from the national capital of Kyiv. Fr. Chirovsky's odd reconstruction of his breakaway church is further compounded by his deconstruction of its checkered history. He whitewashes the profound collaboration of many Ukrainian Catholics with the German Nazis after June 1941 by suggesting that the former were merely "confused" after years of Bolshevik oppression. He sanitizes the complex political Anschluss of the Union of 1596, when the Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy opted for the unia—and seats in the Polish parliament. The essay also reeks of blatant hostility towards Moscow and all things Russian.

It is truly ironic that this attempt at ecclesiastical legerdemain appears in an issue of FIRST THINGS in which Fr. Richard John Neuhaus properly raises his theological eyebrow at the Mormons' latest effort to pass themselves off as a mainstream Christian community. The Mormons would have us refer to them simply as the "Church of Jesus Christ" without the historic suffix of "Latter-day Saints." The Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, Russia, and throughout the world will never accept the Byzantine Catholic communities under any name as genuine Eastern churches with any claim to historical, canonical, or spiritual legitimacy.

That Fr. Chirovsky could present such a disappointing polemic will only fan the fires of suspicion of Rome that still burn brightly in many quarters of the Orthodox Church. That means more work ahead for those of us who seek rapprochement with the West.

(The Rev.) Alexander F. C. Webster
St. Mary Orthodox Church
Falls Church, Virginia

Andriy Chirovsky replies:

Father Webster's attack is sad. Yes, there are far more Orthodox than Catholics in Ukraine. There are even more unchurched. Greco-Catholics are indeed concentrated in Western Ukraine, as Fr. Webster points out, but he omits the fact that they are present today again throughout Ukraine. They are more numerous in Western Ukraine simply because that part of Ukraine was under Russian rule only since World War II. In other parts of Ukraine, when the Russians took control over the centuries, they soon destroyed the "uniate" Church.

As for hostility towards all things Russian, let me say this. In 1988 His Beatitude Myroslav Ivan Cardinal Lubachivsky, Primate of the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church (a name for my church that I like to avoid because it might *seem* to advance ethnic or nationalist identities over the more legitimate emphasis on the ecclesiastical see—Kyiv—to which it ties all of its history), wrote to Patriarch Pimen of Moscow, asking for mutual forgiveness between the two churches and between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples. Many Ukrainians have said they had nothing for which to repent after centuries of oppression and genocide by Russian overlords, but His Beatitude declared that we Ukrainians *do* have a sin. We have hated the Russians for what they have done to us over the centuries and we need to repent for that sin. I agree with him. Sadly, this profound gesture was met with an icy silence from Moscow.

The desperate attempt to somehow tie the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church to the Nazis is born of Soviet historiography. The Greco-Catholic Church stood firm against both atheistic regimes, Nazi and Bolshevik. (Read Andrii Krawchuk, *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine: The Legacy of Andrei Sheptytsky* [1997].)

Fr. Webster's analogy between Mormonism and the Eastern Catholic Churches is simply bizarre. Many

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Christians cannot understand the apoplexy of some Orthodox at the mere mention of Eastern Catholics. Fr. Webster speaks so univocally for all of Orthodoxy in his rejection of Eastern Catholics. How different he sounds from Bishop Kallistos (Ware) of Oxford University, or other moderate Orthodox.

The Church of Kyiv chose union with Rome through a canonical synod in 1596. (Read B. Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform* [1998].) It does not claim to be the exclusive heir of the baptism of Kyivan Rus' in 988, but rather seeks to reestablish full communion with worldwide Orthodoxy. It does not believe that breaking its cherished unity with Rome is the way to achieve that goal. Why is it that Fr. Webster and some others who consider themselves ecumenists insist that ecumenical rapprochement between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches must be preceded by the destruction or at least the discrediting of the Eastern Catholic Churches? I certainly do not deny the Orthodox Churches—even those in the thrall of the KGB—all "historical, canonical, and spiritual legitimacy," as Fr. Webster does for my church. I hope that we can recognize each other for the close relatives we really are, estranged by history.

The gospel puts some great demands on all of us. We all have a long way to go.

Learning from *Wilder*

As the author of *The Lost Children of* Wilder*: The Epic Struggle to Change Foster Care*, I reacted to Richard John Neuhaus' glowing three-page account of my book a little like a mother who gradually realizes that the person embracing her baby is doing his best to smother it ("What We Learned from *Wilder*," June/July 2001).

Father Neuhaus praises the book as "beautifully told," "assiduously researched," "refreshingly candid," and highly pertinent to the debates generated by President Bush's proposal for freer government financing of "faith-based" social services.

But his ideological grip proceeds to extinguish all the uncomfortable truths that are at the book's core. These include the fact that for decades the tax-supported "faith-based" foster care system of New York City discarded and damaged children like Shirley Wilder because they were of the wrong color or the wrong religion, and kept many others in damaging institutions—not just government institutions, but religious ones that often served ethnic pride and political power better than they served children. As my book makes clear, the *Wilder* lawsuit challenged this entrenched injustice and the real suffering it caused.

What happened to the lawsuit, and to Shirley Wilder's son and grandson, is indeed "a complex and fascinating story." What a shame that to advance his own views Fr. Neuhaus eliminated any hint of its living, breathing contradictions.

Nina Bernstein
New York, New York

RJN replies:
It is certainly true that I highlighted those aspects of the book that seemed to be of greatest interest. Some might call that my "ideological grip." I call it discernment. It is also true that some of the religious institutions challenged by *Wilder* were less than adequate (foster care is, by definition, inadequate), and others were horrible. Ethnic pride and political power played a part, as did self-sacrificing devotion to children in need, a factor acknowledged, but not adequately acknowledged, in Ms. Bernstein's book. Among "the uncomfortable truths that are at the book's core" is the militantly secularist and antireligious motivation of the lawyers behind *Wilder*. The book is "refreshingly candid" about that, and it is a factor powerfully pertinent to the debate over "faith-based" social services. Ms. Bernstein should not be upset that people draw from her book lessons other than those she intended. Books, like babies, finally go out into the world and take on a life of their own. She should be glad to know that her baby, far from being smothered, is alive and well and making a valuable contribution to one of the great public policy debates of our time.

The One True Church?

Regarding Richard John Neuhaus' comments in "While We're At It" (October 2001) concerning the efforts of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to encourage the use of its full name, and discourage the use of the name "Mormons": The purpose of all this is to counter the efforts of those, mainly evangelical Protestants, who try to brand us a "pseudo-Christian cult." It is not to try to fit into what Father Neuhaus calls the "mainstream." It is our witness to the world that this is the only true and living church on the face of the earth. There is no other church that teaches all the same things we do, so if these our unique doctrines are true, then, logically, that would have to make us the only true church, wouldn't it?

Gordon Cummings
Granada, California

RJN replies:
If.

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THIS TIME

Hard Thoughts in Wartime

James Nuechterlein

November 21, 2001. As of this date, the American war against terrorism is going better than almost anyone expected. It's far too early to claim victory, of course. Indeed, given the breathtaking ambition of the Bush Administration's aims—to eliminate the threat of all terrorist groups with "global reach"—it will necessarily be a very long time, if ever, before such victory can definitively be proclaimed.

But early signs are good, and the instant doomsayers have already been made to look bad. The analogies with Vietnam, the invocations of "quagmire," appear, at best, premature. And those who claimed to find no distinction between the terrorists' destruction of the World Trade Center and the American bombing of Afghanistan have been widely dismissed as the moral idiots they are.

What is striking, in fact, is the near unanimity to date of popular support for the war effort. The neo-pacifist left has been effectively marginalized: the American people are ready, it seems, to give war a chance. (The mainstream church groups have predictably stood outside the consensus. For example, the response to September 11 of the *Lutheran*, the organ of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America—the denomination with which I am in nominal and increasingly embarrassed communion—waffled feebly, regretting the terrible cruelty of the terrorist attacks but suggesting nonetheless that the use of force on America's part must be abjured. That reaction runs contrary to traditional Lutheran teaching, which has never insisted on nonviolence and has always supported the doctrine of just war.)

I do not mean to be glib. There is a long and honorable—if, in my view, misguided—tradition of pacifist thought among Christians and non-Christians alike. And not all arguments against a strong American response depend on pacifist principles. Those who insist that concerted action against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups will produce a new generation of Islamic "martyrs" cannot simply be dismissed out of hand. Tertullian's observation that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church may well be relevant also to Islam. Indeed, in the short run at least, it is more likely so than not—especially in light of the seventy-two black-eyed virgins presumably awaiting the martyred Islamic faithful in paradise. (Though one detects a sexist note here. According to an account from an Islamic source reported by the invaluable Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), female martyrs get only to choose the best from among the husbands they may have had prior to martyrdom.) In this perspective, the injunction that America must "break the cycle of violence" seems not as feckless as it appears at first glance.

But the argument for restraint, while plausible, is not finally persuasive. Radical Islam will produce new generations of martyrs regardless of the nature of the American response to September 11. Those who hate the West in general and America in particular need no fresh incentives to keep their hatred alive. It is implacable and ineradicable—nothing we do or do not do can "capture their hearts and minds," to revive a phrase from the Vietnam War era. Those hearts and minds are forever closed to us, despite the exhortations to the contrary of those who speak blithely of eliminating the "root causes" of terrorism. (One enters here the obligatory disclaimer: we are speaking of radical Islam, or Islamism, not of the Muslim world in general.)

Then, too, the empirical question as to what in fact deters terrorists has not been definitively answered. It may be the case, in the pungent if inelegant motto of the Vietnam War hawks, that "if you've got them by the short hairs, their minds and hearts will follow." A stringent discipline unblinkingly administered to the Taliban and its supporters can go a long way toward diminishing the allure of anticipated paradisial joys for would-be martyrs. Much of radical Islam's contempt for the West stems from our presumed softness and decadence. Incontrovertible military evidence to the contrary may induce a greater respect, if not affection, for the Great Satan.

In any case, it is simple justice that requires American retaliation. It requires an extraordinary lapse from reality to say, yes, the guilty must be punished, but no, we must not employ violence. Those who speak of bringing the perpetrators of September 11 before a court of law (preferably international) tend to go vague in specifying how that "bringing" will be accomplished (the United Nations?). The United States has been viciously attacked, and it owes it to the victims to make, within the limits imposed by the rules of just war, an appropriately harsh response. There is nothing in the Judeo-Christian tradition, properly understood, that need inhibit such a response.

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This will demand a severity of will that does not come easily to Americans. As in so much else, we would do well to follow the example of Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln felt, with an extraordinary intensity of compassion, the suffering of the victims, military and civilian, on both sides of the Civil War. But he never for a moment let his sympathy get in the way of his duty—which is to say that he knew the difference between sympathy and a sentimental retreat from the exigencies of war that, however understandable, would be finally self-indulgent. If war must be prosecuted, he understood, it must be prosecuted with the singleness of purpose necessary to its successful conclusion. He directed his generals to do what victory required, and it required terrible things. In a once celebrated but now largely forgotten novel of World War II, Nicholas Montserrat's *The Cruel Sea*, the naval captain protagonist, faced with an intolerable moral situation too complicated to recount here, finally concludes, "One does what one must, and says one's prayers."

That "does what one must" is morally problematic, of course. Leaders in wartime often resort to notions of necessity to cover decisions whose morality may well be open to challenge. One thinks, for example, of Harry Truman ordering the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The reference above to "the limits imposed by the rules of just war" must always be kept in mind by our leaders. One hopes that George Bush will never face anything like the awful choice that confronted President Truman. But war really is hell, and rules, however necessary, do not entirely suffice. It is difficult to imagine that any leader or any nation ever came out of any war with entirely clean hands.

War is a limit situation in a world burdened with the effects of original sin. It pushes us to and sometimes beyond our moral capacities. We can only do what we must, and say our prayers. FT

September 2001

We meet our griefs again when work is through
and do with words what little words can do.
A stranger weeps beside us through the night.
Beneath our pleasant sun, we never knew
the dark that hates the sky for being bright.
We thought to build a garden without rue,
to climb and, all-beloved, to reach the height.
Our sins were trifling, the false called true,
a petty disbelief in wrong and right.
For every sin we pay, but no sin drew
these hates. It is our virtue they requite.
Along the shore, the squabbling seabirds mew
at passing ships and wheel away in fright.
We meet our griefs again when work is through.
We do with words what little words can do.

J. Bottum

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Opinion

Knowledge for the Sake of Knowledge

Edward Tingley

In the unforgettable *Franny and Zooey*, J. D. Salinger's wearied heroine, recovering from some kind of spiritual crisis, mulls unhappily over her college experience.

> "It was the worst of all in class . . . " she said with decision. "That was the worst. What happened was, I got the idea in my head—and I could not get it out—that college was just one more dopey, inane place in the world dedicated to piling up treasure on earth and everything. I mean treasure is treasure, for heaven's sake. What's the difference whether the treasure is money, or property, or even culture, or even just plain knowledge? . . . Sometimes I think that knowledge—when it's knowledge for knowledge's sake, anyway—is the worst of all."

This special contempt was warranted by the idea Franny had acquired (from where?) that knowledge was supposed to be something different from mere booty—that knowledge was, in some sense, for something.

> "I don't think it would have all got me quite so down if just once in a while—just once in a while—there was at least some polite little perfunctory implication that knowledge should lead to wisdom, and that if it doesn't, it's just a disgusting waste of time! But there never is! You never even hear any hints dropped on a campus that wisdom is supposed to be the goal of knowledge. You hardly even hear the word 'wisdom' mentioned!"

Ah, *wisdom*—that antiquated little word.

If one scarcely heard the word in Franny's day, fifty years ago, one can be certain it keeps a low profile today. And is that not justified? *Is* knowledge for wisdom? It would be entirely natural for us to reply that Franny, young thing, is out of the loop in the understanding of education. She hasn't properly grasped the point of "knowledge for its own sake," *liberal* knowledge—that distinction made so clear by John Henry Newman. "Knowledge is capable of being its own end. Such is the constitution of the human mind, that any kind of knowledge, if it be really such, is its own reward." Not "for the sake of life and person," or any other end external to itself. Rather, "the pursuit of knowledge promise[s] nothing beyond knowledge itself." In a recent issue of First Things (November 2000), Peter Leithart called liberal knowledge utterly "useless": "The liberal arts are useless in the same way that the centerpiece on a dining room table is useless; . . . useless in the way that perfecting a golf swing is useless." Yale president Bartlett Giamatti put the same point this way: "If you pursue the study of anything not for the intrinsic rewards of exercising and developing the power of the mind" then you are not pursuing a liberal education.

It may be easy to overrule Franny Glass, but to do so would be to embrace the distortion of liberal learning that is demanded by a post-Enlightenment world closed to wisdom—a distortion ironically facilitated by none other than Newman himself. In the idea of "knowledge its own end" that was central to *The Idea of a University*, Newman aimed to protect wisdom from the encroachment of utility, and it has become customary for those who resist the co-option of the humanities by politics and fashion to call for a return to his ideal. But his program cannot serve as a solution. Newman was already embroiled in our troubles, and he insisted on knowledge rather than wisdom in order to escape them. In doing so, he paid no heed to the support his choice lent to a new tradition that was absolutely opposed to the heritage he meant to protect. Comparatively speaking, Newman may appear to be a defender of "that old tradition" that "began in Palestine and Greece," but in important ways he accommodated the Enlightenment order that has effectively ended that tradition.

The problem first shows itself in the rhetoric of "uselessness." There is no more devastating comeback to the demand for utility. But uselessness is also a dangerous term to employ in modern times. In fact, one can use it unproblematically only when addressing an audience whose sense of ultimate purpose is whole, rich, and vibrant. Aristotle extols a "wisdom" directed "at no end beyond itself" in a discourse conceived to clarify the nature of all "excellent" human action. Augustine explicates the specific role of a "wisdom" that is "loved for its own sake" in leading us to God, "the resting place of desire." But Newman employs the idea in

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defensive discourses framed to confront the prejudices of a new world.

The nine discourses of *The Idea of a University* deal mostly with two such prejudices: that theology has no place in a contemporary university and that what society needs is modern skills, not another institution touting the "virtues of the intellect." Newman did not challenge the modern presumption that a university is an institution for the dissemination of truths demonstrable to all—one that is incompatible with sectarian attachments—and so he was at pains to overturn the perception that "religion is not knowledge." It is only in the final discourse that he turns from the wider world to Catholic prejudice, arguing that the subject matter of a church-run university must embrace material that is "of the world" (the study of literature, history, and art indifferent to the purposes of religion). His argument was consistent: the proper business of a university is *knowledge*—knowledge of God, profitless knowledge, knowledge of man. Newman thus revealed his debt to the Enlightenment thinking that has ruled the modern university ever since its founding.

To begin with, Newman held an Enlightenment view of knowledge as something fundamentally universal. "Facts and their relations" in each region of science could yield a "universal knowledge" that may be settled (using reasoning and evidence) to the satisfaction of human beings regardless of their beliefs. "I have no intention," he explained, "of bringing into the argument the authority of the Church, or any authority at all; but I shall consider the question simply on the grounds of human reason and human wisdom."

Second, even while promoting the idea of a "circle of knowledge" in which all the sciences formed an integrated whole, Newman conceived a university with the standard Enlightenment structure—the complete "division of labor" recommended by Kant. There were only specialties; no faculty or department was empowered to articulate an overarching understanding for the university as a whole. It was certainly not the business of theology (devoted solely to "the truths we know about God put into system"), which by virtue of its narrowness Newman compared to geology. As for a possible crowning role for philosophy, Newman's "own conception" of a "sort of science" of philosophy was doomed to stillbirth. On the Enlightenment pattern, philosophy as Newman pictured it could hardly aspire to any station higher than narrow expertise in logic or analysis.

As George Marsden has suggested, Newman's claim that "religious truth is not only a portion, but a condition of general knowledge" may well have implied something more than the mere inclusion of theology among university subjects. But Newman did not elaborate it. Moreover, in its context, this passage has an entirely polemical intent; it merely turns the idea of "general knowledge" against those who wished to exclude theology from the university entirely. By Newman's day, there would be no more *summae* to order the whole of our knowledge, and that is a truly pivotal development. The task of integration was now handed to the individual—which is another way of saying that the big picture was no longer a concern of education at all.

The fact that Newman's university was not intended to assist Catholics in their Catholicism needs special underlining. "Knowledge is one thing, virtue is another. . . . Liberal education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman." Once Newman has clarified that the qualities of the gentleman "are no guarantee for sanctity or even for conscientiousness," and "may attach to the man of the world, to the profligate," the implication has become quite clear. And is this not a knowledge acceptable to the wider modern world? What, by now, is the difference between knowledge and "treasure on earth"? Paul's message in his first letter to the Corinthians (1:20-21) rings through the ages: "Where is the wise man? Where is the scholar? Where is the philosopher of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?"

As the designer of a public institution, Newman may have imagined that he was not free to fiddle with the reigning conception of knowledge. But in accepting that understanding he capitulated to the late-modern distinction between *fact* and *value*, an Enlightenment legacy. The fact/value distinction is not a dichotomy inherent in human thought. It is a distinction that was devised at a particular historical juncture. Knowledge (involving argument, demonstration, evidence) was now conceived as an antidote to *preaching* (which was understood as an appeal to evidence not universally visible to "the public," that newly heterogeneous client body of the modern university). By its strategic embrace of "universal knowledge," Newman's university took on the modus operandi of an enterprise altogether indifferent to the aims of education. Such an enterprise cannot further genuine liberal learning, which is a function of wisdom—of *learning to live*. As John Paul II put it very clearly in *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, "What is at stake [in education] is the very meaning of the human person."

To acquire wisdom is to learn not facts but the nature of things relative to the human task, which for the Christian is to become what God desires. Because the fulfillment of God's will (and nothing else) is the Christian purpose, the world has a character—it is the material in and through which we are assisted or obstructed on that journey. History, philosophy, art, literature—all these things, if not filtered through a standard of mass experience—help us to understand *the nature of things*:

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as Augustine put it, "that which really exists" in the realm of our true fulfillment.

Helping the student to read, and so to acquire this wisdom, is what education is for. John Paul II expressed it with wonderful clarity in his constitution for Catholic universities. Here "scholars will be engaged in a constant effort to determine the relative place and meaning of each of the various disciplines within the context of a vision of the human person and the world that is enlightened by the gospel." And that is something a university built of Enlightenment distinctions cannot do.

The false dichotomy of (universal) knowledge and (private) opinion and the phony division between public and private learning is fatal to education, which is precisely an illumination (as the Pope has observed) by which students are "helped to live their Christian vocation." The modern professor is no longer free to interpret reality in a meaningful way; such interpretation has been privatized—turned into solitary guesswork. But the ancient notion of education is that the individual not be condemned to learn about life alone: education is a communitarian reality. "Happy is the man who meditates on wisdom . . . ; he places his children under her protection and lodges under her boughs" (Sirach 14:20-26)—that is, he *takes this upon himself*, not letting his children wander unaided. The professor shows by example how to read in the face of real questions—not how to read as if the problem were the engineering of agreement with nameless colleagues. The student needs to talk through his grasp of the meaning of Emerson or Michelangelo for his own life, and do this as part of his social existence.

To view "knowledge" (understood as the product of modern scholarly argument) as an ultimate good—the great lesson that universities have taken from Newman—is to embrace senseless productivity and to confuse the education of those who recognize a destiny with that of those who do not. To make widely acceptable "evidence" the core principle of research merely creates "democratic" institutions that are useless—defensible to all but servant to none. Newman inherited the Enlightenment ambition to address all people—thus his talk of human reason, human civilization, universal knowledge—and to the extent that Western society as a whole embraces no common purpose by which to define rationality, civilization, or knowledge, this did nothing but smooth the way for the one thing that such a society could hold in common: commodifiable mass experience, which in the realm of intellect unfolds as the informational commodity, the widely retailable statement. Higher education since the Enlightenment has seen the cutting off of education from its fundamental source of nourishment: a concrete and shared sense of the meaning of a human life.

Newman's translation of wisdom into knowledge is actually an attempt to fabricate a wisdom acceptable to modernity—to reconstruct wisdom outside the communitarian, nonuniversal conditions in which the concept has meaning. But one cannot afford (borrowing an excellent expression from Newman) to be "friends with the world." One must go beyond knowledge "about God" to believe in a knowledge from God. One must have the courage to dismiss irrelevant conceptions of "evidence"—to write and teach to help the lost, not satisfy the scholars.

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Jews and Compassionate Conservatism

Murray Friedman and Alan Mittleman

Since September 11, President Bush has placed much of his domestic policy agenda on hold. Yet we would be wrong to conclude from his recent emphasis on foreign affairs and homeland security that such crucial components of "compassionate conservatism" as public funding for tuition vouchers and "charitable choice" have been abandoned for good. Rather, we should treat the current (and temporary) pause in domestic policy making as an opportunity to assess the status of Bush's signature initiatives prior to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.

In those months, Bush's proposals had been greeted with intense criticism by various groups, but above all by Jews and Jewish organizations, many of whom worried that charitable choice would result in "excessive entanglement" of government and religion, and breach the "wall of separation" between church and state. In its program plan for 2000-2001, for example, the Jewish Council on Public Affairs (the coordinating body for local and national Jewish community relations) reaffirmed its "opposition to any legislation that omits meaningful and effective First Amendment safeguards such as those that prevent proselytizing, coercion, or indoctrination and that safeguards clients and service provider employees against religiously based discrimi-

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nation." If President Bush wants his policies to succeed, he will have to answer these concerns. And if he wants to answer these concerns, he will have to understand the motivations of those who voice them. American Jews, for their part, may need to reconsider their views on church-state relations.

Jewish fears of religion in the public life of the nation have their roots in the middle decades of the twentieth century. In the immediate postwar years, Jews often felt like outsiders in American life. Such civic bodies as the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League began a concerted effort to eliminate barriers both to themselves and other groups that felt excluded from society. High up on the list of Jewish concerns were widespread, usually Christian, religious practices in the public schools and other areas of American life.

Spearheaded by the America Jewish Congress and its redoubtable general counsel Leo Pfeffer, along with such secular groups as the American Civil Liberties Union and such activists as the late Madalyn Murray O'Hair, these Jewish agencies and their allies were successful in convincing the Supreme Court by the mid-1960s that Bible reading and prayer in the schools, as well as most forms of government aid to parochial schools, were unconstitutional. So successful were Pfeffer and his allies in establishing a stringently separationist reading of the Establishment Clause that religion became relegated solely to private behavior, leaving what Richard John Neuhaus has famously called a "naked public square."

Though it is rarely acknowledged in the mainstream press, absolute separation is a relatively new posture for American Jews. As historians Jonathan Sarna, David Dalin, and Naomi Cohen have shown, for the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century American Jews promoted an image of the United States as a pan-religious society in which Jews would find their place as one religious community among others, indeed as one with a noble pedigree. Of course, Jews resisted the idea of an explicitly Christian state. But they also rejected the concept of a secular society. They argued for government funding for Jewish schools and Jewish military chaplains—for, in general, the equal treatment of Jews and Judaism, but not for the separation of religion from public life. Only toward the latter part of the nineteenth century—when a movement for a "Christian amendment" to the Constitution gained respectability—did Jews make common cause with "freethinkers" and progressives who wanted to purge the nation of publicly expressed religious sentiments.

But the social circumstances that led Jews to rejoice in the postwar victories achieved in church-state separation have changed considerably, and those changes now occasion a need to review earlier positions. American Jews have moved from outsiders to insiders in American life. They are, by and large, influential members of what was once called "the Establishment." Despite this, many continue to think of themselves as outsiders, nurturing an image of their own marginality. This sense of marginality, along with persistent fears of anti-Semitism, continues to invest the "wall of separation" with totemic power. Tampering with separation, appearing to efface the boundary between church and state in however minor or symbolic a way, is still taboo. Jewish groups continue to invoke the trope with incantatory repetition as if recalling an ancient and saving wisdom. Resembling believers in magic, they refuse to accept contrary evidence. Yet such evidence is pervasive. Jews, for example, are disproportionately represented in Congress, with Jewish members coming often from states that have few Jews. Survey research shows overwhelmingly a sharp decline in anti-Semitism; indeed, most Americans have friendly feelings for Jews.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions dating back to at least 1990, has edged away from strict separation and toward an "equal treatment" approach to religion. Hence the judicial basis for Jewish public policy, no less than the social marginality that originally motivated the policy, has been eroded. The metaphoric "wall of separation between church and state" no longer suits the situation either of Jews or of the wider society.

In recent years, for example, a broad-based movement has begun to mobilize religion in partnership with government in order to combat a myriad of social problems. Numerous articles have highlighted the efforts of such ministers as Eugene Rivers in Boston, Floyd Flake in New York, and Herb Lusk in Philadelphia—all of whom have worked successfully with gang youth and in the development of drug treatment, housing rehabilitation, and employment training programs. Although the details of charitable choice and vouchers are politically and constitutionally controversial, the laudable motivation behind these policies reflects our nation's long-held faith in the efficacy of religion. According to a recent survey by Public Agenda, 69 percent of Americans believe that religion is the key to strengthening family values and encouraging moral behavior. Eighty-seven percent believe that volunteer and charity work would increase if more Americans were to become deeply religious. Eighty-five percent believe that religion can help parents do a better job of raising their kids. And 79 percent think that it would contribute to a decrease in crime.

This "faith in faith" fully informs popular support for charitable choice. According to an April 2001 survey

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commissioned by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 75 percent of Americans support government funding of faith-based organizations. Nearly three-quarters (72 percent) identify the care and compassion of religiously motivated workers as an important reason for their support. Three-quarters believe that houses of worship make a significant contribution to solving America's social problems. Reflecting and amplifying these convictions, political scientist Robert Putnam writes in his acclaimed study *Bowling Alone* that "faith communities in which people worship together are arguably the single most important repository of social capital in America. . . . Nearly half of all associational memberships in America are church related, half of all personal philanthropy is religious in character, and half of all volunteering occurs in a religious context."

While American Christians may strongly support increasing the role of religion in public policy making, most American Jews firmly oppose it. They have taken their strict separationist legal strategy, developed to serve a legitimate desire for inclusion in an earlier period, and elevated it into a comprehensive worldview. Deeply suspicious of religion as a public force, they appear to favor a thoroughly secular society where religion keeps to itself. This view, as we have seen, is sharply at variance with that of most Americans. According to a survey commissioned by the Center for Jewish Community Studies, while some 42 percent of non-Jews agree that "democracy in the U.S. works better if Americans are religious," only 11 percent of Jews affirm the same statement. Similarly, although 76 percent of non-Jews feel that "religion should play an important role in shaping American values," only a bare majority (51 percent) of Jews agree. And while 65 percent of non-Jews wish to see the influence of religion increase in America, only 30 percent of Jews share those hopes.

There is a certain awkwardness in the Jewish posture here. Is the danger to Jews in challenging the feelings and sensibilities of so many of their neighbors in so sensitive an area not greater than that posed by the "slippery slope" of charitable choice or vouchers? Does not the absolutist posture of the Jewish establishment on separationism engender its own form of intolerance? For example, when Senator Joseph Lieberman called for religion to play a more pervasive role in the society shortly after receiving the Democratic Party's vice presidential nomination, ADL head Abe Foxman warned him to stop making "overt expressions of religious belief while campaigning." Then, after the election, liberal columnist Leonard Fein, writing in the *Forward*, called on American Jews to repudiate Lieberman's religious rhetoric. Does this intolerance of the historic interaction of religious and political rhetoric help the Jewish community or does it only isolate it? Regardless of whatever approach to constitutional doctrine community leaders wish to take, it need not give rise to an imperative of hyper-secularism.

While the mainstream of the Jewish community continues to cling to a strict separationist ideology as the gold standard of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has been edging away from this position for some time. The Court has shown increased sympathy for the views of a number of constitutional theorists, including Philip Kurland, Michael McConnell, and Carl Esbeck, who have called for equal treatment for religion. Their arguments are summed up in what has come to be called the "Kurland Rule": if a policy furthers a legitimate secular purpose it is a matter of indifference whether or not that policy employs religious institutions.

Mainstream Jewish groups have opposed this development every step of the way. The Anti-Defamation League, for example, called the recent *Good News v. Milford* decision (which held that a Bible study club in upstate New York could not be banned from using a public school facility after hours) "a setback for religious freedom in this country and . . . contrary to the fundamental principle of church-state separation." Another Jewish body similarly expressed its "profound disappointment" in the ruling.

Still, there are small signs that the postwar Jewish consensus on strict separation is beginning to weaken. Acceptance of public funding for the secular aspects of religious schools—long popular among Orthodox Jews—has broadened. Speaking at a national conference on Jewish education convened by the American Jewish Committee, Jack Wertheimer, rector of the Jewish Theological Seminary and perhaps the leading non-Orthodox advocate of such aid, notes that it costs $420 million each year to educate today's 200,000 Jewish day-school students. This figure exceeds half of the combined monies raised by all Jewish federations each year. Calling for a reexamination of the Jewish community's traditional opposition to government assistance to parochial education, Wertheimer argues that government funding could be directed strictly to general education, not to the religion curriculum, thereby leaving the basic structure of church-state separation intact. Thus, a number of leaders of federations of Jewish agencies, the primary vehicle for social planning and fundraising in the Jewish community, have shifted their posture recently. For example, in response to Pennsylvania legislation that grants generous tax credits to corporations that make gifts to private and parochial schools, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh federations have recently prepared applications.

There are also indications that the intellectual underpinnings for absolute separation within the Jewish community are undergoing revision. "It has struck

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me," says Jonathan Sarna, the Joseph H. and Belle R. Braun Professor of American Jewish History at Brandeis University, "that the separationist ideal, essentially a theory of separate spheres, reflects an ideology that I and most of my friends have long since rejected. . . . Clearly the whole basis of strict separatism, with its assumption that religion and state should occupy completely differing spheres of life, [needs] to be rethought."

The terrain being mapped out today by proposals for government to directly fund churches, mosques, and synagogues for social welfare purposes is new and the results are uncertain. In this atmosphere of uncertainty, the critical response by mainstream Jewish bodies to vouchers and charitable choice is understandable. Also pertinent are painful memories of how Jews have been treated when church and state have been too closely intertwined. These fears cannot be ignored. Jewish leaders are acutely aware that there are some who would still like to make this a Christian nation in more than a demographic or sociological sense.

However, the "threats" posed to Jews by compassionate conservatism are quite minimal, if not nonexistent. If Jews allowed themselves some confidence in their own status as insiders, they would be more open to experimentation with these new church/government partnerships. If they worried less about a resurgence of religiously inspired bigotry and more about the desperate situation of hopeless people trapped in collapsed communities, they would show greater interest in compassionate conservatism—not to be sure, as a panacea, but at least as a promising possibility.

Almost a half-century ago, Will Herberg, whose *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* profoundly influenced the study of the sociology of religion in this country, mounted a lonely vigil against Pfefferian absolutism. Writing in *Commentary*, he declared that while it was possible to understand Jewish sympathies for a strict reading of the Establishment Clause, "such a stance would not, over the long run, prove beneficial." American Jews, he went on, "must rid themselves of the narrow and crippling minority group defensiveness that dominates much of their thought and behavior." Herberg's advice has become newly pertinent as this country moves into a new century. And those who hope to contribute to realizing the potential of compassionate conservatism must begin to make this case to America's Jews.

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The Reappearing Nuclear Family

David Blankenhorn

As if it didn't have enough to fret about, the two-parent American family got taken for quite a ride in the past year. First, in April the Census Bureau dramatically reported that the "nuclear family" was "rebounding." The page-one story in *USA Today* announced: "The traditional nuclear family—a married mom and dad living with their biological children—is making a comeback, according to a Census report released today. The proportion of the nation's children living with both biological parents jumped from 51 percent in 1991 to 56 percent . . . in 1996." On *ABC World News Tonight*, Peter Jennings declared: "The Census Bureau said today that the number of children who live with both their parents increased during the 1990s." Scores of news organizations around the country reported the same happy story.

But in May, the story reversed itself. Journalists across the country began to report that "nuclear families" now constitute less than 25 percent of all U.S. households. An editorial in the *New York Post* announced that "the American nuclear family" was now "up there with the Pacific salmon as an endangered species." A *Newsweek* cover story on unmarried mothers ("the new faces of America's family album") explained at length how the "traditional family" was "fading fast." Dr. James Dobson, the radio personality and president of Focus on the Family, an influential Christian pro-family organization, said that the "alarming" Census Bureau figures revealed "just how dire the situation has become," as "the family is unraveling at a faster pace than ever." The *New York Times* took a sunnier view. Following up on its page-one news story ("Number of Nuclear Families Drops as 1-Parent Families Rise"), the *Times* editorial board urged its readers not to worry about the decline, since "the nuclear family is not the only kind of family or even the only healthy kind of family."

Well, now. Is it possible for the nuclear family to be simultaneously "making a comeback" and "fading fast"? Of course not. So which is true? Amazingly enough, the answer is *neither*. What is actually happening to U.S. family structure is quite different from the news conveyed by either cycle of stories.

While the Census Bureau has been quick to blame the media for the confusion, the fault lies primarily with the Bureau. For mysterious reasons, the Census Bureau chose in the fine print of its April report to define a

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"traditional nuclear family" as a household consisting of two biological parents, their minor children, *and no one else.* That is, a household that includes grandparents is not "traditional." A household that includes boarders, or a foster child, is not "traditional." Moreover, during the 1990s, for reasons that have almost nothing to do with the core issue—which is how many U.S. children are growing up in households with two married parents—three-generation and large or complex households with children declined slightly as a proportion of all households with children.

That little curio of a demographic fact—that tangent of a tangent—was the entire basis of the Census Bureau's April "rebound" report. No evidence presented in that report justifies the assertion that the proportion of children living with both biological parents rose during the early- and mid-1990s. And to add injury to insult, the obscurantist definition of "traditional" means that the Census Bureau, while allegedly describing a nuclear family "rebound," actually *underreported* the proportion of U.S. children living with two married parents. The Census Bureau report puts the figure at 56 percent for 1996. But my own research, subsequently confirmed by other researchers and the Census Bureau itself, shows that the actual figure for 1996 is 64 percent.

As for May's precipitous drop in optimism, it can be traced to further manipulation of definitions on the part of journalists with no helpful guidance and arguably even some complicity from the Census Bureau. This time, using a data table released in mid-May with much fanfare by the Census Bureau, journalists chose to measure married-couple-with-children families not as a proportion of all *families* (two or more persons living together related by blood, marriage, or adoption), but instead as a proportion of all *households.* Grandma living on her own is a household. College roommates sharing an apartment are a household. The number of non-family households in the U.S. has been growing steadily for many decades for multiple reasons (including longer life spans and greater affluence), most of which have little to do with the state of marriage and child rearing. Indeed, marrieds-with-children were a distinct minority of all U.S. *households* even in the 1950s. That's why most scholars agree that the best way to measure the prevalence of a family phenomenon such as marriage is to place it in the context of family households; throwing in non-family households is like mixing apples and oranges. This piece of confusion was the primary basis for the "decline" stories that received so much attention last May.

This episode is a distressing example of irresponsibility by a public agency charged with collecting and reporting data on how we live. Even at this late date, it is impossible for scholars to get accurate trend-line data from the Census Bureau on the proportion of U.S. children living with their two biological married parents. This past June, nine senior family scholars, led by Norval Glenn of the University of Texas and Linda Waite of the University of Chicago, wrote a public letter to the Census Bureau asking it to disentangle the definitions and report this basic information. The Census Bureau politely declined. For the time being, at least, accurate information about this trend will have to come from elsewhere.

Which brings us to the truly good news. A series of recent reports from independent scholars, plus largely unpublished data from the 2000 Census, all suggest that the trend of family fragmentation that many analysts had assumed to be unstoppable suddenly stopped in its tracks about six years ago.

What we are seeing is not (at least not yet) a "rebound." But it's certainly not a "decline." To be conservative, let's call it a cessation, a significant pause. But let's say it more optimistically: after more than three decades of relentless advance, the family structure revolution in the U.S. may be over.

Here are the basic numbers. The proportion of all U.S. families with children under age eighteen that are headed by married couples reached an all-time low in the mid 1990s—about 72.9 percent in 1996 and 72.4 percent in 1997—but has since stabilized. The figure for 2000 is 73 percent. Similarly, the proportion of all U.S. children living in two-parent homes reached an all-time low in the mid-1990s, but since then has stabilized as well. In fact, the proportion of children in two-parent homes increased slightly from 68 percent in 1999 to 69.1 percent in 2000.

Looking only at white, non-Hispanic children, a study by Allan Dupree and Wendell Primus finds that the proportion of these children living with two married parents stopped its downward descent during the late 1990s, and even increased modestly from 1999 to 2000, rising from 77.3 to 78.2 percent. Another study from the Urban Institute finds that, among all U.S. children, the proportion living with their two biological or adoptive parents increased by 1.2 percent from 1997 to 1999, while during the same period the proportion living in stepfamilies (or blended families) decreased by 0.1 percentage points and the proportion living in single-parent homes decreased by two percentage points. (The study finds that in 1999 about 64 percent of all U.S. children lived with their two biological or adoptive parents, while about 25 percent lived with one parent and about 8 percent lived in a step or blended family.) Among low-income children, the decline in the proportion living in single-parent homes was even more pronounced, dropping from 44 percent in 1997 to 41 percent in 1999.

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And, perhaps most encouraging, from 1995 to 2000 the proportion of African-American children living in two-parent, married-couple homes rose from 34.8 to 38.9 percent, a significant increase in just five years, representing the clear cessation and even reversal of the long-term shift toward black family fragmentation.

What has caused this shift? No one knows for sure, but we can make some plausible guesses. The roaring economy probably had little or nothing to do with it, since all previous economic booms since 1970 have coincided with growing family fragmentation, not reintegration. On the other hand, federal and state welfare reforms dating from the mid-1990s, which dramatically restructured and in some instances eliminated what had previously been guaranteed economic supports for unmarried mothers, have almost certainly played a role. As the above-cited data suggest, post-1995 family structure changes have been most dramatic among low-income families.

More generally, on the core social question of whether family fragmentation is a bad thing or a not-so-bad thing, a steady shift in popular and (especially) elite opinion took place over the course of the 1990s. Denial and happy talk about the consequences of nuclear family decline became decidedly less widespread; concern and even alarm became much more common. As a society we changed our minds, and as a result we changed some of our laws. And now, it seems, we are beginning to change some of our personal behavior. This is very encouraging news.

It is now clear that those who have long and loudly insisted that nothing can be done to stop the trend of family fragmentation are wrong. Remember all their clichés? We have to be realistic, they opined. The "family diversity" trend is irreversible. We can't put the toothpaste back in the tube. We shouldn't fall into the "nostalgia trap." We can't go back to "Ozzie and Harriet." Well, the next time someone tells you that, just smile and show him the new numbers. Positive change in U.S. family structure is not only desirable and possible. It is already occurring. Today our main challenge is no longer to reverse a trend toward disintegration, but to intensify the nascent trend toward reintegration.

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Between Beasts and God

Gilbert Meilaender

Near the beginning of the twenty-fourth and last Book of Homer's *Iliad*, called by Simone Weil "the only true epic" the West possesses, even the gods—detached as they are in their bliss from all suffering—have seen enough. Achilles has become inhuman. Ignoring our animal nature, our kinship with the beasts, he neither eats nor sleeps. Indeed, since the death of his friend and comrade Patroclus the only food he wants is slaughter of the Trojans. "You talk of food?" he says to Agamemnon, who has argued that the Greek warriors must eat before they return to battle,

> *I have no taste for food—what I really crave*
> *is slaughter and blood and the choking groans of men!*

He has vowed, indeed, to throw twelve young Trojan warriors on the funeral pyre he will build for Patroclus—a human sacrifice to the memory of his friend. And, of course, he continues to tie the corpse of Hector to his chariot and drag it three times daily round dead Patroclus.

Achilles is inhuman. He cannot acknowledge the limits of bodily life—in particular, our mortality. He cannot acknowledge that we are less than immortal gods—and that, therefore, our actions must have limits and our lives must recognize bonds of human community across the generations. Another human being, a fellow human being, does not impose upon Achilles what Weil called "that interval of hesitation" before one who is our equal in dignity. Brilliant, proud, godlike Achilles . . . is not a man. Acknowledging no limits, acting as if he were himself more than human, he becomes in Homer's characterizations less than human—"like some lion, going his own barbaric way," "like inhuman fire raging on through the mountain gorges / splinter-dry."

Apollo makes the case for putting an end to what is happening. "Achilles has lost all pity! No shame in the man." With the help of Zeus, Priam, the aged Trojan King, comes to Achilles' tent to plead for the return of the body of his son, Hector. In one of the most famous scenes in the history of our culture, Priam puts to his lips "the hands of the man who killed my son" and reminds Achilles of the bond between the generations. "Remember your own father, great godlike Achilles."

> *Those words stirred within Achilles a deep desire*
> *to grieve for his own father. Taking the old man's hand*
> *he gently moved him back. And overpowered by*
> *memory*
> *both men gave way to grief. Priam wept freely*
> *for man-killing Hector, throbbing, crouching*
> *before Achilles' feet as Achilles wept himself,*
> *now for his father, now for Patroclus once again,*
> *and their sobbing rose and fell throughout the house.*

The gods may live free of such sorrows, Achilles tells Priam, but "we wretched men / live on to bear such torments." The fact of human mortality undergirds the bond of human community. One generation dies that another may succeed it, though not without a sense of loss and sorrow. To be human is to be born of human parents, to have a place in the affective tie that binds together the generations of humankind.

"So come," Achilles says to Priam, "we too, old king, must think of food." Acknowledging once again his own place within society and the limits of his mortal flesh, he eats, sleeps, and takes Briseis, now restored to him, to his bed. Commenting on the poem, Bernard Knox notes that now at last Achilles occupies "man's

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central position between beast and god." He is no longer "godlike" Achilles, nor "some lion, going his own barbaric way." And precisely in being neither, his true humanity—in all its nobility, dignity, and pathos—is displayed.

Likewise, at the beginning of St. Mark's Gospel, Jesus, as the representative Israelite and therefore representative man, is depicted precisely as one who in his humanity stands between the beasts and God. Having been baptized by John and declared the beloved Son of God, Jesus is driven by the Spirit out into the wilderness to be tempted by Satan—the beginning of his great battle with Satan recorded in the Gospel. And, St. Mark writes, "he was with the wild beasts; and the angels ministered to him." The beasts may be mentioned simply to accentuate the loneliness of the desert as a place of testing and struggle, but more probably, as D. E. Nineham suggests, "they are thought of as subject and friendly to" Jesus, and, hence, "the passage should be understood against the background of the common Jewish idea that the beasts are subject to the righteous man." Cared for by the angelic servants of God, Jesus simultaneously exercises Adam's dominion over the animals. He stands where one who is truly human ought to stand—between the beasts and God. He occupies an "in-between."

The story of this true man culminates in a resurrection of the body—that is, in a vindication of the creation. It teaches us to honor the trajectory of human bodily life from birth to death—from the dependence that marks our birth to the dependence that marks our aging and dying. We are mortals, not immortals. But we are mortals whose special place in creation—and whose longing for something more than this life alone can give—has been vindicated by the triumph of Christ. We must learn to honor this bodily life without asking of it more than it can be or offer.

If this is what it means to be human, it may be no surprise that bioethics—concerned as it is with *Bios*—should, especially at its most philosophical, focus so much attention on the beginning and end of life, on birth and death. For they are connected more profoundly than as simply the beginning and the end points of a life. To give birth to one like oneself, out of the very substance of one's being, is, even if only unwittingly, to nod in the direction of our mortality. Anyone who has had a child will recall how the experience of becoming a parent immediately gives one a different perspective on one's own parents. We stand in a line of succession. We give birth to those who take our place, even though they do not precisely replace us.

If we stand between the beasts and God, we occupy a distinct place within the creation—a place that is passed on from parents to children in the act of begetting. One can deny this, of course, though not without paying a certain moral cost. Thus, for example, in his *Discourse on Inequality*, Rousseau allows himself to speculate about whether the orangutan might be "a variety of man." We lack sufficient knowledge to decide, he says. "There would, however, be a method by which, if the orangutan and others were of the human species, the crudest observers could assure themselves of it even by demonstration; but since a single generation would not suffice for this experiment, it must be considered impracticable, because it would be necessary for what is only an hypothesis to be already proved true before the experiment that was to prove it true could be tried innocently." Rousseau means, of course, that if human beings and orangutans could successfully interbreed, it would be demonstrated that they were of the same species. And we may suspect that Rousseau's claim that the experiment could not be "tried innocently" unless it were known in advance that orangutans were themselves human may be less sincere than his playful willingness to contemplate—in the name, of course, of research—acts of bestiality that would deny any distinct place in the creation to humanity.

It should not really surprise us that Rousseau might toy with such possibilities. In his *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, though doubting whether true happiness is attainable, he describes his notion of the kind of happiness appropriate to a human being as follows:

> But if there is a state in which the soul finds a solid enough base to rest itself on entirely and to gather its whole being into, without needing to recall the past or encroach upon the future; in which time is nothing for it; in which the present lasts forever without, however, making its duration noticed and without any trace of time's passage; without any other sentiment . . . except that of our existence, and having this sentiment alone fill it completely; as long as this state lasts, he who finds himself in it can call himself happy . . . with a sufficient, perfect, and full happiness which leaves the soul no emptiness it might feel a need to fill. . . . What do we enjoy in such a situation? Nothing external to ourselves, nothing if not ourselves and our own existence. As long as this state lasts, we are sufficient unto ourselves, like God.

He wants to be godlike. Desiring that, he is bound to lose the sense of our humanity—that "in-between" place that distinguishes us not only from God but also from the beasts. Desiring to be like God, he can contemplate the possibility that he might be a fit mate for an orangutan.

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In our own time, as we have come to think of ourselves more and more in terms of will and choice, Hobbes' "masterless men," we have transformed the meaning of birth. The bodily act of begetting, by which parents transmit their humanity to their children, can become an act of technical mastery over that part of nature which happens to be the human body. Here I do not bother to note the various ways in which we do this. Article after article tells the story. Nor will I give heed here to ways in which new reproductive technologies—or, should the day come, cloning—can subvert the meaning of parenthood. I will look from the other side—at what it means to be a child who is a product rather than a gift. Compare two rather different ways of picturing what it means to have a child.

We might—indeed, we have increasingly come to—picture it this way: because having children is something people want for their life to be full and complete, because having children is an important project for so many people, we ought to use our technical skills to help them achieve what they desire—a child, and, quite possibly, a child of a certain sort. Indeed, having children—and, perhaps, children of a certain sort—is an entitlement to which there can be few limits. If the suffering and disappointment that infertility brings can be relieved, if people who desire a child can live more fulfilled lives by achieving that aim, then reproductive technologies are a good thing. We rightly use our technical mastery to augment human happiness by satisfying our individual projects, our desire for a child "of one's own." A story line of that sort increasingly dominates our thinking.

But compare that approach now to a rather different image of the child that emerges in Galway Kinnell's poem "After Making Love We Hear Footsteps."

> *For I can snore like a bullhorn*
> *or play loud music*
> *or sit up talking with any reasonably sober Irishman*
> *and Fergus will only sink deeper*
> *into his dreamless sleep, which goes by all in one flash,*
> *but let there be that heavy breathing*
> *or a stifled come-cry anywhere in the house*
> *and he will wrench himself awake*
> *and make for it on the run—as now, we lie together,*
> *after making love, quiet, touching along the length of*
> *our bodies, familiar touch of the long-married,*
> *and he appears—in his baseball pajamas, it happens,*
> *the neck opening so small*
> *he has to screw them on, which one day may make him*
> *wonder about the mental capacity of baseball players—*
> *and flops down between us and hugs us and snuggles*
> *himself to sleep,*
> *his face gleaming with satisfaction at being this very*
> *child.*
>
> *In the half darkness we look at each other*
> *and smile*
> *and touch arms across his little, startlingly muscled*
> *body—*
> *this one whom habit of memory propels to the ground of*
> *his making, sleeper only the mortal sounds can sing*
> *awake,*
> *this blessing love gives again into our arms.*

This is a child who is not "his own," or "her own," or even (what is a little closer to the truth) "their own." We are pressed almost to eliminate that little word "own." This child is no one's product or project, but a gift received, a blessing love gives into our arms.

In the passion of sexual love a man and woman step out of themselves and give themselves to each other. Hence, we speak of sexual ecstasy—a word that means precisely standing outside oneself, outside one's own will and purpose. No matter how much they may desire a child as the fruit of their love, in the act of love itself they must set aside all such projects and desires. They are not any longer making a baby of their own. They are giving themselves in love. And the child, if a child is conceived, is not then the product of their willed creation. The child is a gift and a mystery, springing from their embrace, a blessing love gives into their arms.

This makes a difference in how we understand the meaning of children. A product that we make to satisfy our own aims and projects is one whom we control—and, indeed, over whom we increasingly exercise "quality" control. A gift who springs from our embrace is one whom we can only welcome as our equal. We are not divine makers, but human begetters. And the child is not the product of our will, of any quasi-divine fiat, but, simply, one of us, who takes his or her place in the community of human generations.

Being of our being, these children are mortal. So ineluctably we find ourselves forced to think not only of birth but also of death. Here too the often admirable urge to do good all too easily becomes a desire for mastery without limits.

More than thirty years ago Paul Ramsey wrote chapter three of his *Patient as Person.* That chapter, titled "On (Only) Caring for the Dying," remains one of the classic essays in bioethics. Thinking self-consciously from within a Christian perspective, Ramsey noted how our desire to master death can turn in two, seemingly quite opposite, directions. We may strive to extend life as long as possible, or we may decide to aim at death when the game no longer seems worth the candle. Seemingly opposite, these two tendencies within our culture both have their root in that same fundamental desire to be master of death. We will hold it at bay as long as we can, and we will embrace it when that seems to be the only

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way left to assert our mastery. Neither way acknowledges the peculiarly "in-between" place that human beings occupy in the creation.

"A living dog is better than a dead lion," says Koheleth, as if the nobility of human life were to lie only in its duration. When our goal is simply to ward off death, to stay alive as long as possible, we miss an essential element in our humanity—the trajectory of bodily life that begins in dependence and moves, at the end, once again toward dependence and death. We miss our mortality. Perhaps more important still, we misdirect the longing buried at the heart of human existence.

Our hearts are restless, St. Augustine wrote, until they rest in God. That is, what the human heart desires is not, simply, more years. That offers quantity and continuance—which is more of the same—when what we desire is something qualitatively different. "Whatever has undergone no change certainly has continuance," Kierkegaard writes, "but it does not have continuity; insofar as it has continuance, it exists, but insofar as it has not won enduring continuity amid change, it cannot become contemporaneous with itself and is either happily unconscious of this misalignment or is disposed to sorrow. Only the eternal can be and become and remain contemporaneous with every age." Even were we to master aging and dying, we would not have achieved the heart's desire; for the longing for God is not a longing for more of the same, more of this life. Were we simply another animal, our good might lie in warding off death and preserving bodily life. But we are not—and it does not. Standing between the beasts and God, our being opens us to God. The deepest chasm in our being is our need, not for more years, but for God.

Neither, however, should we embrace death—aim at it for ourselves or others—as if it were an unqualified good. "Whose life is it anyway?" I may ask. "Have I not been making decisions about this life of mine for years now? Should I not be free to end it if I wish?" Such questions come quite naturally to us, but to give them moral standing is to live a lie. We are earthly, mortal creatures whose being is, nonetheless, open to God. We are not just animals—for we are open to God. We are not gods—for we are open to God. Indeed, we are never quite the independent individuals we like to think we are, as the umbilical cord ought to remind us, and we deceive ourselves if we suppose that freedom is the sole truth of human existence. If we begin with the story of our creation, we have to say that the author of our being has authority over us. If we begin with the story of our reconciliation and say "Jesus is Lord," we have to say with St. Paul: "You are not your own; you were bought with a price. So glorify God in your body." In either case, the project of mastering death—of aiming at it for ourselves or others—is a delusion, embracing as a good what should be, simply, undergone. Edgar, in Shakespeare's *King Lear*, gets the attitude about right:

> Men must endure
> Their going hence, even as their coming hither;
> Ripeness is all.

Here again, the temptation to be more than human may leave us less than human. Taking control of dying, taking aim at life, through practices such as euthanasia or assisted suicide, invites us to ignore our shared humanity. Not all born of human parents, not all who share in the bond of human generations over time, will seem equal in dignity—if and when those practices become accepted among us. To be equal in dignity it will then not suffice to be a member of the human community; it will be necessary to exercise those capacities of reason and will that make mastery possible. What seems at first like an expansion of our compassion—for those who lack these capacities—very quickly becomes a restriction of the scope of human community as they become candidates for elimination. From within the human community, the full number of those who occupy that "in-between" place, a great divide erupts. Some exercise godlike mastery, others (like the beasts) are put out of their misery.

To be human, then, is to learn to live and love within limits—the limits of our embodied, mortal life, the limits of those whose being opens to God. It is to acknowledge, honor, and esteem the particular place—between the beasts and God—that we occupy in the creation. One need not, however, contemplate for long the vision of humanity I have been developing before a certain problem inescapably arises. To accept—even affirm and honor—such limits in our coming hither and our going hence is to accept suffering we might possibly relieve. It is to admit that there is good we might in our freedom accomplish which we should not attempt, because what we do counts for even more than what we accomplish. "The Fates have given mortals hearts that can endure," Apollo says, addressing the gods to argue that Achilles' inhumanity must be stopped. Achilles must somehow come to accept the meaning of mortal life, the limits that must be endured—not because we are unable to transcend them, but because we ought not. Can it be right to accept limits even on the good we might accomplish?

One response, of course, and it is a perfectly legitimate one, is to note that we may find other, morally acceptable ways to relieve suffering and do good. To the degree this is possible in any given instance, we have every reason to be glad and no reason to oppose it. But simply to take refuge in such hopes and possibilities is to make our life far too easy. We have to reckon with the

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fact that honoring the limits of our "in-between" condition may mean there is good which, in our freedom, we might accomplish but which we nevertheless decline to do. Can that possibly be reasonable?

Discussing some sermons of St. Augustine (first preached probably in the year 397 but newly discovered in only 1990), Peter Brown notes that Augustine was often required to preach at festivals of the martyrs. This was a time when the cult of the martyrs was of profound importance to the average Christian, for persecution was still a very recent memory. The martyrs were the great heroes, the "muscular athletes" and "triumphant stars" of the faith. But, Brown suggests, one can see Augustine quite deliberately making the feasts of the martyrs "less dramatic, so as to stress the daily drama of God's workings in the heart of the average Christian." For that average believer did not doubt that God's grace had been spectacularly displayed in the courage of the martyrs. What he was likely to doubt, however, was whether such heroism could possibly be displayed in his own less dramatic and more humdrum day-to-day existence. And so, Augustine points "away from the current popular ideology of the triumph of the martyrs to the smaller pains and triumphs of daily life."

An example of how he does this is quite instructive for our purposes. "God has many martyrs in secret," Augustine tells his hearers. "Some times you shiver with fever: you are fighting. You are in bed: it is you who are the athlete." Brown comments:

> Exquisite pain accompanied much late-Roman medical treatment. Furthermore, everyone, Augustine included, believed that amulets provided by skilled magicians . . . did indeed protect the sufferer—but at the cost of relying on supernatural powers other than Christ alone. They worked. To neglect them was like neglecting any other form of medicine. But the Christian must not use them. Thus, for Augustine to liken a Christian sickbed to a scene of martyrdom was not a strained comparison.

Here is a vision of life—and a rather noble one at that—for which "minimize suffering" is not the only or the primary imperative. It directs our attention not just to what we do or accomplish, but also to the kind of people we are.

A number of years ago, the philosopher J. B. Schneewind wrote an article with the seemingly puzzling title, "The Divine Corporation and the History of Ethics." In it he sketched a way of understanding an ethic—the traditional, received Christian ethic—in which one's moral responsibilities are always limited. To be sure, Schneewind did this in part for the sake of explaining how modern moral philosophy had developed by turning away from that received ethic. But to understand it is to comprehend something of the vision of our humanity I have been unfolding.

Think of our world as a cooperative endeavor created, ordered, and governed by God. In it, as in any cooperative endeavor, participants play their roles, carry out the tasks assigned them, and in so doing join together to produce a good which none of them could have produced alone. No one participant is responsible for achieving the good of the whole or the best overall good possible; yet, the work of each is ordered toward that good. Sometimes individual agents will see more or less clearly how their tasks are related to the overall good, and in such cases they will need to take that into account and could perhaps be criticized if they simply ignored the general good while noting that they had fulfilled their assigned task. At such moments they need to act creatively in ways that are not simply given in any role.

There may be other times, however, when an individual cannot really see the larger good his assigned duty serves. In such cases, he cannot be criticized for ignoring the larger good while "minding his own business," for he simply doesn't know that larger good. We can imagine a world in which the overall good is very important but also very complex, far too complex for any individual agent always to be sure of how his work contributes to achieving it. And we can also imagine that the supervisor in charge of this supremely important but very complex project is able to foresee problems and deal with emergencies, is fair in his supervision, and is good—"too good ever to assign any duties that would be improper from any point of view." That world, imagined as a cooperative endeavor with God as that uniquely qualified supervisor, is the Divine Corporation.

Changing from a workplace metaphor to a more literary one, we might think of these agents as characters in a play. They know the part given them, and each must play it in his own way. But none of them is the dramatist or director, and none of them knows how the plot of the play is to be satisfactorily worked out. This is our situation. We are not the author but characters in the story—under authority. C. S. Lewis put the metaphor this way:

> We do not know the play. We do not even know whether we are in Act I or Act V. We do not know who are the major and who the minor characters. The Author knows. . . . That it has a meaning we may be sure, but we cannot see it. When it is over, we may be told. We are led to expect that the Author will have something to say to each of us on the part that each of us has played. The playing it well is what matters infinitely.

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Whichever metaphor we prefer, it is clear that if God recedes as a governing, directing, authorial presence whose responsibility it is to see to the good of the whole or work out the plot of the play, then human responsibility correspondingly increases and intensifies. That, as Schneewind suggests, is the story of modern moral philosophy. It is common, and for certain purposes quite helpful, to contrast the approaches of Bentham and Kant, to see in them the two quite different normative paths—consequentialist and deontological—modern moral philosophy has taken. But in another way, seen against the background of the Divine Corporation, they are quite similar. Lacking either Nature or Nature's God to supervise and direct that Divine Corporation, our moral responsibility increases. It becomes our task to determine and achieve the overall good or to find principles of action that can be willed universally.

Suppose a child is born with severe physical or mental defects. Suppose someone suffers greatly while dying. Who bears responsibility for that? Who must somehow make it good? In something like the Divine Corporation model God is finally responsible. Hence, we have centuries of reflection on theodicy. But if God, that uniquely qualified supervisor, is eliminated from the picture, either no one is to blame or we are. Either no author is at work bringing the plot of this story to a satisfactory conclusion, or we will have to sit down at the word processor and assume that divine authorial responsibility. There is no need for theodicy any longer, as if we needed assurance that God would work things out. The need, rather, is that we should see ourselves as responsible for making things work out. And so, we are tempted to step out of our "in-between" place, to forget that as we seek to be more than human we may become less than human.

We can see a practical illustration of this if we consider the widespread—indeed, now almost routine—practice of prenatal screening of infants in the womb. Suppose we decline to screen and a child is born with defects. And suppose we no longer can say with the psalmist, "Return, O Lord! How long? / Have pity on thy servants!" If we are not simply cooperators in and with a power greater than our own, we are the lifegivers, who bear responsibility for the quality of the life we give. If we merely cooperate with a power greater than our own, our task is to benefit as best we can the life this child has. When we become the lifegivers, we may be asked to decide whether it is a benefit to have such a life.

Reaching that high, we may fall into a state less than human. For in accepting such responsibility for the next generation, in allowing ourselves even to suppose that it could be a fitting role for human beings, we lose the fundamental human capacity to love—to say to our children, to the next generation, "It's good that you exist." And once again, instead of equal human dignity for all born of human parents, we will see a fundamental divide erupt among us: some will bear a quasi-divine responsibility. Others, whose lives do not meet our standards, will be put out of their misery. Better perhaps to learn to affirm and honor our peculiar place between the beasts and God.

In accepting our limits, we accept the fact that there may be suffering which could be relieved but ought not. Ought not because there is no right way, no fittingly human way, to do so. This does not mean, however, that those who suffer do so alone. Quite the contrary. Oliver O'Donovan, noting how suffering has become almost unintelligible for us, has helpfully distinguished between compassion and sympathy. "Sympathy is the readiness to suffer with others and enter into the dark world of their griefs. Compassion is the determination to oppose suffering; it functions at arm's length, basing itself on the rejection of suffering rather than the acceptance of it." Since we cannot imagine suffering as our own willed project, and since we have come to suppose that all moral order has its ground in our will, suffering must, by definition, be morally unintelligible. We can interpret it only as a defeat, though we may live to fight another day.

For Christians, the ills to which this mortal human life is subject, the sufferings we bear, are, as William F. May has put it, "real, but not ultimate." They are real, sometimes terrible, and we must oppose them as best we can within the limits appropriate to creatures such as we are. But we cannot possibly take their measure rightly if, as May puts it, we "cannot believe that the decisive powers in the universe could possibly do anything worthwhile in and through the suffering" we and others undergo. However deep and profound our suffering, "the Fates have given mortals hearts that can endure." That is, though suffering and dying are a great crisis of this bodily life, the very deepest problem is the isolation and abandonment they seem to bring. Hence, if we are to endure, we need from others not just compassion but sympathy—that readiness to "enter into the dark world" of the sufferer. And if we are to make sense of our humanity, of the heavy yet limited responsibility we bear, the Divine Corporation will need more than just a uniquely qualified supervisor. That supervisor might be capable of compassion, but we will need sympathy.

When, in that most famous of scenes, Priam comes to Achilles in his tent and they give way to their common grief, Achilles says:

> *Let us put our griefs to rest in our own hearts,*
> *rake them up no more, raw as we are with mourning.*
> *What good's to be won from tears that chill the spirit?*

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So the immortals spun our lives that we, we wretched men
live on to bear such torments—the gods live free of sorrows.

But perhaps those are not the gods we need if we are to be fully human, for, living free of sorrows, they do not promise true sympathy. This is most strikingly apparent when Hector confronts Achilles, terrible in his power and anger, and Athena comes to Hector in the guise of his brother Deiphobus, promising to help him in the fight. "Come, let us stand our ground together—beat him back."

"Deiphobus!"—Hector, his helmet flashing, called out to her—
"dearest of all my brothers, all these warring years,
of all the sons that Priam and Hecuba produced!
Now I'm determined to praise you all the more,
you who dared—seeing me in these straits—
to venture out from the walls, all for my sake,
while the others stay inside and cling to safety."

Hector hurls his spear, but it glances off Achilles' shield.

He stood there, cast down . . .
he had no spear in reserve. So Hector shouted out
to Deiphobus bearing his white shield—with a ringing shout
he called for a heavy lance—
but the man was nowhere near him,
vanished—
yes and Hector knew the truth in his heart.
. . . . . .
I thought he was at my side, the hero Deiphobus—
he's safe inside the walls. . . .

Rather different is the picture we find in Mark's Gospel. In that story, it is not too strong to say that God dies outside the walls of the city, sharing the mortality that marks human life. It is of the dead man on the cross that the centurion says, in the Gospel's climactic statement: "Truly this man was the Son of God." This God does not live free of sorrows. He accepts the mortality that marks our own "in-between" place—and is therefore also one of us. In a world governed by such a God, we can find and accept our place, we can live out the role given us in faith and hope. We can, that is, ourselves become fully human. FT

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The Basics About Stem Cells

Maureen L. Condic

In August of last year, President Bush approved the use of federal funds to support research on a limited number of existing human embryonic stem cell lines. The decision met with notably mixed reactions. Proponents of embryonic stem cell research argue that restricting federal funding to a limited number of cell lines will hamper the progress of science, while those opposed insist that *any* use of cells derived from human embryos constitutes a significant breach of moral principles. It is clear that pressure to expand the limits established by the President will continue. It is equally clear that the ethical positions of those opposed to this research are unlikely to change.

Regrettably, much of the debate on this issue has taken place on emotional grounds, pitting the hope of curing heartrending medical conditions against the deeply held moral convictions of many Americans. Such arguments frequently ignore or mischaracterize the scientific facts. To arrive at an informed opinion on human embryonic stem cell research, it is important to have a clear understanding of precisely what embryonic stem cells are, whether embryonic stem cells are likely to be useful for medical treatments, and whether there are viable alternatives to the use of embryonic stem cells in scientific research.

Embryonic development is one of the most fascinating of all biological processes. A newly fertilized egg faces the daunting challenge of not only generating all of the tissues of the mature animal but organizing them into a functionally integrated whole. Generating a wide range of adult cell types is not an ability unique to embryos. Certain types of tumors called teratomas are extraordinarily adept at generating adult tissues, but unlike embryos, they do so without the benefit of an organizing principle or blueprint. Such tumors rapidly produce skin, bone, muscle, and even hair and teeth, all massed together in a chaotic lump of tissue. Many of the signals required to induce formation of specialized adult cells must be present in these tumors, but unlike embryos, tumors generate adult cell types in a hopelessly undirected manner.

If a developing embryo is not to end up a mass of disorganized tissues, it must do more than generate adult cell types. Embryos must orchestrate and choreograph an elaborate stage production that gives rise to a functional organism. They must direct intricate cell movements that bring together populations of cells only to separate them again, mold and shape organs through the birth of some cells and the death of others, and build ever more elaborate interacting systems while destroying others that serve only transient, embryonic functions. Throughout the ceaseless building, moving, and remodeling of embryonic development, new cells with unique characteristics are constantly being generated and integrated into the overall structure of the developing embryo. Science has only the most rudimentary understanding of the nature of the blueprint that orders embryonic development. Yet, recent research has begun to illuminate both how specific adult cells are made as well as the central role of stem cells in this process.

The term "stem cell" is a general one for any cell that has the ability to divide, generating two progeny (or "daughter cells"), one of which is destined to become something new and one of which replaces the original stem cell. In this sense, the term "stem" identi-

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fies these cells as the source or origin of other, more specialized cells. There are many stem cell populations in the body at different stages of development. For example, all of the cells of the brain arise from a neural stem cell population in which each cell produces one brain cell and another copy of itself every time it divides. The very earliest stem cells, the immediate descendants of the fertilized egg, are termed embryonic stem cells, to distinguish them from populations that arise later and can be found in specific tissues (such as neural stem cells). These early embryonic stem cells give rise to all the tissues in the body, and are therefore considered "totipotent" or capable of generating all things.

While the existence of early embryonic stem cells has been appreciated for some time, the potential medical applications of these cells have only recently become apparent. More than a dozen years ago, scientists discovered that if the normal connections between the early cellular progeny of the fertilized egg were disrupted, the cells would fall apart into a single cell suspension that could be maintained in culture. These dissociated cells (or embryonic stem cell "lines") continue to divide indefinitely in culture. A single stem cell line can produce enormous numbers of cells very rapidly. For example, one small flask of cells that is maximally expanded will generate a quantity of stem cells roughly equivalent in weight to the entire human population of the earth in less than sixty days. Yet despite their rapid proliferation, embryonic stem cells in culture lose the coordinated activity that distinguishes embryonic development from the growth of a teratoma. In fact, these early embryonic cells in culture initially appeared to be quite unremarkable: a pool of identical, relatively uninteresting cells.

First impressions, however, can be deceiving. It was rapidly discovered that dissociated early embryonic cells retain the ability to generate an astounding number of mature cell types in culture if they are provided with appropriate molecular signals. Discovering the signals that induce the formation of specific cell types has been an arduous task that is still ongoing. Determining the precise nature of the cells generated from embryonic stem cells has turned out to be a matter of considerable debate. It is not at all clear, for example, whether a cell that expresses some of the characteristics of a normal brain cell in culture is indeed "normal"—that is, if it is fully functional and capable of integrating into the architecture of the brain without exhibiting any undesirable properties (such as malignant growth). Nonetheless, tremendous excitement accompanied the discovery of dissociated cells' generative power, because it was widely believed that cultured embryonic stem cells would retain their totipotency and could therefore be induced to generate all of the mature cell types in the body. The totipotency of cultured embryonic stem cells has not been demonstrated and would, in fact, be difficult to prove. Nonetheless, because it is reasonable to assume embryonic stem cells in culture retain the totipotency they exhibit in embryos, this belief is held by many as an article of faith until proven otherwise.

Much of the debate surrounding embryonic stem cells has centered on the ethical and moral questions raised by the use of human embryos in medical research. In contrast to the widely divergent public opinions regarding this research, it is largely assumed that from the perspective of science there is little or no debate on the matter. The scientific merit of stem cell research is most commonly characterized as "indisputable" and the support of the scientific community as "unanimous." Nothing could be further from the truth. While the scientific advantages and potential medical application of embryonic stem cells have received considerable attention in the public media, the equally compelling scientific and medical *disadvantages* of transplanting embryonic stem cells or their derivatives into patients have been ignored.

There are at least three compelling scientific arguments against the use of embryonic stem cells as a treatment for disease and injury. First and foremost, there are profound immunological issues associated with putting cells derived from one human being into the body of another. The same compromises and complications associated with organ transplant hold true for embryonic stem cells. The rejection of transplanted cells and tissues can be slowed to some extent by a good "match" of the donor to the patient, but except in cases of identical twins (a perfect match), transplanted cells will eventually be targeted by the immune system for destruction. Stem cell transplants, like organ transplants, would not buy you a "cure"; they would merely buy you time. In most cases, this time can only be purchased at the dire price of permanently suppressing the immune system.

The proposed solutions to the problem of immune rejection are either scientifically dubious, socially unacceptable, or both. Scientists have proposed large scale genetic engineering of embryonic stem cells to alter their immune characteristics and provide a better match for the patient. Such a manipulation would not be trivial; there is no current evidence that it can be accomplished at all, much less as a safe and routine procedure for every patient. The risk that genetic mutations would be introduced into embryonic stem cells by genetic engineering is quite real, and such mutations would be difficult to detect prior to transplant.

Alternatively, the use of "therapeutic cloning" has been proposed. In this scenario, the genetic informa-

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tion of the original stem cell would be replaced with that of the patient, producing an embryonic copy or "clone" of the patient. This human clone would then be grown as a source of stem cells for transplant. The best scientific information to date from animal cloning experiments indicates that such "therapeutic" clones are highly likely to be abnormal and would not give rise to healthy replacement tissue.

The final proposed resolution has been to generate a large bank of embryos for use in transplants. This would almost certainly involve the creation of human embryos with specific immune characteristics ("Wanted: sperm donor with AB+ blood type") to fill in the "holes" in our collection. Intentionally producing large numbers of human embryos solely for scientific and medical use is not an option most people would be willing to accept. The three proposed solutions to the immune problem are thus no solution at all.

The second scientific argument against the use of embryonic stem cells is based on what we know about embryology. In an opinion piece published in the *New York Times* ("The Alchemy of Stem Cell Research," July 15, 2001) a noted stem cell researcher, Dr. David Anderson, relates how a seemingly insignificant change in "a boring compound" that allows cells to stick to the petri dish proved to be critical for inducing stem cells to differentiate as neurons. There is good scientific reason to believe the experience Dr. Anderson describes is likely to be the norm rather than a frustrating exception. Many of the factors required for the correct differentiation of embryonic cells are not chemicals that can be readily "thrown into the bubbling cauldron of our petri dishes." Instead, they are structural or mechanical elements uniquely associated with the complex environment of the embryo.

Cells frequently require factors such as mechanical tension, large scale electric fields, or complex structural environments provided by their embryonic neighbors in order to activate appropriate genes and maintain normal gene-expression patterns. Fully reproducing these nonmolecular components of the embryonic environment in a petri dish is not within the current capability of experimental science, nor is it likely to be so in the near future. It is quite possible that even with "patience, dedication, and financing to support the work," we will never be able to replicate in a culture dish the nonmolecular factors required to get embryonic stem cells "to do what we want them to."

Failing to replicate the full range of normal developmental signals is likely to have disastrous consequences. Providing some but not all of the factors required for embryonic stem cell differentiation could readily generate cells that appear to be normal (based on the limited knowledge scientists have of what constitutes a "normal cell type") but are in fact quite abnormal. Transplanting incompletely differentiated cells runs the serious risk of introducing cells with abnormal properties into patients. This is of particular concern in light of the enormous tumor-forming potential of embryonic stem cells. If only one out of a million transplanted cells somehow failed to receive the correct signals for differentiation, patients could be given a small number of fully undifferentiated embryonic stem cells as part of a therapeutic treatment. Even in very small numbers, embryonic stem cells produce teratomas, rapid growing and frequently lethal tumors. (Indeed, formation of such tumors in animals is one of the scientific assays for the "multipotency" of embryonic stem cells.) No currently available level of quality control would be sufficient to guarantee that we could prevent this very real and horrific possibility.

The final argument against using human embryonic stem cells for research is based on sound scientific practice: we simply do not have sufficient evidence from animal studies to warrant a move to human experimentation. While there is considerable debate over the moral and legal status of early human embryos, this debate in no way constitutes a justification to step outside the normative practice of science and medicine that requires convincing and reproducible evidence from animal models prior to initiating experiments on (or, in this case, with) human beings. While the "potential promise" of embryonic stem cell research has been widely touted, the data supporting that promise is largely nonexistent.

To date there is *no* evidence that cells generated from embryonic stem cells can be safely transplanted back into adult animals to restore the function of damaged or diseased adult tissues. The level of scientific rigor that is normally applied (indeed, legally required) in the development of potential medical treatments would have to be entirely ignored for experiments with human embryos to proceed. As our largely disappointing experience with gene therapy should remind us, many highly vaunted scientific techniques frequently fail to yield the promised results. Arbitrarily waiving the requirement for scientific evidence out of a naive faith in "promise" is neither good science nor a good use of public funds.

Despite the serious limitations to the potential usefulness of embryonic stem cells, the argument in favor of this research would be considerably stronger if there were no viable alternatives. This, however, is decidedly not the case. In the last few years, tremendous progress has been made in the field of adult stem cell research. Adult stem cells can be recovered by tissue biopsy from patients, grown in culture, and induced to differentiate into a wide range of mature cell types.

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The scientific, ethical, and political advantages of using adult stem cells instead of embryonic ones are significant. Deriving cells from an adult patient's own tissues entirely circumvents the problem of immune rejection. Adult stem cells do not form teratomas. Therapeutic use of adult stem cells raises very few ethical issues and completely obviates the highly polarized and acrimonious political debate associated with the use of human embryos. The concern that cells derived from diseased patients may themselves be abnormal is largely unwarranted. Most human illnesses are caused by injury or by foreign agents (toxins, bacteria, viruses, etc.) that, if left untreated, would affect adult and embryonic stem cells equally. Even in the minority of cases where human illness is caused by genetic factors, the vast majority of such illnesses occur relatively late in the patient's life. The late onset of genetic diseases suggests such disorders would take years or even decades to reemerge in newly generated replacement cells.

In light of the compelling advantages of adult stem cells, what is the argument against their use? The first concern is a practical one: adult stem cells are more difficult than embryonic ones to grow in culture and may not be able to produce the very large numbers of cells required to treat large numbers of patients. This is a relatively trivial objection for at least two reasons. First, improving the proliferation rate of cells in culture is a technical problem that science is quite likely to solve in the future. Indeed, substantial progress has already been made towards increasing the rate of adult stem cell proliferation. Second, treating an individual patient using cells derived from his own tissue ("autologous transplant") would not require the large numbers of cells needed to treat large populations of patients. A slower rate of cell proliferation is unlikely to prevent adult stem cells from generating sufficient replacement tissue for the treatment of a single patient.

The more serious concern is that scientists don't yet know how many mature cell types can be generated from a single adult stem cell population. Dr. Anderson notes, "Some experiments suggest these [adult] stem cells have the potential to make mid-career switches, given the right environment, but in most cases this is far from conclusive." This bothersome limitation is not unique to adult stem cells. Dr. Anderson goes on to illustrate that in most cases the evidence suggesting scientists can induce embryonic stem cells to follow a specific career path is equally far from conclusive. In theory, embryonic stem cells appear to be a more attractive option because they are clearly capable (in an embryonic environment) of generating all the tissues of the human body. In practice, however, it is extraordinarily difficult to get stem cells *of any age* "to do what you want them to" in culture.

There are two important counterarguments to the assertion that the therapeutic potential of adult stem cells is less than that of embryonic stem cells because adult cells are "restricted" and therefore unable to generate the full range of mature cell types. First, it is not clear at this point whether adult stem cells *are* more restricted than their embryonic counterparts. It is important to bear in mind that the field of adult stem cell research is not nearly as advanced as the field of embryonic stem cell research. Scientists have been working on embryonic stem cells for more than a decade, whereas adult stem cells have only been described within the last few years. With few exceptions, adult stem cell research has demonstrated equal or greater promise than embryonic stem cell research at a comparable stage of investigation. Further research may very well prove that it is just as easy to teach an old dog new tricks as it is to train a willful puppy. This would not eliminate the very real problems associated with teaching *any* dog to do *anything* useful, but it would remove the justification for "age discrimination" in the realm of stem cells.

The second counterargument is even more fundamental. *Even if* adult stem cells are unable to generate the full spectrum of cell types found in the body, this very fact may turn out to be a strong scientific and medical advantage. The process of embryonic development is a continuous trade-off between potential and specialization. Embryonic stem cells have the potential to become anything, but are specialized at nothing. For an embryonic cell to specialize, it must make choices that progressively restrict what it can become. The greater the number of steps required to achieve specialization, the greater the scientific challenge it is to reproduce those steps in culture. Our current understanding of embryology is nowhere near advanced enough for scientists to know with confidence that we have gotten all the steps down correctly. If adult stem cells prove to have restricted rather than unlimited potential, this would indicate that adult stem cells have proceeded at least part way towards their final state, thereby reducing the number of steps scientists are required to replicate in culture. The fact that adult stem cell development has been directed by nature rather than by scientists greatly increases our confidence in the normalcy of the cells being generated.

There may well be multiple adult stem cell populations, each capable of forming a different subset of adult tissues, but no one population capable of forming everything. This limitation would make certain scientific enterprises considerably less convenient. However, such a restriction in "developmental potential"

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would not limit the *therapeutic potential* of adult stem cells for treatment of disease and injury. Patients rarely go to the doctor needing a full body replacement. If a patient with heart disease can be cured using adult cardiac stem cells, the fact that these "heart-restricted" stem cells do not generate kidneys is not a problem for the patient.

The field of stem cell research holds out considerable promise for the treatment of disease and injury, but this promise is not unlimited. There are real, possibly insurmountable, scientific challenges to the use of embryonic stem cells as a medical treatment for disease and injury. In contrast, adult stem cell research holds out nearly equal promise while circumventing the enormous social, ethical, and political issues raised by the use of human embryos for research. There is clearly much work that needs to be done before stem cells of any age can be used as a medical treatment. It seems only practical to put our resources into the approach that is most likely to be successful in the long run. In light of the serious problems associated with embryonic stem cells and the relatively unfettered promise of adult stem cells, there is no compelling scientific argument for the public support of research on human embryos. FT

Jerusalem Artichoke

It's *not*, though: Anyone can tell you this is
absolutely not an artichoke.
And the *Jerusalem* that it professes?
Some Italian costermonger spoke
about the sunflower—the English heard
not *girasole* but *Jerusalem*—
and, naming these vile tubers, they conferred
an accidental dignity on them.

People say a flower shows us
certain proof that there's a God;
is *Helianthus tuberosus*'
ugly tuber—sunk in sod—
proof of the devil? If the flower
needs the root, the devil's sent
expressly by a higher power:
Neither thing's an accident.

Deborah Warren

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Dostoevsky Also Nods

Rodney Delasanta

Those of us who thought we were well informed about 1054 and all that were stung by the viscerally hostile reaction of many Orthodox Christians to John Paul II's recent Pauline pilgrimage to Greece, Syria, and Malta. Whereas ecumenism in the West seems to have succeeded in muting anti-papal rhetoric among most Protestants, the East is still quite capable of hurling public insults at the Bishop of Rome and the Catholic Church itself.

It would be folly to understate the abounding historical reasons for this disdain and presumption to think that any brief chronicle is explanation enough. From the filioque controversy in the Nicene Creed to Eastern perceptions of papal overreach; from the Latin Crusaders' incomprehensible sack of Constantinople in 1204 to Western impotence against the Ottoman capture of that "Second Rome" in 1453—there are numerous sources of suspicion and animosity. Nor have Catholic incursions into Russian Orthodox provenance in more recent times endeared Rome to the East. Father Willard Francis Jabusch was right in reminding us in *Commonweal* of Alexander Nevsky's mythic heroism in saving Russia for Orthodoxy against the invading Teutonic Knights in the thirteenth century and, in the seventeenth, the Polish massacre of monks, women, and children at the Russian monastery of Optina Pustin. Recent overzealous proselytizing, especially in Ukraine, has also left the Orthodox wary of Catholic intentions.

Notwithstanding these and countless other reasons for friction, there are no two forms of Christianity that are at their base more theologically compatible than Catholicism and Orthodoxy because—need it be said?—the doctrines they share were already in place long before the schism in 1054. To name only a few: God as a Trinity of Persons (despite the filioque flap); Christ the Redeemer as the Incarnate Son of God (no mere ethicist he); the centrality of the sacraments to divine worship, especially the Eucharist; the claim of ecclesial authority through apostolic succession (despite Orthodox refusals to accept Petrine authority); and the veneration of the Virgin Mary as the Mother of God. Also instructive is Catholicism's own perception of its separation from Orthodoxy on the one hand and Protestantism on the other. Catholic catechetics before Vatican II, for example, would routinely distinguish between Orthodox and Protestant Christianity by declaring the former to be only in schism from Rome while describing the latter as heretically separated.

It is thus probably right to say that, despite the official state of schism and mutual excommunication (the latter not lifted until 1967 by Pope Paul VI and the Patriarch Athanegoras), Catholics still thought of Orthodox believers as spiritual kin with whom they had considerably more in common than with Protestants. And they also assumed, gratuitously as it now seems, a semi-benign reciprocity of Orthodox feelings towards them. After all, if France and Germany could forgive each other for two world wars in the twentieth century (with a carnage much bloodier than Constantinople in 1204), couldn't Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, whose raison d'être is forgiveness itself, do the same? How surprising and disappointing, then, to hear the Pope slandered as "the two-horned grotesque monster of Rome" when he landed in Athens. I was living in Switzerland in 1969 when Paul VI made a first-ever papal visit to Geneva, and I can attest to the fact that he was received more hospitably in that gray *civitas dei* of John Calvin than John Paul was in Orthodox Athens.

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On second thought, though, my disappointment at anti-Catholic Orthodox ire is not entirely surprising, for I have routinely been forced to abide it while reading my favorite nineteenth-century novelist, Fyodor Dostoevsky. Now, obviously, Dostoevsky was Russian Orthodox, not Greek, but the depth of his hostility to Rome belongs to a species that might be called pan-Orthodox. Perhaps if we can begin to understand the depth of Dostoevsky's disdain we can extrapolate from it to understand how, over a century after his death, much of Eastern Christianity is still not on speaking terms with its Western cousins.

Even the cursory reader of Dostoevsky must know that he was on the side of the angels in the great Christian/Secularist *psychomachia* that has been waged since the Enlightenment. Having taught some of his novels in my Western Civilization classes, I can say that he has touched my students and me in a manner that no other Christian apologist (Pascal, say, or Kierkegaard, or his contemporary John Henry Newman) has quite succeeded in doing. As the most prophetic writer of the nineteenth century, Dostoevsky saw the coming triumph of secularism with an extraordinary clarity: whether by way of the dyspeptic narrator of *Notes from Underground* railing against the invasive "anthill" culture of the secularized West; or the impoverished student Raskolnikov in *Crime and Punishment* experimenting with utilitarian ethics in order to rationalize his murder of the money lender; or the roster of abusive characters in *The Idiot* deprecating the holiness of Prince Myshkin; or the demonic Stavrogin and Peter Stepanovich in *The Devils*, with their pitiful cell of Russian Nihilists, plotting to overthrow all that is holy to Christian Russia; or Ivan in *The Brothers Karamazov*, so converted to Western atheism that he could easily overwhelm his saintly brother, Alyosha, in dialectic. Against what he acknowledged to be compelling arguments for the culture of disbelief, Dostoevsky did not offer philosophical counterarguments but instead, in the spirit of the Gospels, Christian parables: the Magdalene-like redemptive love of fallen women—Liza, Sonia, Nastasya, and Grushenka—who illuminate his major novels; the kenotic love of the "holy fool," Prince Myshkin, the greatest Christ figure in literature since *Don Quixote*; the lover of children, Alyosha Karamazov, who transforms the pathos of the illness and death of the consumptive youngster Ilyusha into an occasion for belief in the Resurrection.

Dostoevsky's was an authentic Christian voice that said "no!" to the new secular world order that sought to uproot Christianity, both Western and Eastern, from what was left of Christendom in his time. Its shibboleth had been voiced by Voltaire: *écrasez l'infame!* The rational eighteenth-century Enlightenment assumed that a benevolent deism would supplant its superstitious predecessor and usher in a *novus ordo saeculorum* free of all traces of supernaturalism and superstition—something like El Dorado in *Candide* or Monticello at Charlottesville. Dostoevsky knew better and saw that what deism had become in the nineteenth century was a halfway house, as Jonathan Swift had predicted, to atheism.

Thus do I gratefully admire Dostoevsky's profound insights into the mysteries of the Christian faith, while at the same time admitting bewilderment that these epiphanies should be accompanied by a crude anti-Catholicism that seems wholly unworthy of a giant of world literature. If I as a Catholic reader can revere him so, I mutter to myself, especially in consequence of his Russian Orthodox spirituality, should he not have tolerated my Catholicism, or at least muted his disrespect for it? East is East and West is West, but to my unsophisticated American eye the spiritual respect of the West for the East has gone cruelly unrequited.

The most obvious example of this in Dostoevsky's fiction, as we all know, is the "Grand Inquisitor" chapter of the greatest Christian novel ever written, *The Brothers Karamazov*. Even when I am reminded that the narrator of that episode is Ivan, the brother tormented into atheism by post-Enlightenment Western ideologies, Dostoevsky nevertheless seems to have gone out of his way to describe Catholic Christianity as not only having abandoned Christ, but literally sent him packing. In the grim person of the aged and bloodless Spanish cardinal Inquisitor, Dostoevsky has reduced the Catholic Church to a Christless institution that delivers bread to its faithful only in exchange for a surrender of their freedom. I confess to moments, in exegetical desperation, when I have tried to mitigate Dostoevsky's Catholic-baiting by suggesting to my students that perhaps what he was really doing with the Grand Inquisitor was typologically describing, by way of a sixteenth-century antetype, nineteenth-century liberalism captivated by atheistic socialism or communism. In short, maybe he was literally describing Spanish Catholicism, but with the proleptic intention of warning against some rough beast, its hour come round at last, slouching towards Moscow to be born.

But I have come to the conclusion that such apologetics are more than a little naive. Of course, in Dostoevsky's mature novels, we must take care in determining which character might speak for Dostoevsky himself. Certainly, there are some parallels with Fr. Zosima in *The Brothers Karamazov* just as there are with his disciple, Alyosha Karamazov. But above all others is the voice of the one character whom Dostoevsky deliberately created as a Christ figure, Prince Myshkin in *The Idiot*. To read anti-Catholic fulmination coming from him (as opposed to, say, Ivan Karamazov) is to hear the anti-Catholicism of Dostoevsky himself.

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Consider this rather long passage from Chapter 7 of Part 4, near the end of the novel, which describes the Epanchins' engagement party at which Myshkin's admiration of his beloved Aglaya is interrupted by news that a certain Pavlishchev has been converted to Catholicism.

> "Pavlishchev was a clear-headed man and a Christian, a true Christian," the prince declared suddenly. "How could he submit to a faith—that is unchristian? Catholicism . . . is no more than an unchristian faith . . . even worse than atheism. . . . Atheism only preaches nullity, but Catholicism goes further; it preaches a distorted Christ, a Christ it has calumnied and defamed, the opposite of Christ! It preaches the Antichrist. . . . Roman Catholicism believes the Church cannot remain on earth without universal temporal power. . . . [It] is not even a religion but very definitely the continuation of the Holy Roman Empire, and everything in it is subservient to that idea, beginning with faith. The Pope usurped the earth, an earthly throne, and took up the sword, and since then everything has been going on that way, except that to the sword they have added craft, deceit, fanaticism, superstition, villainy. . . . They have bartered everything, everything for money, for base earthly power. And isn't that the teaching of Antichrist? How could they fail to create atheism? Atheism has come from them, directly from Roman Catholicism! . . . Among us only exceptional classes of people don't believe, those . . . who have lost their roots. But there, in Europe, awesome masses of the people themselves are beginning to lose their faith—first from darkness and lies, and now from fanaticism, from hatred of the Church and Christianity. . . .
>
> "For socialism too is an offspring of Catholicism and the essential Catholic ideal. It, too, like its brother atheism, springs from despair in opposition to Catholicism as a moral presence, to replace the lost moral power of religion, to quench the spiritual thirst of parched humanity, and to save it not through Christ but also through violence! . . . Our Christ, whom we have preserved and they have not even known, must shine forth in opposition to the West! Not by falling like slaves into Jesuit traps but by carrying our Russian civilization to them; we must now stand before them."

Prince Myshkin's harangue is the most withering attack on Catholicism in the entire Dostoevsky canon. What makes the timing of it especially odd is that it was written in 1867-68 while Dostoevsky and his wife were residing for short periods in Dresden, Geneva, Vevey, Milan, and Florence. They must have been aware of the progress of Italian unification, which by the time Dostoevsky was writing *The Idiot* had stripped the papacy of everything in the Papal States, except a tenuous control of Rome itself, and which, three years later, would make a de-papalized Rome the capital of a united Italy. The Pope would retire to the papal precincts, refuse Italian indemnification, and eventually declare himself a prisoner in the Vatican. It seems a strange time for Dostoevsky to have raised such a polemic over the pitiful remains of papal temporal power, which had not presumed to inject itself seriously into European politics since the Thirty Years War, some two and a half centuries earlier. To see Catholicism in 1867 as "the continuation of the Holy Roman Empire," or the Pope as "a usurper of the earth," would, in the words of Dostoevsky biographer Joseph Frank, "be looked on by the majority of his compatriots with the same rather frightened and pitying incredulity as that displayed by the Epanchins' guests" in the novel.

One might even entertain the thought, though it may seem bizarre at first, that there was as much for Dostoevsky to approve of as to condemn in Pope Pius IX. True, Ultramontanism was cresting and by 1870 would culminate in Vatican I and the definition of papal infallibility (at the very time that the Pope was politically deposed by Victor Emmanuel). But Pius' whole career since the revolutions of 1848 had been directed against the same dominations and powers at which Dostoevsky, too, took aim. Shortly before the publication of *The Idiot*, the Pope had issued the encyclical *Quanta Cura*, to which was attached the Syllabus of Errors. Eamon Duffy has described it as a "now familiar Vatican Jeremiad" against the notion that "the Roman Pontiff can and should reconcile himself with progress, liberalism, and recent civilizations."

Many of the syllabus' eighty condemnations—in Duffy's words, of "Indifferentism, Freemasonry, Socialism, Gallicanism, Rationalism"—concerned developments that equally disturbed Dostoevsky. Doesn't his condemnation of the "nihilist" characters in *The Devils*—Stavrogin, Peter Stepanovich, et al.—constitute his own syllabus of errors? Are any of Pius' diatribes more withering than Dostoevsky's denunciation of these figures, whom he compares to the legion of devils (from Luke 8:32-35) cast out of the possessed man and permitted to enter a herd of swine that plunge into the sea? Considering the furor caused by the Syllabus of Errors throughout liberal Europe, it is hard to believe that Dostoevsky, who read French fluently and devoured daily newspapers both at home and abroad, would not have known of its existence and would not

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have been grudgingly forced to admit, if only to himself, that he and the Pope were facing the same implacable enemy. Is not the enemy of my enemy my friend?

Not, apparently, with Orthodox true believers, then and now. Yet in our own time should one not expect more of the Patriarch of All Russia, Alexei II, when considering the prospect of a papal visit to Moscow? Of course, as Fr. Jabusch has made clear, Alexei has his own reasons for foot dragging. All politics, even Russian Orthodox politics, is local. Still, should he not acknowledge that this is a pope whom many have credited as having contributed enormously to the fall of atheistic communism—and in his own country? Pope Leo, who faced down Attila the Hun at the gates of Rome fifteen centuries earlier, confronted a less dangerous foe. But now, thanks in part to the efforts of the Pope and Polish Solidarity, the Soviet Union is no more; the Russian Orthodox Church has been restored; persecutions of Eastern Christians have ceased; individual churches and seminaries have been reopened; ex-Communists may be seen ceremoniously crossing themselves—and the Pope has apologized to the Orthodox for the sins of Catholics in the past.

For those of us with long enough memories, all this seems miraculous, the kind of miracle prayed for at every pre-Vatican II Latin Mass which ended with the so-called Last Gospel. How many remember that the reading of the opening verses of John's Gospel was directed at "the conversion of Russia"? How many have noticed that something resembling that conversion has actually happened and that it would not have been done without the ministrations of a Polish pope? Under the circumstances why should we not expect Alexei to welcome his brother Patriarch, and brother Slav, to Moscow to sing a Slavonic Te Deum in thanksgiving?

The old reason—fear of Roman Catholic domination—can explain only some of the hostility. Maybe examining Dostoevsky's phobias can help, one of which was, in fact, Poland. When reading Dostoevsky, one cannot help but notice that the Polish character is always in the wrong, especially when he is identified as a Catholic. Grushenka's former lover in *The Brothers Karamazov*, for example, who comes back to her only when he learns that she has acquired a small fortune, is a Pole caught by Dimitri cheating at cards. In *The Idiot*, the faithless Aglaya's beloved, whom she marries instead of Prince Myshkin, is a Polish emigré count (a fake one, as it turns out), who succeeds in luring Aglaya into the confessional "of a certain celebrated Catholic priest" and thus "gain[ing] complete ascendancy over her mind." With minor, unnamed Polish characters, Dostoevsky's favorite epithet is "obsequious." The disdain is also present in his correspondence: in a letter from Geneva to his friend Maikov in St. Petersburg, Dostoevsky defends himself against bureaucratic questioning of his loyalty to the Czar by "ask[ing] him to free me of the suspicion of betraying the Fatherland and in having relation with the Polacks. . . . I hate the Polacks and love my Fatherland." Finally, in what must be the most petulant example of ethnic pique on record, Joseph Frank tells us that Dostoevsky loved classical music, especially Mozart and Beethoven, but not Chopin, because he was a Pole.

Maybe Dostoevsky's habitual dismissal of all things Polish is a consequence of the seventeenth-century horrors at Optina Pustin, or the more recent Polish rebellion of 1863, which he deplored. Still, with all deference to Fr. Jabusch's reading of Polish culpabilities, it may be argued that Russia was more sinning than sinned against in its relations with its Slavic cousin to the west. A century after Optina Pustin, Russia cynically colluded in a series of three partitions, with Austria and Prussia, that resulted in the complete disappearance of Poland from the map of Europe. Chopin did not compose his Polonaises in Paris of the 1830s and '40s merely as romantic folk celebrations but in commemoration of the failed rebellion of 1830 which provoked a stream of Polish refugees to Paris fleeing Russian oppression in their homeland. Indeed, Chopin's last concert before his premature death was a benefit for these refugees, who at his funeral in Paris in 1849 sprinkled Polish earth over his grave. When we add to these political causes of strife the un-Orthodox phenomenon of Poland's historic Catholic loyalties, we can better understand Dostoevsky's Polish phobia, and perhaps the phobias of the current Orthodox churchmen. Ironically, Dostoevsky may have explained some of this in a memorable line from *The Brothers Karamazov*: "I did him dirt and forever after did I hate him."

I have not meant, of course, to disparage Dostoevsky's greatness or Orthodox holiness. As a great writer and a good man, he understood Christianity *de profundis* and was able to transmit that understanding with an unmatched power. He has warned us, with a prescience that would have terrified even him had he seen it played out in history, especially on his native soil, that "without God all is permitted." Malcolm Muggeridge once said that Stalin's great mistake was denying his people access to the Gospels while permitting them to read their Dostoevsky—and Tolstoy. Dostoevsky's literary presence in our time has kept the votive candle to Christian faith lighted. His fiction, I make bold to say, can be, and has been, a channel of grace. Some of my students have confided to me that *The Brothers Karamazov* actually converted them away from the *novus ordo saeculorum*—insidiously present in every corner of their lives, even on their dollar bills—to a renewed belief in Christ.

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Nevertheless, Dostoevsky, like Homer, also nods—and in that nodding reveals some disturbing reasons for the continued enmity between Eastern and Western Christianity. Certainly, his notion that the future of Christianity would be exclusively connected to the Christ of Russian Orthodoxy—him "whom we have preserved and *they have not even known*" (to quote Prince Myshkin)—was exploded in October 1917. And Dostoevsky's fantasy that this Russian Christ "must shine forth in opposition to the West"—that the East must not "fall like slaves into Jesuit traps but carry our Russian civilization to them"—seems to have gotten it backwards. Were he alive today, would he have recognized the great irony that, had it not been for the providential nexus of two scorned adversaries, Catholicism and Poles, Ivan Karamazov might have had the last word? FT

Requiem

A payload of people phoning home:
their ghost voices linger, caught on tapes,
rewound, rewound, as if listening could summon them
back into themselves. The last hope's

supplanted now with clinging to a missed
call, replaying it, imagining words—
but what?—equal to the worst
dream, which shook itself, woke, cut the cords

binding earth to sky. Now we go
yawing rudderless into our new history.
Were those God's smouldering hindquarters we saw
between the towers? Or has this mystery,

being human, stunned even God into absence?
Whence cometh my help? The fire engine
pulling from the station winds its sirens
and we fall silent. Psychopaths grin

from their unmarked vans. Around midnight,
a drunk puking at our garden gate sounds
on the verge of detonating. And why not?
Nothing can surprise me. Night drowns

itself in sleeplessness. Then it's day.
The veiled rain, dread's dullest minion,
with chilly fingers drums its lullaby
—*not real, not real*—on the windowpane.

What's real? Outside, in thin light,
wet lavender relinquishes its scent,
a bruised sweetness rising through the rain.

Passing the open window, caught a moment
by the cool, still smell, I forget
and almost breathe again.

Sally Thomas

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Philosophy and Tyranny

Damon Linker

The tension between philosophy and politics is as old as philosophy itself. The case of Socrates—tried and executed for impiety and corrupting the youth of ancient Athens—might be the most famous example of political-philosophical conflict, but it is hardly the only one. From Anaxagoras, Aristotle, and Cicero to Averroes, Maimonides, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, history is filled with examples of philosophers persecuted at the hands of political authorities. Only recently—and only in liberal democracies founded on universal human rights—have men and women been allowed to philosophize without fear of tyrannical oppression.

But there is another dimension to the problematic relation between politics and philosophy—one that has showed itself more vividly in our time than in any previous era: the enthusiastic embrace of tyranny by philosophers. Throughout much of the twentieth century, and especially in the post-World War II period, intellectuals living in the free societies of the West were faced with a choice. They could offer support—however measured or qualified—for the liberal democratic order and its freedoms. Or they could reject it in favor of one of the various experiments in antiliberal and antidemocratic politics that arose throughout the course of the century. To be sure, some took the former path. But a distressingly large number of the century's most gifted minds opted, instead, for tyranny—or at least refused to acknowledge that there is a significant qualitative difference between constitutionalism and dictatorship.

What are we to make of this decision for despotism? Why were so many twentieth-century intellectuals led to it? Why are some led to it still? These are the difficult and disturbing questions that Richard Wolin's *Heidegger's Children* and Mark Lilla's *The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics* raise and seek to answer. Wolin and Lilla, two of our most learned and perceptive intellectuals, approach their subject in remarkably similar ways. Rather than discussing the relation between politics and philosophy in the abstract, they offer a series of philosophical-biographical sketches of some of the most noteworthy European intellectuals of the past century. Wolin explores the lives and works of Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse, while Lilla focuses on Heidegger, Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Alexandre Kojève, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida. The portraits they draw of these figures are, as one might expect, far from flattering. Yet they go a long way toward helping us make sense of the fateful coincidence of philosophy and tyranny in our time. This is especially true in the case of Heidegger—easily the most troubling case of all.

Heidegger's pertinence to any account of the intersection of philosophy and tyranny hardly needs to be justified. Not only was he by many accounts the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century, as well as a decisive influence on many of its leading thinkers, but his political "fall" was arguably its most dramatic and profound. As is now well known, Heidegger joined the Nazi Party and was appointed rector of Freiburg University in 1933, shortly after Hitler's rise to power and just six years after publishing one of the century's most acclaimed works of philosophy, *Being and Time*. From

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HEIDEGGER'S CHILDREN. By RICHARD WOLIN. *Princeton University Press. 312 pp. $29.95.*

THE RECKLESS MIND: INTELLECTUALS IN POLITICS. By MARK LILLA. *New York Review. 216 pp. $24.95.*

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his administrative position, he attempted to "revolutionize" the university by bringing it into conformity with National Socialist aims. He gave propaganda lectures throughout Germany, cut ties with Jewish students and colleagues (including his mentor, Edmund Husserl), denouncing some of them to Nazi officials, and signed petitions in support of Hitler.

While Heidegger later pointed to his resignation as rector in May 1934 as an indication of how quickly he became disillusioned with the regime, numerous actions and statements made public after 1945 reveal a far more ambivalent position. When a 1935 lecture course was published in 1953, Heidegger refrained from excising a notorious passage in which he extolled the "inner truth and greatness" of National Socialism. Neither did he retract or contradict equally infamous passages in which he asserted that Russia and America were "metaphysically the same." More troubling still, a 1966 interview with the German magazine *Der Spiegel* revealed that, despite his eventual dissatisfaction with the Nazis, Heidegger continued to think that National Socialism constituted a more adequate response to what he believed to be the unique challenges of modernity than democracy ever could.

The case of Heidegger's Nazism has generated considerable scholarship and journalism over the years, some of it thoughtful, much of it dreadful. Most authors who have chosen to tackle the subject succumb to one of two temptations, both of which reflect a failure of moral judgment. Either they are led by indignation to dismiss Heidegger as a demonic charlatan or they arrogantly defend him without stooping to confront the serious moral concerns raised by his actions and ideas. In charting a course between these extremes, Wolin and Lilla manage to combine uncommon moral seriousness with intellectual depth.

Of the two books, Wolin's is more narrowly focused on Heidegger and his influence. The four "children" he examines, all Jewish, studied with Heidegger in the 1920s and early '30s, and, in Wolin's words, would be "faced with the conundrum of how to reconcile their youthful philosophical allegiances with the 'totalitarian turn' in Heidegger's thought circa 1933." While all of them criticized Heidegger's behavior to varying degrees and attempted to distance themselves from his philosophical approach, Wolin finds that they each continued to accept one or another of Heidegger's many questionable assumptions about modernity. And it is these assumptions that, for Wolin, led Heidegger to embrace Hitler. He thus concludes that, "like a Greek tragedy—though on a smaller scale—the sins of the father [were] visited upon the daughters and sons."

This is not to say that all four figures developed along identical philosophical trajectories. For example, Arendt, with whom Heidegger conducted an extramarital affair when she was his student in the mid-1920s, remained a Heideggerian "political existentialist," though she came to transpose "the revolutionary energies that Heidegger praised in right-wing revolutionary movements to the ends of the political left." Löwith, by contrast, adopted an attitude of "Stoic detachment" toward what he considered to be the essentially "destitute" character of modern life, while Jonas and Marcuse endorsed alternative forms of "left-wing dictatorship" as preferable to the prosaic and partial goods of liberal democratic politics. What is crucial for Wolin, however, is that all of them ultimately "*accepted . . .* [the] *series of deep-seated prejudices concerning the nature of political modernity*" that they acquired largely from Heidegger.

It is not until the final third of the book that Wolin begins to examine those prejudices themselves, and in particular, their place in Heidegger's thought. Taking his cue from one of Heidegger's favorite sayings of Friedrich Hölderlin—"As you begin, so shall you remain"—Wolin looks for clues to Heidegger's mature political views in the details of his intellectual biography.

Heidegger was born in 1889 into a strict Catholic family in the provincial town of Messkirch, Germany, where his father served as the sexton of the local church. At the age of eighteen, he stumbled upon an obscure work of nineteenth-century philosophy, Franz Brentano's *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* (1862), which posed a series of questions that would occupy his thinking for the rest of his life. What does it mean "to be"? If particular entities or beings (such as rocks, desks, people, stars, atoms) can each be said "to be," then what is the meaning of "Being" as such? What do we mean when we attribute "Being" to some entity—when we say, for example, "it *is*" or "I *am*"? At first, the young Heidegger followed Brentano's suggestion and looked to Aristotle for answers to these ontological questions, though for the precocious young Catholic it was Aristotle as seen through the lens of Thomistic theology.

For a time, Heidegger's philosophical ambitions meshed quite nicely with the conservative Catholicism in which he was reared. He contemplated becoming a Jesuit, devoted himself to the study of scholasticism, and fell under the influence of the antimodernist theologian Carl Braig. During his mid-twenties, Heidegger even contributed a series of articles to the ultraconservative Catholic journal, *Der Akademiker*—a periodical whose first issue contained a Preface by Pope Pius X encouraging a vigilant and uncompromising struggle against modernity. For the young Heidegger, modern culture was characterized by a corrosive individualism and a quasi-pagan "glorification of subjective experience" that could only be overcome by a return to the

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absolute and eternal truth of Being embodied in the Church. Wolin is thus probably right to claim that "Heidegger's lifelong ontological quest, centered on the question of Being, was first catalyzed in response to the disorienting pluralism and relativism of cultural modernity."

But the happy synthesis between philosophy and faith did not last. Shortly after he completed his doctoral education in 1915 with a study of Duns Scotus, Heidegger began to break from the Church. A prolonged and intense study of the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey, the nineteenth-century social theorist who had emphasized the crucial place of "historical knowledge" in the study of mankind, apparently convinced Heidegger of the inadequacy of the atemporal account of Being found in the scholastic tradition. By 1919, he would write to his mentor at Freiburg University, the theology professor and priest Engelbert Krebs, that "the theory of historical knowledge has made the system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me." In Wolin's words, scholastic theology's "aversion to temporality, its inordinate focus on 'universality' and 'eternity' at the expense of the singularity of the here and now," separated it, in Heidegger's mind, from the reality of human existence. Heidegger's mature philosophy emerged directly from this assumption.

Heidegger's interest in religion was not yet at an end, however. Following his break with Catholicism, he turned almost immediately to the study of the essential texts of Protestant theology. He did so, not in pursuit of religious truth, but rather as a means to uncovering a central element of human experience that he now believed had been covered over by the institutions and practices of the Catholic Church—namely, the capacity to be fundamentally transformed or "gripped" at the root of one's existence by a spiritual experience. As Wolin writes, quoting Heidegger, "insofar as scholasticism, following the mistaken lead of Aristotle, attempted to take its bearings from the natural world rather than the domain of inner life, it 'severely jeopardized the immediacy of religious life and forgot religion for theology and dogmas.'" In the works of Augustine, Luther, Schleiermacher, and Kierkegaard, by contrast, Heidegger believed he had found an account of the divine that would enable him to "dismantle" the tradition of scholastic ontology and, in so doing, gain access to this more "primordial" experience.

For Heidegger, Protestant theology was one of several promising avenues by which to pursue a radically concrete and historical investigation into the question of the "meaning of Being." Like that of the Catholic Church, Aristotle's approach to this question—at least as it was traditionally understood—was, in Heidegger's view, profoundly ill-conceived. Aristotle had famously written in the *Metaphysics* that "that which 'is' primarily is the 'what,' which indicates the substance of the thing." Heidegger had come to believe that this focus on the "whatness" of things deeply distorts the radically temporal nature of human existence. While it might be appropriate to speak of nonhuman entities as kinds of things, to speak of a human being in such a way—as, for example, a "rational animal" or "transcendental ego"—is a profound error. The habits of thought inherited from the philosophical tradition were shot through with this error, and in modernity they had come, largely through the influence of modern science, to permeate human self-understanding. Man—but above all, modern man—conceives of himself in terms of the objects that surround him in the world, rather than as who he truly is—namely, the openness in which or through which those entities appear as what they are.

In order to break free from the prejudice in favor of substance that he detected in the Western philosophical tradition, as well as to clarify his inchoate thoughts about the unique openness of human beings to Being itself, Heidegger employed a version of the phenomenological approach to philosophy that he encountered in the work of Edmund Husserl, for whom he worked as an assistant during the early 1920s. In Heidegger's few autobiographical statements, he invariably emphasized the importance of Husserlian phenomenology on his own philosophical development. But the publication of Heidegger's many university lectures from the 1920s in the years since his death (in 1976) show that Heideggerian phenomenology bore little resemblance to Husserl's version of it. Whereas Husserl had hoped to use phenomenology to place philosophy on an objective, scientific basis by exposing timeless "essences" embedded in human experience, Heidegger wanted to do, if anything, the opposite.

That is, Heidegger sought to use phenomenological description of our intentional experience of the world to gain access to its primordial grounds. Heidegger would show that, far from being founded in eternal essences or ideas, all human thinking, rational and nonrational alike, is rooted in something prereflective—namely, the brute givenness of human existence. Nothing less than Being itself—and along with it the totality of entities within the world, as well as the categorical relations among them—is revealed to us prior to any act of reasoning we might bring to bear upon them. An entity *is* (or, what is the same thing for Heidegger, *appears as*) what it is by virtue of its disclosure as such in a meaningful human world.

These various strands of thinking finally came to fruition in Heidegger's early masterwork, *Being and Time* (1927), which managed to combine ontological reflection, phenomenological description, and cul-

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tural critique in a philosophically electrifying way. In this work, Heidegger wanted above all to come to grips with the meaning of Being. But he argued that in order to gain access to that meaning, it was necessary to interrogate the only entity for whom the meaning of Being can be an issue: a human being. Hence the book—which was originally intended to be the first part of a much larger study of Being itself—focused almost exclusively on man, at least insofar as he is open to the question of Being.

The result—which Heidegger named "fundamental ontology"—resembled nothing so much as an anthropological investigation, albeit one of an oddly formalistic kind. Man, according to Heidegger, is an entity who tends to understand Being in terms of the meaningful "world" in which he at any given moment "always already" finds himself stuck or enmeshed. Within this world, nonhuman entities show up or reveal themselves as what they are in the act of being used by human beings to realize practical ends, or what Heidegger calls "outstanding possibilities" of existence. Most of the time, individuals allow these possibilities to be determined by the view of Being that prevails among the mass of people who make up the world, which Heidegger dubs the "They." That is, we tend to take on the reigning interpretation of our world and accept it unthinkingly as an obvious, self-evident truth. And when we do so—when we allow ourselves to be "tranquilized" by the They—we are "inauthentic."

But there is another, "authentic" possibility of existence—one in which a human being allows himself to be "summoned out of his lostness in the They" to face the arbitrariness of having been "thrown" into a particular world and having accepted its prevailing possibilities and interpretation of Being as his own. The key to attaining this state of authenticity is embracing the "mood" of "anxiety," which discloses our fundamental finitude to us—the possibility of annihilation in death. For Heidegger, to be authentic is to live life—to choose one's possibilities—in the light of the nothingness that can envelop us at any moment.

Heidegger's tendency to write about our "Being-toward-death" in personal terms throughout much of *Being and Time* has led many to believe, today no less than when it was first published, that its teaching is primarily a radically individualistic one. But the late chapters of the book make clear that this is far from being the case. In these passages, we learn that each individual's "anticipatory resolution" regarding death must be undertaken as a "struggle" with the other members of his "generation." Together, they must determine the essence of the contemporary "Situation" that prevails within the historical community, or "people," to which they belong. In other words, the community—which as the inauthentic They is determined by received norms, practices, beliefs, and traditions—must be transformed into an authentic collectivity that forges a new understanding of existence in what Heidegger calls a "moment of vision." At this moment, the community chooses its "hero," who, in turn, leads it on a quest to determine its historical "destiny" by appropriating its past and projecting it onto an indefinite future. Hence, despite the fact that *Being and Time* comes to a close without returning to an explicit discussion of Being as such, the reader is left with the distinct impression that Heidegger means to indicate that Being is indistinguishable from Time, understood as human history or fate.

Many of Heidegger's defenders have pointed out that there is nothing overtly Hitlerian about his published work. Yet Wolin contends that, while this is technically true, there is a deeply radical normative component to Heidegger's philosophy. The fact is that the book's ideal (a collective act of "anticipatory resoluteness") can be realized only by a generation that is prepared to make a decision of existential proportions. Although Heidegger certainly did not advocate in *Being and Time* that his readers join the Nazi Party or any other political movement, he did denigrate as inauthentic all public action that failed to break decisively with received standards regarding every conceivable element of human life and death. In Wolin's view, Heidegger thus came to embrace—and his thought to embody—the deeply nihilistic conviction that "widespread destruction was required before anything of lasting value could be built."

According to Wolin, it was above all the breathtakingly radical character of the National Socialist revolution that inspired the philosopher to embrace it so enthusiastically. For Heidegger, as it was for such fellow philosophical supporters of Hitler's movement as Carl Schmitt and Ernst Jünger, prosaic and pragmatic liberal democracy was beneath contempt. As for Marxism, it merely radicalized certain elements of modernity—its materialism and economistic outlook—while leaving its essential character unchallenged. Only the movement led by Hitler and Mussolini opened up the possibility of (in Heidegger's words) a "countermovement to nihilism"—one in which a concrete, historical people (*Volk*) would seize its possibility for authentic existence.

In order to gain insight into Heidegger's fateful decision for Hitler, as well as to assess the causes of his rapid disillusionment with the reality—if not the ideal potential—of the Nazi regime, Wolin looks to the recently published transcript of a course Heidegger taught in 1934, in the aftermath of his failed rectorship. That the title of the course was "Logic" did not indicate that Heidegger planned to teach his students anything as mundane as the rules of inference or the nuances of

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Frege's predicate calculus. Rather, as he announced at the outset of the class, he intended nothing less than to "shake logic *to its very foundations*." What modern professors of philosophy call logic is, for Heidegger, merely a superficial technique based on an encrusted metaphysical error that covers over the original and more primordial understanding of "logos" that treated language as a "site" for the revelation of Being. And as Wolin writes, Heidegger maintained that

> Being never reveals itself arbitrarily. Thus . . . certain peoples are linguistically and historically privileged. Ultimately, therefore, all linguistic questions turn out to be questions of human existence . . . [and] when posed "essentially," existential questions also concern the historical self-understanding of a people, or *Volk*.

It is thus appropriate, and perhaps even essential, that a course on logic focus on "the hidden potentials of Germany's National Revolution."

Heidegger is quite clear in his remarks to his class that he believes the Nazis provided the Germans with a historic opportunity to opt for a wholly new understanding of Being—an understanding that, in Wolin's words, "would be free of the divisiveness and debilities of the liberal era." By "choosing themselves," as Heidegger puts it, the German people had adopted a unified will that could overturn the pluralistic differentiation that prevails within liberal societies. No longer would state and society, private and public, religious and secular, stand opposed to one another. Instead, they would combine to form a single entity led by a transformed university on a self-generated "spiritual mission." Academic freedom would thus become a thing of the past, as merely "scholarly education" made way for what Heidegger calls "knowledge service"—a mode of thinking based entirely on "the forces and demands of the National Socialist state."

It was these hopes that were dashed during the year that Heidegger served as rector. As Wolin points out, Heidegger became deeply disappointed that university reforms "had proved insufficiently radical, and that the 'dissolution' of the old university structure had not proceeded fast enough." While Heidegger appears in the 1934 lecture to maintain hope for future reforms, a year later he would denounce the "works that are peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism" for failing to live up to its "inner truth and greatness." By the end of the war, he had convinced himself that he was a victim of the Nazis, who had failed to appoint him as their official philosophical spokesman. Hence his remarkable comment to Ernst Jünger that he would apologize for his Nazi engagement only if Hitler could be brought back to apologize to him.

In his later work, Heidegger adopted a far less politically active stance. Calls for collective authenticity and resolution were replaced by an ominous demonization of technology and a quasi-mystical insistence on the necessity of "letting beings be." What never changed—and, if anything, became even more pronounced in his later work—was Heidegger's steadfast hostility to the modern age, along with its premier political and social institution, constitutional democracy. According to Wolin, it was an outlook from which "Heidegger's children" found it equally difficult to extricate themselves. Although, like their teacher, they surely manifested "a capacity for probing philosophical insight that one risks losing sight of today"—and while none of them quite matched Heidegger's breathtaking "incapacity for political judgment"—they nevertheless perpetuated many of his "conservative revolutionary" prejudices, and along with them a startling lack of appreciation for "values of 'public reason.'" Wolin insists that in reading and learning from them today, we must take care not to adopt these supremely questionable and dangerous assumptions as our own.

On this matter, as on much else in his insightful and disturbing book, Wolin is surely right. As an exercise in moral judgment, *Heidegger's Children*, like Wolin's previous work on Heidegger and other twentieth-century intellectuals, is unimpeachable. When it comes to analysis and argument, however, the book offers us far less than we might have hoped for. The problem is not that Wolin lacks the ability to understand and recount the details of the figures he examines. On the contrary, he is supremely fluent in the hyper-abstract idiom of twentieth-century continental philosophy. Rather, the shortcomings of his work arise from his apparent unwillingness to answer the hardest questions raised by his research.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Wolin's explanation of precisely why Heidegger embraced political tyranny. Wolin tells us that he was "overdetermined" by the antiliberal "*Zeitgeist* of the interwar years" and his antimodern Catholic upbringing to support political extremism. Yet one wonders how much we really learn from reducing Heidegger—or, for that matter, any philosopher—so thoroughly to his historical and personal context. When, like Wolin's, such accounts are taken too far, they border on the tautological, telling us little more than that the figure we wish to understand believed what he did because of who he was—all the while refusing to attend adequately to the ideas that, one would think, made that figure a unique individual. In the case of Wolin's treatment of Heidegger, we are told *what* he thought and *where* many of those ideas originated, but we learn next to nothing about *why* he held those views—beyond the insinuation that he was

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simply an unreflective and foolish bastard. Perhaps he was. But anyone who has approached Heidegger's work with an open mind discovers that his views, however troubling and even outrageous, cannot be waved away quite so easily.

As for Wolin's treatment of "Heidegger's children," the situation is marginally better. Here, at least, he does offer an explanation of their unsavory political opinions, though that explanation is far from persuasive. In Wolin's view, Arendt, Löwith, Jonas, and Marcuse continued to adhere to Heidegger's least defensible political presuppositions because of "the delusions of Jewish assimilationism." Arguing that they were each drawn to Heidegger out of the conviction that he was the twentieth-century embodiment of the German *Kultur* into which they wished to be assimilated, Wolin implies that they remained in his orbit even after his endorsement of the Nazis out of what can only be described as Jewish self-hatred. Or at least this is what Wolin insinuates in the eight pages of the book's second chapter. Other than that, the theme of Judaism is all but ignored. One almost wonders if it was a last-minute imposition of an editor in search of a unifying argument for the book. As it is, the explanation is woefully underdeveloped, and the reader is left with the conclusion that Heidegger's greatest students remained in thrall to their teacher's views because they, too, were unreflective and foolish bastards.

An appropriately serious reckoning with Heidegger and the many other illiberal intellectuals of the past century would have to wrestle more profoundly than Wolin is willing to do with their deepest moral and political concerns. Railing against them for being "elitist" and "aristocratic" simply doesn't get us very far—however satisfying it might be for a convinced democrat like Wolin—and neither does his desultory praise of Jürgen Habermas' commitment to egalitarian "discussion" in the public square as an alternative to Heideggerian authenticity. For the fact remains that, however poor their political judgment, Heidegger and his philosophical descendants present a critique of modernity and democratic norms that is deeply powerful. Until we make a greater effort to understand their reasons for rejecting these fundamental elements of our world, their actions will remain utterly mysterious.

In this regard, Lilla does much better in *The Reckless Mind*. Aside from highly (and justly) critical chapters on Schmitt and Derrida, he exhibits greater sympathy for his subjects than Wolin. His treatment of Walter Benjamin, in particular, is a model of nuance and insight. Benjamin, a hermetic literary critic who flirted with radical politics in the interwar period and died fleeing from the Nazis in 1940, has been transformed over the past two decades into a prophet of postmodernism by a coterie of (mostly American) academics. But Lilla takes a different approach to interpreting his life and writings. Following the pregnant suggestion of Gershom Scholem that Benjamin must be understood as "a theologian marooned in the realm of the profane," Lilla explores the many half-hidden religious aspects of his work, finally coming to the conclusion that Benjamin was "the modern incarnation of the type of thinker who cannot be understood apart from traditional theological distinctions." Anyone who has tried to make sense of Benjamin's idiosyncratic work on its own terms—as opposed to using it as a proof-text for left-wing postmodernist pronouncements—will find this judgment to be exactly right.

But the main purpose of Lilla's book is, like Wolin's, to examine and assess the morally dubious actions and ideas of Europe's leading twentieth-century intellectuals. Lilla treats the topic most explicitly in the book's lengthy opening chapter and in its concluding Afterword. In these passages, Lilla suggests that the key to understanding the link between philosophy and tyranny in our time is, of all things, love.

"What has philosophy to do with love?" asks Lilla at the beginning of his book, and he answers, "if Plato is to be believed, everything." What follows is a Platonic account of the role of eros in different kinds of human lives. Some, driven by an "unconscious memory of the beauty of the Ideas," become philosophers, spending their lives attempting to consummate their love of eternal truth. Others, lacking the metaphysical desires as well as the intelligence and discipline of philosophers, seek erotic satisfaction in physical union with another human being. And then there are those who can accept neither possibility. Combining the philosopher's "frenzied yearning" for perfection with the immoderation of those who direct their erotic longings toward physical satisfaction, this third type of man allows eros to "overwhelm [his] reason and natural instincts, directing them to its own ends and becoming the soul's tyrant."

> What is political tyranny, Plato has Socrates ask in the *Republic*, if not the unjust rule of a man who himself is tyrannized by his basest desires? . . . [For Plato,] the philosopher and the tyrant, the highest and lowest of human types, are linked through some perverse trick of nature by the power of love.

According to Lilla, this psychological account of the perfection and perversion of philosophic eros is the key to understanding the actions of those he dubs "philo-tyrannical" intellectuals. He sets out to substantiate this bold thesis in his opening chapter by examining the love and friendship that linked Heidegger to Arendt and Karl Jaspers.

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That Heidegger and Arendt engaged in a love affair is less relevant for Lilla than the fact that she was initially drawn to him out of a love of philosophical truth. Whatever physical attraction may have existed between them, Arendt's feelings for her teacher were aroused in large part by what she later described as his "passionate thinking," as he struggled to wrest a new understanding of Being from the texts of the Western philosophical tradition. As she would later write, Heidegger seemed to engage in "thinking as pure activity" and philosophized with a "passion which not so much rules and oppresses all other capacities and gifts, as it orders them and prevails through them." Regularly witnessing this display before her in the classroom, Arendt became convinced that "thinking" itself had "come to life again" in the person of Martin Heidegger.

Their affair lasted little more than a year, ending before Heidegger achieved international renown with the publication of *Being and Time* in 1927, yet she clearly continued to have feelings for him and to think of him as nothing less than the living embodiment of philosophy. She was thus devastated by news of his enthusiastic support for Hitler. How could Heidegger, whom she considered a philosopher par excellence, have directed his extraordinary passions into the Nazi cause? This question haunted Arendt as she fled Germany in 1933, first for France, and then, in 1941, the United States. In fact, Lilla contends that it determined the contours of her own thought long after she established an independent reputation as an intellectual and scholar. Even her reconciliation with Heidegger in 1950 did not diminish her need to make sense of his political actions in her own terms. For despite their renewed closeness—reflected in warm correspondence, occasional friendly visits, and Arendt's determined efforts to ensure the translations of her teacher's works into English—a frank and open discussion of the Nazi period seems never to have occurred. Heidegger appeared incapable of understanding the contemporary world in anything other than the bleakest terms—and his own actions as anything other than an understandable, if ultimately futile, response to this situation.

Left to make sense of Heidegger's actions on her own, Arendt came to interpret them as a particularly vivid example of the perennial conflict between philosophy and political power. "When philosophers try to become kings," writes Lilla, summarizing Arendt's position, "either philosophy is corrupted, politics is corrupted, or both are." The best course of action is therefore to separate the two spheres, "leaving philosophers to cultivate their gardens with all the passion they have, but keeping them quarantined there so they can cause no harm." It was this stance that enabled Arendt, in Lilla's words, "to remain, in her own eyes, a genuine friend both of Heidegger's philosophy and of political decency."

Heidegger's relationship with Jaspers developed along somewhat different, although, for Lilla, more revealing lines. The two men met in 1920 and quickly began an intense friendship based on what Jaspers called "a foundation of philosophizing." In his work, Jaspers was concerned with what he described as "limit situations"—situations in which, as Lilla writes, "the cloud of forgetting that normally envelops our *Existenz* evaporates and we are suddenly confronted with the fundamental questions of life and, especially, death." This was, of course, the same theme that preoccupied Heidegger at this time, and each man immediately recognized in the other a kindred spirit. Jaspers, in particular, understood that in Heidegger he had encountered an extraordinarily rare human being. As he wrote in his *Philosophical Autobiography*, "Through Heidegger I saw in a contemporary that 'something' that normally can be found only in the past, and that is essential to philosophizing." That "something" was, as Arendt likewise noted, philosophical passion—a lust for truth that yielded breathtaking flights of speculation and questioning. But Heidegger's depth also had a more ominous side. "It could sometimes seem," Jaspers wrote, "that a demon had crept into him."

Lilla describes how Jaspers, despite his awareness of Heidegger's dark side, was shocked to see his friend leap so decisively into the world of politics in 1933. Shortly after Heidegger rose to the leadership of Freiburg University, their friendship fell apart. Although the two men exchanged pleasantries for the next four years, they lost contact after 1937, when Jaspers was removed from his university post and (in Lilla's words) "forced into the terrifying position of surviving until the war's end as an anti-Nazi married to a Jewish woman and barred from leaving the country."

It wasn't until 1949 that the two friends reestablished contact, and even then, it took a year of correspondence until Jaspers broached the subject of Heidegger's Nazism. When he did, he was deeply disappointed to discover that, although Heidegger was willing to acknowledge that his decision for Hitler had been a mistake, he did so entirely in nonmoral terms, describing it as little more than a tactical error on his part. The real victim of the war was, he argued, Germany, which was surrounded by enemies on all sides and forced to put its hopes in a new "advent" that would rescue it from oblivion. For Jaspers, this was definitive proof that his friend had been lost. As he later wrote, Heidegger "really doesn't know and is hardly in a position to find out what devil drove him to do what he did."

But while his friendship with Heidegger had ended, Jaspers found it impossible to forget him. In 1928 he began to keep a private notebook devoted to his observations and thoughts about Heidegger, and he continued to contribute to it until at least 1964. Lilla con-

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cludes his chapter on these figures by quoting from a passage in which Jaspers addresses Heidegger in anguish: "I beseech you! If ever we shared anything that can be called philosophical impulses, take responsibility for your own gift! Place it in the service of reason, of the reality of human worth and possibilities, instead of in the service of magic!" Lilla glosses this moving passage as follows:

> [Jaspers] felt betrayed by Heidegger as a human being, as a German, and as a friend, but especially as a philosopher. What he thought they shared in the early years of their friendship was the conviction that philosophy was a means of wresting one's existence from the grip of the commonplace and assuming responsibility for it. Then he saw a new tyrant enter his friend's soul, a wild passion that misled him into supporting the worst of political dictators and then enticed him to intellectual sorcery.

For Lilla, Heidegger's actions can best be understood as a result of philosophical passion run amok.

This psychological interpretation returns in the book's Afterword, where Lilla expands on these insights and applies them much more broadly. Its title—"The Lure of Syracuse"—is a reference to Plato's journey to the Sicilian city in 368 B.C. in the hopes of educating its ruler, Dionysius, in philosophy. These hopes were dashed, however, as Dionysius became a brutal tyrant, and Plato was lucky to escape with his life. Legend has it that it was from this experience that Plato learned that it would take either a miracle or an extraordinary coincidence for philosophy and political power to coincide.

In seeking to understand why so many twentieth-century intellectuals came to the opposite conclusion—how, in Lilla's words, it "became respectable to argue that tyranny was good, even beautiful"—Lilla considers, and rejects, a number of different theories that have been proposed as explanations over the years. The philosophical choice for tyranny cannot be traced solely to an overabundance of "rationalism," as Isaiah Berlin and the members of the Frankfurt School have claimed. But neither can simple-minded "irrationalism" of the kind emphasized by Jacob Talmon be blamed. And while Raymond Aron was right to point out the dangers of an excess of "commitment" on the part of French intellectuals, such German scholars as Fritz Stern and Jürgen Habermas have been correct to identify the opposite tendency ("disengagement") as the crucial defect in many others.

In place of these explanations, Lilla proposes that we look within the souls of the philotyrannical intellectuals themselves. When we do, we find that they have succumbed to the "blissful kind of madness" that love can induce, whether its object is "another human being or . . . an idea . . . [of] eternal truth, justice, beauty, [and] wisdom." When such passions refuse the discipline that "the philosophical life aims to provide," they come to dominate the soul. And when that love is inspired by ideas, the results can be disastrous, especially when the love-struck intellectual attempts to realize his ambitions in politics.

For Lilla, it was Plato's awareness of our potentially "tyrannical inclinations" that saved him from the fate of so many philotyrannical intellectuals in the twentieth century. And we would be well-advised to recognize that there is a "connection in the human mind between the yearning for truth and the desire to contribute to [what Plato described as] 'the right ordering of cities and households.'" It was by manipulating this "urge"—by appealing, "slyly and dishonestly, to the sense of justice and hatred of despotism that thinking seems to instill in us, and which, unmastered, can literally possess us"—that the ideologies of the twentieth century were able to convince so many philosophers to provide them with enthusiastic legitimation.

Lilla's psychological argument—that the human mind becomes "reckless" when it fails to discipline its own erotic desire for truth and justice—has much to recommend it. It has the advantage of offering both a compelling explanation of the actions and ideas of the twentieth century's philotyrannical intellectuals, as well as a prescription for avoiding their errors in the present and future. If Lilla is right, the need to "master the tyrant within" will not "disappear in less extreme circumstances," for its sources lie in the very "makeup of our souls." We need above all to practice self-control and to embrace the virtue of moderation if we hope to master the madness that lurks within us. Only if we do so will we be ensured of remaining tethered to moral decency and capable of distinguishing between a beautiful mirage of the good and the good as it truly is.

While *The Reckless Mind* is elegantly argued, beautifully written, and exhibits a fluency and confidence with both philosophy and history that is exceedingly rare, Lilla's central argument is, like Wolin's, ultimately less than fully convincing. The problem lies primarily in Lilla's decision to rely so heavily on psychology to understand his subjects. Doing so is certainly suggestive, but it is hardly sufficient. By placing so much emphasis on the importance of psychological moderation in theoretical inquiry, Lilla makes it seem as if the primary difference between, say, Heidegger on the one hand and Aristotle or David Hume on the other is the extent of their philosophical sobriety. There is undoubtedly something to this interpretation, as anyone who compares the tone and tenor of these philoso-

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phers' writings will instantly note, but it can hardly be said to capture the full extent of the difference between them.

While a person's disposition has significant influence on how he approaches the truth, we have reason to suspect that it exercises far less of one than Lilla would have us believe. As with all choices, a person makes political decisions on the basis of opinions about which ends are choiceworthy—that is, on the basis of opinions about the good and the true. Whether or not that person has a moderate or immoderate temperament is of secondary importance. (While all Nazis were evil, they were not all equally fanatical; some were even sober.) Moderation alone cannot generate opinions about goodness and truth, just as we cannot know whether sobriety or radicalism are called for until those ends have been discovered or revealed.

Understanding the actions of illiberal intellectuals thus requires that we examine and assess what they held to be good and true. In Heidegger's case, this means confronting assumptions that Heidegger himself never appears to have subjected to scrutiny. The first of these has to do with philosophical method. For all of Heidegger's hostility to various aspects of modern life—and despite his claim to have turned toward phenomenology in order to reveal the contours of primordial human experience—he was very much a member of the modern stream of thought that begins philosophical inquiry with a radical break from common opinions about the good, the just, the beautiful, and the holy. This current arose in explicit opposition to an older and more circumspect approach to reflection—one that sought knowledge through the dialectical examination and rational refinement of these opinions. For such figures as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas, thinking not only begins from common moral opinions, it also has to refer constantly back to them as a necessary touchstone along the way to theoretical knowledge.

But for the modern tradition to which Heidegger belongs, philosophy begins with a contrary impulse—the drive to indeterminate liberation from all received views. Following a path staked out by Descartes, Locke, Kant, and many others, the members of this tradition put their trust in the autonomous human mind and reject a gradual ascent from common opinions in favor of a radical rupture from them. It should thus come as no surprise that, having decided to cut themselves off from the moral contents of life, they then go on to portray the world as a moral and theological void. For them, philosophy discloses a world that is (in Max Weber's famous phrase) "disenchanted."

This is not to say that Heidegger and his many predecessors and successors ever fully succeed in making a complete break from moral opinion. On the contrary, their very quest for liberation (like all human goals) presupposes some notion of—some opinion about—the good. In fact, it is these moral assumptions, more than their shared methodological presupposition, that determine the unique character of their various philosophical positions. The contrasting examples of Richard Rorty and Heidegger illustrate the point particularly well. In his endorsement of the disenchantment thesis, in his denial of metaphysical truth or higher principles of any kind, and in his wholesale dismissal of "Platonism" for its attempt to acquire such truth, Rorty's thought is indistinguishable from Heidegger's. And yet, as anyone who has spent time with the work of the two authors is well aware, Rorty and Heidegger are worlds apart.

The difference between them lies primarily in the realm of moral principle, which neither thinker deigns to discuss explicitly. Rorty's work, on the one hand, is clearly suffused with a love for the good of secular, radical egalitarianism, and it is for the sake of this good that he seeks to dissolve every competing moral claim with the acid of philosophical criticism. This is why Rorty comes off as so amiable and amusing to American liberal intellectuals, despite his manifest radicalism—because he employs his anti-philosophical arguments to further a good that is extremely congenial to them. Heidegger, on the other hand, employs similarly corrosive arguments for the sake of a very different good—one that contemporary American intellectuals find considerably more sinister. That is, Heidegger is primarily concerned with the collapse of the hierarchical dimension of life—and above all, the experience of the noble—in the modern world.

In a recently published 1941 lecture on "German Nihilism," Leo Strauss explains how this concern with nobility—when combined with the conviction that the modern world is incompatible with the experience of the high or exalted—contributed in a decisive way to the enthusiasm for militarism and, in turn, National Socialism among Germans of the interwar period. Strauss points out that many members of Heidegger's generation became convinced that nobility in the modern period was endangered by "the identification of the morally good with the object of enlightened self-interest." In a world in which the useful is equated with the good, the noble—which comes to sight as disinterestedly beautiful or good in itself, regardless of its usefulness—would simply disappear.

It was thought that one could most effectively combat this trend by positing the opposite of the prevailing modern view—namely, the absolute "*difference* between the moral good and self-interest." In other words, Heidegger and his peers "insisted on self-sacrifice and self-denial" and therefore found themselves attracted to the

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one virtue that calls us to complete sacrifice of one's own good: courage. Strauss explains why:

> . . . the difference between the noble and the useful, between duty and self-interest, is most visible in the case of . . . courage, military virtue. The consummation of the actions of every other virtue is, or may be, rewarded: it actually pays to be just, temperate, urbane, munificent, etc.; the consummation of the actions of courage, i.e., death on the field of honor, death for one's country, is *never* rewarded: it is the flower of self-sacrifice. . . . [T]he German philosophers were [thus] tempted to overstress the dignity of military virtue, and in very important cases . . . they succumbed to that temptation.

Heidegger's embrace of Hitler must be understood as the decision of a man who was convinced that the highest good consists in noble sacrifice—and that only the *Führer* could call it forth under modern conditions.

Heidegger eventually came to see that there was something deeply problematic—though not immoral—about his hope that Hitler could usher in a modern rebirth of nobility. Is it not the height of foolishness to believe that a people, or even its leader, can *will* its own self-sacrifice? Isn't it rather the case that one is inspired to sacrifice by an experience of something external—an ideal, a principle, a deity—calling on one to do so? There seems, in other words, to be a necessary element of passivity, responsiveness, and gratitude in every experience of the noble. Hence the late Heidegger's talk of the "call" of thinking. Hence also his notorious oracular assertion (in his 1966 *Der Spiegel* interview) that "only a god can save us now." Heidegger came to recognize the indispensability of the divine as the source or ground of any and all enchantment, even as he persisted in rejecting every god in which mankind has heretofore believed. All he could do was "prepare to be prepared" for a new revelation whose content, as always, remained wholly indeterminate.

Wolin would have us believe that Heidegger's concern with "suffering and nobility of character" was merely an expression of an outmoded "romantic sensibility." But it can't be dismissed so easily. Without something to look up to—without something to call on man to sacrifice his own personal good for something higher than himself—he loses his moral compass. Without a higher principle, he loses his ability to make judgments about good and bad, right and wrong, beautiful and ugly. His life is impoverished. Habermas might convince certain naive secularists that intersubjective consensus is sufficient to guarantee a good political order. But Augustine was more persuasive when he pointed out that a group of individuals without a transcendent good—that is, God—to guide them is indistinguishable from a thuggish gang of robbers.

No, Heidegger wasn't wrong to worry about such matters. Contrary to Lilla's account, his at times immoderate and undisciplined concern with them—along with his fixation on the only question that really matters, the question of the meaning of existence—is what makes him, for all his manifest flaws, a great philosopher. What is truly remarkable about Heidegger is not so much his unceasing, even manic desire to secure the conditions of the experience of nobility under modern circumstances, or his endless quest to understand the meaning of Being, or even his belief that the Nazis represented an historic opportunity to re-enchant the modern world. All of these traits are understandable, given his deepest and most questionable assumption—namely, that the world, in its "essence," has been disenchanted in modernity. What is truly remarkable is that he appears never, even for a moment, to have entertained the possibility that it was he, and not the world, who had been disenchanted.

In this, he is hardly alone. In fact, it is above all this assumption—and not merely an antimodern ideology or an immoderate psychological disposition—that binds together the myriad intellectuals examined by Wolin and Lilla. To reject the truth of this assumption—to say that Heidegger's writings, as well as those of so many others in our time, reflect or express a deeply *personal* experience of godlessness—is not to deny that we can learn quite a lot from studying them. But it is to diminish their usefulness for understanding our shared public world. Instead of standing as an authoritative description of the essence of modernity—let alone of "Being" as such—the work of these tortured figures must be understood primarily as a testament to what existence looks like to the most profound of atheists—and to what kind of actions such men might be tempted to undertake. FT

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Books In Review

One Man's Bach

THE TRUE LIFE OF J. S. BACH. By KLAUS EIDAM. Translated by Hoyt Rogers. *Basic. 432 pp. $35.*

Reviewed by **Michael Linton**

NICHT BACH, sondern Meer sein! Beethoven's famous pun on Johann Sebastian Bach's last name ("not a Brook, but rather an Ocean!") is perhaps the most eloquent summary of the Saxon composer's importance to music. He was widely regarded as the greatest keyboard artist of his age, and his compositions, although not as well known, were deeply respected by his musical peers. His sons (and his students) were the greatest composers of the succeeding generation, serving courts in Hamburg, Berlin, and London. Mozart, who probably never before had been confronted with a genius equal to his own, was stunned into silence when he came across Bach's motets during a visit to Leipzig. As a boy Beethoven was instructed out of Bach's *Well-Tempered Clavier*, and Chopin began his day with devotional playings of those same preludes and fugues. Mendelssohn's earliest string symphonies were elegies to Bach, and Brahms devoted much of his career to the task of editing the first complete collection of Bach's compositions.

Even Wagner, perhaps temperamentally the antithesis of Bach, paid him tribute in the polyphony that forms the foundation for *Die Meistersinger*. Today, pianists all over the world begin their studies with the two-part "inventions" Bach wrote as teaching pieces for his children. His hymn harmonizations provide the basis for the study of traditional harmony in music schools and conservatories. Such pieces as the *Well-Tempered Clavier*'s C Major Prelude and the Air on a G String stand as deeply loved works by the general public, and his *Art of the Fugue* and *Goldberg Variations* are seen universally as the summits of musical intelligence by connoisseurs. Beethoven was right. Bach's significance is oceanic.

Perhaps because of this, biographers have disagreed widely as to the essential significance of his work. In the nineteenth century he was hailed as the champion of German music (which meant polyphonic music, as opposed to the supposedly decadent lyrical traditions of the Italians). In the past century he was called the "fifth evangelist" by some Christians, while other critics (particularly East Germans) argued that he was a man of the Enlightenment who wrote what he was paid to write and owed his allegiance only to the Art of Music. Christoph Wolff's recent biography presents the composer as a "most learned musician," which is to say a man very much like Professor Wolff himself.

Now Klaus Eidam comes along and gives us *The True Life of J. S. Bach*. Mr. Eidam is an amateur musician but a professional television producer and a theater director in Germany. His enthusiasm for Bach's music is matched by his disdain for previous biographers and professional musicology in general. Because past writers have not paid sufficient attention to some primary (although tangential) sources, Eidam claims that their accounts of Bach's life are inaccurate and even fundamentally misleading. Eidam's "true" Bach is a man dedicated to his art, a Christian throughout his life, though of the undogmatic kind, and a bit of a calculating social climber. (And despite what some readers might be led to believe from the title, no accounts of out-of-wedlock children or lists of mistresses appear in the book.)

Eidam does bring to the surface interesting details in Bach's life, such as the fire that destroyed half of the city of Muehlhausen only weeks before Bach's arrival there in May of 1707, creating such chaos that the town council had some trouble finding pen and ink with which to sign Bach's contract. He is also good at reporting unsubstantiated eighteenth-century gossip, which always makes for entertaining reading. As to his complaints about previous biographers, they are often well founded, but most of them have been known and widely discussed for several generations. His continual hounding of Phillip Spitta (who wrote in 1880) and Albert Schweitzer (whose Bach biography was published in 1905) is unnecessary.

Indeed, Eidam's own work is deeply marred both by errors in fact and profound misunderstandings. Let one sentence stand as an example for many. "The Pietists professed the doctrine of the Swiss theologian Calvin, and a half century later Voltaire could still only dare to settle on the outermost fringe of Switzerland because he was not a Calvinist." Most of the Pietists were not Reformed but Lutherans, Calvin was French and not Swiss, and when Voltaire lived in Geneva (which did not become a part of the Swiss Confederation until 1815) it was very much a Calvinist state.

ERRORS SUCH AS THESE (and there are many of them) are annoying but usually insignificant to Eidam's picture of the composer. Much more problematic is his ridiculing of much recent research by musicologists that has revealed the depth of Bach's musical thought and its effect on the actual structure and purpose of his music. Let me give one example of the kind of analysis Eidam disdains but which, had he made use of it, would have deepened his portrayal of his subject.

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Bach wrote a setting of the Magnificat for Christmas Vespers in 1723. It was one of the first large-scale compositions he wrote after moving to Leipzig the previous year, a list of works that would culminate in the *St. Matthew Passion* and the *B Minor Mass*. The Magnificat is divided into twelve movements. "*Fecit potentiam*," the seventh, is a setting of Luke 1:51. Here Bach begins with a florid choral and orchestral texture not unlike a concerto grosso, moves into a brief fugue, but ends with a surprising chordal setting in which the entire chorus sings the same text at the same time: "*mente cordis sui*" ("by the imagination of their hearts"). This is the only place in the whole work where Bach does this. Although this kind of compositional strategy is typical of Handel (it happens frequently in his *Messiah*), it is an unusual one for Bach. And not only is the compositional technique unusual, the choice to so dramatically heighten these words and no others in the Magnificat seems odd. Why, then, did Bach do it?

The reason becomes clear upon reading the epilogue Luther appended to his commentary on the Magnificat. Writing to the somewhat dissolute son of the Elector of Saxony, Luther commends to his grace the Magnificat and in particular its fifth and six verses, for there is nothing to fear on earth, he wrote, "not even hell itself, so much as that which the Mother of God there calls 'the imagination of their hearts.'" For Luther, those very words, "*mente cordis sui*," were the summary of the whole text. At least that's what he wanted the Prince to remember. Bach apparently owned nearly three complete sets of Luther's works (they are mentioned in the inventory of his estate). It is highly probable that Bach's unusual setting of these words is the direct result of his reading of Luther's commentary. Any other explanation is unconvincing.

This detail is helpful to keep in mind, for it testifies to the fact that Bach's music frequently is full of intelligent and meaningful design, even on the smallest scale. Such observations throw light on the composer's character, demonstrating the many-layered care he took with his compositions, a care that he must have known would pass largely unrecognized by many of his listeners.

UNFORTUNATELY, EIDAM'S inability to recognize the usefulness of this kind of study of Bach's works weakens his picture of Bach, both as an artist and as a man. (Though, to his credit, he avoids the kind of postmortem psychoanalysis that has marred recent

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Foreword by **U. S. Senator Sam Brownback**

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

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biographies of Mozart and Beethoven.) In the end, no amount of complaint about previous writers or retelling of two-hundred-year-old gossip can adequately substitute for what the art itself tells us about the artist.

Faith Seeking Explanation

RELIGION EXPLAINED: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT. By PASCAL BOYER. *Basic. 375 pp. $27.50.*

***Reviewed by* Paul J. Griffiths**

PASCAL BOYER CLAIMS, as his book's title proclaims, to have explained religion. What he means, in fact, is that he has explained it away. In making his claim, he enters his name in a long list of previous practitioners, going back probably as far as Cicero, whose dialogue *On the Nature of the Gods* can at least arguably be read as an exercise in explaining away. It is certain that David Hume thought he had explained religion away two hundred and fifty years ago with his complementary works, *Natural History of Religion* and *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.* And since Hume, explanations of religion that also explain it away have been legion: Marx, Freud, Durkheim, and so on through the serried ranks of dusty doctoral dissertations and the proceedings of forgotten academic societies. The enterprise hasn't quite worked to the satisfaction of all, however, and although Boyer seems largely unaware that what he is trying to do has a history, it is clear that if he were aware of it he would simply say, as so many have said before, that this time it has finally and unimpeachably been done right. So let's see how he fares. How does Boyer understand religion, and what kind of explanation does he offer?

For Boyer, religion is about nonobservable entities and agencies, and most especially about personal or quasi-personal agents with at least some nonhuman powers. Religious concepts, which he also calls supernatural concepts, have such entities as their referent, and religious behaviors are taken by those who engage in them to bring them into relation with such entities. These concepts and behaviors are what Boyer wants to explain, and he begins the explanatory enterprise by asking why it is that among the many possible religious concepts and behaviors, only a small selection appears attractive to human beings. We humans typically believe in and pray only to what he calls "full-access strategic agents," which is to say only to agents who have access to all the information relevant to a particular state of affairs, and who can in some way intervene in or affect that state of affairs. We do not, by and large, believe in or pray to agents of other kinds: agents who don't have the relevant information, or who lack the necessary causal powers.

Why is this? Why are we humans predisposed to have only these kinds of religious concepts? Boyer's answer, in brief, is that our brains have been "designed by evolution" (a recurring phrase) to employ particular cognitive systems that help us to make sense of "particular aspects of objects around us and produce specific kinds of inferences about them." There are, for instance, brain-systems in this sense that deal with inanimate objects, others that deal with human persons, and yet others that deal with supernatural agents. Just as our brains have become by evolution such that they inevitably (and mostly unconsciously) deploy the complex inferential systems that permit us to survive and get around in a world of inanimate objects, so they also have become such that we find ideas about full-access strategic agents to be plausible because these ideas generate for us rich inferences about how to behave and what choices to make, and they do so with particular richness in a social context in which we can reasonably assume that everyone else shares such ideas.

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

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Boyer thus reverses many traditional attempts to explain religion away. It is not that we invent the gods because by so doing we can meet needs otherwise difficult to satisfy, or because they permit us to explain things otherwise hard to explain, or because they give us the illusion of comfort in a harsh and comfortless world, or because they give us persuasive reasons to act morally. It is, rather, that evolution has equipped us (or most of us) with certain proclivities or dispositions to explain misfortune, gain scarce social goods, and act morally (by which Boyer means, roughly, acting in such a way as evolutionarily to benefit either ourselves or the tribe). Moreover, these proclivities dispose us to accept and act upon the idea that there are gods—or, if you prefer, full-access strategic agents. Evolution, in Boyer's story, makes all of us likely worshipers in much the same way that it makes all of us likely language-users. We are innately predisposed for both, and so such disparate religious traditions as Christian theology, Islamic law, and Buddhist metaphysics are merely different forms of baroque ornamentations added on to an evolutionary edifice.

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There are many details to Boyer's story. He draws enthusiastically upon ethnographic data, as well as upon half-understood (and often completely misunderstood) fragments of Jewish, Islamic, and Christian thought, to illustrate what he has to say. But in the end, he takes the explanation he offers to be true, its vocabulary to be final ("scientific" is his preferred term), and all competing explanations to be, simply, wrong—or at the very least easily capable of being subsumed as partial truths into his explanation.

This blithe confidence is particularly apparent when, for example, he claims that the explanations offered by Catholics for why they go to Mass cannot be right, whereas his explanations are. And there's a problem here of a fairly obvious sort, one that invalidates many of the book's more extravagant claims. It is, simply, that even if Boyer's evolutionary story about the attractiveness of Mass-going is correct (I doubt that it is, but it can be allowed for the sake of argument), it by no means follows that the reasons that Catholics give for why they go to Mass are automatically false. The same holds true, mutatis mutandis, for other religious views and practices he discusses. Here's why.

Boyer's explanation for the attractiveness of Mass-going is that it is a

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"*snare for thought* that produces highly salient effects by activating special systems in the mental basement." A Catholic explanation, to put it much too briefly, is that Mass-going is a proper response to a sacramental gift of unparalleled significance given by God. The two explanations are roughly on a par with respect to their use of technical terms unlikely to be easily appreciated by outsiders without a lot of work (mental basement? sacrament?). They are also, and more importantly, not obviously contradictory, which means that both may be true.

Boyer seems not to see this, and in this he is unlike the more intelligent among earlier explainers-away of religion. They—David Hume provides the best example—saw clearly that in order to show the unacceptability of what religious people appeal to when they try to explain religion it is not enough to provide an alternative explanation. For doing so will only show what is almost always trivially true about every state of affairs, which is that there are many sets of conditions sufficient for its occurrence, and that more than one set of such conditions is likely to obtain at any given time. Specifying one such set therefore does not suffice to rule out others.

To apply this obvious point to the case at hand: it may be that God's act and our response to it suffices to establish Mass-going as an enduring social practice; and it may also be that its persistence can be explained by reference to the cognitive and affective advantages it provides for us vis-à-vis evolution. In order to show that the Catholic explanation is unacceptable, Boyer would have to show what's wrong with it in its own terms, and he neither does this nor seems to see that he needs to. Hume, by contrast, did see this need, and this is why he paired the *Natural History* (which provides the alternative explanation) with the *Dialogues* (which provides the—putative—demonstration of religion's wrongness).

Boyer, then, fails to establish the unacceptability of religious people's explanations of their religion; the possible validity of his own explanation is thus irrelevant. And what's worse, he apparently fails even to see what he would need to do in order to establish what he claims to have established.

THERE IS, IN ADDITION, a further deep fissure in the book's fabric of argument. Boyer wants to provide an evolutionary explanation for the plausibility of religious belief and practice, and in so doing to show that it should not be taken seriously in its claims about the way things are. But such explanations ought to be applicable to Boyer's own views, since he claims that everything about our cognitive life can be explained by appeal to our evolutionary history. What is it, then, about evolutionary selection that makes Boyer's views (his physicalism, his evolutionism, his touching faith in science and its high priests, his apocalyptic enthusiasm for what science can now do) probative? Boyer does not say. His views are, apparently, exempt from the very process of investigation they require. The whole program is thus performatively incoherent, propounding as it does a method of analysis that ought to be applicable to all claims and arguments, and yet exempting itself from that very process. Again Boyer seems not to see the difficulty, and this strains the credulity and the patience of the reader.

Boyer, then, does not establish what he claims to have established. But this is not to say that his book is without merit. It is breezily written, ascending at times to the eloquence of the revivalist preacher. It also has many passing observations of interest on the habits of the Fang people of

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Cameroon, among whom Boyer has done fieldwork, as well as about the habits of those for whom scientific evolutionism provides the final vocabulary, about which he is a native informant. But it is, in the end, a tract for the faithful that does not take its own faith commitments seriously enough.

belief, endow a series of lectures in this discipline?

As usual, Hauerwas gives a diverse range of answers to this basic question, but those answers can be summarized fairly simply. Natural theology is an instance of the Christian practice of taking intellectual responsibility. For Gifford, this stance of responsibility was important, both to establish the credibility of Christianity and to defend the moral and spiritual values of the modern project. Hauerwas wants to "keep faith with Adam Gifford." The provocative claim that natural theology is a dog-

Taking Responsibility

WITH THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE: THE CHURCH'S WITNESS AND NATURAL THEOLOGY. By STANLEY HAUERWAS. *Brazos. 250 pp. $22.99.*

***Reviewed by* R. R. Reno**

STANLEY HAUERWAS OFTEN changes his topic, but he never changes his tune. Christian witness should be Christian; the Church should be churchly; theology should be theological. *With the Grain of the Universe*, originally delivered as the Gifford Lectures in winter 2001, plays the same melody. The topic is natural theology, which in the modern Christian tradition is often understood as the effort to use reasons available to all in order to establish the basis for a religious outlook. Against this standard approach, Hauerwas insists that natural theology is a dogmatic discipline. The truth of Jesus Christ is the key to the truth about everything else. Or to use the Hauerwasian idiom, learning the Christian language trains us to speak truthfully about the world.

These lapidary formulations can mislead, for Hauerwas is not interested in defining "natural theology" in some abstract way. Instead, he focuses on a practical question. Why is natural theology so important? Why, as he asks in the introductory lecture, did Adam Gifford, a wealthy Scotsman who was concerned about both modern culture and religious

R. R. RENO *is Associate Professor of Theology at Creighton University.*

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WEEK I: Oxford: David Payne performs "C.S. Lewis: My Life's Journey; Dedication and tour of "The Kilns" (C.S. Lewis' home); Music Recital at the Sheldonian Theatre; David Suchet reads Ecclesiastes.

WEEK II: Cambridge: Service of Evensong at Ely Cathedral; an English Country Dinner and Dance at Chilford Hall; Lamb's Players Theatre presents "The Great Divorce"; punting on the river Cam.

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matic discipline is meant to show the truth of Christianity, as well as to give aid to modern intellectual, moral, and political life. Here is how I think Hauerwas goes about accomplishing both goals.

THE FIRST ACT OF assistance is criticism. Hauerwas argues that standard modern assumptions undermine our capacity to take responsibility—for Christianity as much as for contemporary culture. He draws attention to the modern quest for a universal and executive rationality that will, once found, properly adjudicate between conflicting claims by appealing to reasons and principles that all people accept as true. In view of this quest, we should be responsible by placing our loyalty in this soon to be discovered universal rationality. Such was Adam Gifford's hope.



Of course, we are all now epistemologically sophisticated. We deny that this universal rationality is possible. However, we do not give up on the ideal of impartial universality. But what, exactly, does the ideal of impartiality look like when we lose confidence in the prospect of finding a universal rationality by which to guide our judgments? What kind of undertaking is "natural theology" without a substantive view of the constraints and dictates of "reason"?

Hauerwas' two chapters on William James, whose *Varieties of Religious Experience* is perhaps the most popular and widely read of all the Gifford Lectures, take up this question. James is important because, as a pragmatist writing at the turn of the century, he anticipates the twentieth-century turn away from an Enlightenment confidence in reason. Following James, we shift from the epistemological to a moral or political form of impartiality. A college degree is nothing if not a four-year exhortation to "think critically." We must learn to "step back" from our particular attachments in order to enter into the sacred realm of free and open debate. James advocates this approach in the place of a substantive account of rationality. If we cannot wrest from reason her mysteries, at least we can adopt proper forms and practices that serve her sacred purpose.

On Hauerwas' reading, this means that James shifts from truth to fairness as the determining basis for responsible intellectual life. In other words, impartiality is not based upon a larger, more universal truth. Instead, it depends on adopting certain habits that block presumptive allegiances and prejudices. This seems so self-evident to most of us that we can hardly object. But Hauerwas presses his case. James was keenly aware that the practices of modern science make our individual lives terribly small. He anticipated Carl Sagan's famous reminder that, from the perspective of modern physics, humanity takes up but a moment on the cosmic timeline. James wished to save us from this conclusion by defending our right to adopt a religious and moral stance that connects us to the transcendent. As James argued, the will to believe, prejudice by another name, gives weight to personal life, even amidst the reductive logic of modern science.

Yet, as Hauerwas points out, faced with a potential conflict of beliefs—my transcendent versus yours—James must introduce deflationary strategies. We must believe, but not too strongly; otherwise, we cannot sustain free and open debate. The burdens of conviction hinder, and one moves much more lightly through the rigors of inquiry and deliberation as a sensitive pluralist who knows how to juggle beliefs with critical skill. Thus, by James' logic, to become more impartial and fair we must become more critically detached from the very beliefs that give our lives consequence and purpose. So, we are caught in a zero-sum game. The more we believe, the more we overcome the reductionistic tendencies of modernity, but at the same time, the less responsible we are as intellectual and moral agents in a modern, pluralistic world. And conversely, the more responsible we are, the less attached we are to our religious and moral convictions, and the less able we are to overcome purely scientific and technical analyses of our situation. James can balance belief and the modern project, but he cannot harmonize them.

OF COURSE, RESPONSIBILITY is not merely intellectual responsibility; it is also social and political. Thus, Hauerwas shifts from the cerebral James to the practical Niebuhr. Reinhold Niebuhr was the most well known Christian political thinker in the twentieth century, and his Gifford Lectures, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, are second only to James' *Varieties* in popularity and influence. That influence rests in

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his promise to make Christianity socially responsible, and by Hauerwas' account, he did so by taking up the same modern task of seeking "critical detachment."

In Niebuhr's hands, justification by faith becomes the "Protestant Principle." All particular claims of authority and sanctity must be relativized; otherwise, one becomes the victim of "spiritual arrogance" and "pharisaic pride." The true believer is the person who rejects the compulsive authority of all beliefs—except the belief that no belief has a right to claim absolute authority. Therefore, like the Jamesian seeker, the Niebuhrian activist must tread lightly. As Niebuhr knows, when the "pride" of truth is defeated, men will approach politics much more "realistically." Relieved of the burden of apostolic authority, the critically detached person makes more responsible decisions, decisions that do not try, foolishly, to resist the weight of events.

Hauerwas' analysis of James and Niebuhr is important. James made no claim to speak as a Christian; Niebuhr was ever the churchman. Yet, by advocating a stance of responsibility that undermines the sharp outlines and authoritative weight of particular truth claims, both exemplify habits of thought that make Christianity increasingly invisible and weightless. The lesson, then, is obvious. One of the most basic features of modernity, both inside the Church and outside, is a drive toward detachment, and this makes it impossible to fulfill the intent of the Gifford Lectures. By the logic of James' and Niebuhr's approaches, we cannot both buttress our loyalty to religious commitments (for that would involve intensifying attachment to a particular vision of the world) and at the same time reinforce our duty to take responsibility for the modern world (which, according to modern assumptions, requires detachment from any particular vision of the world).

By Hauerwas' lights, then, we must take a very different tack. Instead of stepping back, we must step forward. To explain this move, Hauerwas' turns to Karl Barth, one of the most remarkable figures of modern Protestant theology, who offered his own Gifford Lectures in a dogmatic mode. Hauerwas' point is simple. Barth's *Church Dogmatics*, a multivolume inquiry into the logic, structure, and consequence of Christian revelation, strikes even the most casual readers as extraordinarily ambitious. Barth always has something to say. This is because Barth loads Christian language with

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

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

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weight—and he throws it around with aplomb, passing judgment on questions metaphysical and moral, epistemological and political. For Barth, the theologian has a positive duty to adopt this expansive stance. Thus, while everything Karl Barth says may be wrong, it can hardly be described as a turn away from "natural theology," at least not if we understand "natural theology" as the project of taking intellectual responsibility for the many concerns of our age.

HAUERWAS INTENDS to commend Barth's ambition. Barth is, says Hauerwas, the greatest natural theologian of the twentieth century. Barth took responsibility, and he did so in the right, intra-Christian way of insisting that faith has sufficient heft to generate judgment about all manner of things. There is no danger of James' zero-sum game. For Barth, the *more* one believes, the *more* one is able to do what intellectually responsible people should do: make considered and informed judgments. Hauerwas agrees. A weightless Christianity has no contribution to make to modern (or postmodern) intellectual life. The catch-up game of relevance is perpetually a day late. The project of trying to find "meaning" in Christian "symbols" is evaporative. It is difficult to see how natural theology can undertake the reparative project of restoring the credibility of faith and buttressing the moral purposes of modernity when theologians shrink Christianity to a vanishing point.

But Hauerwas does not just agree with Barth; he urges him forward. "Barth was hesitant," Hauerwas accurately observes, "to provide a fulsome account of the practices necessary for the witness that the Church is." If we are to have judgment truly and fully informed, then the *more* of belief must be linked with the *more* of participation in a visible and distinct form of life. I can well imagine Hauerwas saying to the Calvinist Karl Barth, "The Protestant Principle be damned. We need a sacred politics to combat our detachment from Christianity, and if that entails priestcraft, then let's have it."

Sacred politics has always been Hauerwas' preoccupation. His indifferent and inconclusive closing remarks on the role of Christianity in the contemporary university show how much more concerned Hauerwas is with *tikkun olam* (healing the world) than with contemplation. The real emphasis of his conclusion falls on two witnesses to the task of faithful "natural theology": John Howard Yoder and John Paul II. Of course,

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

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both no more advance propositions in the discipline of natural theology than does Hauerwas. Instead, both provide clarity about how to take responsibility, not *for* the world (that is God's job), but *in* the world.

Yoder teaches us that Christianity does not need the world in order to have a body. We are given a body in Jesus Christ. To dwell in him, Yoder insists that we must resist the detaching, distancing, and spiritualizing strategies of worldly accommodation. Thus, one of Hauerwas' great themes is struck. Christianity is at its best when standing in stark contrast to the world. Nothing better hardens and solidifies the faith than galvanizing conflicts with worldly powers. The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church. The first pole of Adam Gifford's concerns—the credibility of Christianity—depends upon the visibility of Christian holiness, not juggling the ever-changing prejudices of intellectual respectability.

In Hauerwas' view, John Paul II teaches the same lesson, but with a twist. For John Paul II, the blood of the martyrs is also the seed of a true humanism. The world, especially our present world, needs a weighty and forceful witness of faith. Thus, as John Paul II reminds us, the Church does not need the world in order to have a body, but the world certainly needs the body of the Church in order to be humane.

HERE, HAUWERWAS addresses the second pole of Adam Gifford's purpose in endowing his lectures—addressing modernity's uncertainty about its own moral and religious purpose. The modern world does not need ideals and principles. No arguments of natural theology can give stability to modernity. Rather, we need ballast amidst the roiling conflicts of worldly powers. We all feel the need to stand somewhere. This is now evident in the resurgent patriotism that has followed in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. We cannot over-

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come evil by adopting critical detachment, the stance of anywhere and nowhere.

And yet, Jesus did not promise the Holy Spirit to the nations. Only the Church, Hauerwas insists, can secure a fully and finally responsible place to stand. One can be a citizen, just as one can be a critical thinker, or a scientific inquirer. But we can only assume these roles responsibly if we do so in the service of the truth. And as Hauerwas never tires of reminding us, only in the Church can we reliably find the teachings and habits to guide us toward such service.


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The Popular Adams

JOHN ADAMS. By DAVID MCCULLOUGH. *Simon & Schuster. 752 pp. $35.*

***Reviewed by* Michael Zuckert**

EVER SINCE 1776 John Adams and Thomas Jefferson have been nearly joined at the hip: collaborators and strong supporters of the movement for independence; members of the Committee to draft the Declaration of Independence; leaders of the American diplomatic corps in France and Britain during and after the Revolutionary War; Vice President and Secretary of State respectively under the new constitution; correspondents extraordinaire during their post-politics years of retirement. Most strikingly, they "rode off into the sunset together," dying on the same day, which happened to be the Fourth of July, and the fiftieth Fourth at that. As their mutual friend Benjamin Rush put it, one was the "North Pole" and the other the "South Pole" of American independence. Or, as Rush said in another place, Adams was the voice and Jefferson the pen of the Revolution, for the one led the debate in Congress while the other drafted the document that immortalized the American decision to break with Britain. That jointure has lasted into our time, for it was but a few years ago that Joseph Ellis' biography of Jefferson made the best-seller lists, now matched and even topped by David McCullough's *John Adams.*

The image of Adams and Jefferson as the Siamese twins of the founding is not quite accurate, however. Joined they are, but from 1790 or so on they stand to each other more as figures tied to opposite ends of a rope wound round a pulley—as one rises the other falls. Almost from the

MICHAEL ZUCKERT *is the Nancy R. Dreux Professor of Government at the University of Notre Dame.*

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moment the Constitution was set in place political parties emerged, with Adams, the Vice President, and Jefferson, the Secretary of State, taking the part of leading figures in the two camps. Twice they ran against each other for the presidency, with Adams narrowly winning the first time (in 1796, when he was heir apparent as Vice President), and Jefferson winning the second (in 1800, when Adams the sitting President was effectively renounced by the nation).

In the minds of most of his fellow citizens, and in Adams' mind as well, Jefferson had thoroughly eclipsed his fellow revolutionist in 1800. The election of 1800 and all the events leading up to it effectively quelled a friendship that had lasted nearly a quarter century. Over a decade later, in retirement at Quincy, Adams wrote to Jefferson in retirement at Monticello, in part to restore the old friendship and in part to set the record straight (as he saw it) in an appeal over the head of the eighteenth and nineteenth century to a more distant posterity: an attempt to pull the strings of that pulley from afar.

In recent years Jefferson's reputation has taken one hit after another, for failings as disparate as being wrong (very wrong) on race and slavery, to being "revolution-crazed," as Adams then and Conor Cruise O'Brien now have charged, to being cold, distant, unknowable as a person, as almost all his biographers ultimately conclude, to being a hypocrite on such matters as civil liberties, as Leonard Levy classically charged four decades ago. The recent DNA study that was (wrongly) taken by many to "prove" that Jefferson hypocritically and exploitatively had a long-standing sexual relationship with his slave Sally Hemings, fathering at least one and perhaps many children by her, was only the latest in this string of charges serving to diminish Jefferson in the hearts and minds of his countrymen. As in the past, Adams' reputation has risen as Jefferson's has sunk. McCullough's near lionizing biography goes a long way toward ensuring that this trend continues and deepens.

THOSE OF US—political scientists, historians, and other scholars—who make the study of the Revolution and early republic our professional concern are tempted to dismiss, even to sneer at, efforts like McCullough's. For one, he is an amateur, having written *Truman*, for example, another massive biographical study of a President, but nothing previously about a

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figure from *our* period. For another, he just does not live up to the standards of scholarship we professionals demand of each other. He does not document as we think one ought, he does not engage the "great debates" that rock the scholarly world. Most unforgivably, perhaps, he is popular—selling more books and reaching a wider audience than the rest of us are likely to do anytime in the near future.

We must resist this temptation, however, and appreciate McCullough's book for the many merits it does possess. He may not specialize in *our* period, but he sure knows a lot about it, and general readers will come away knowing much more than they did going into it. He knows how to tell a story; perhaps the greatest strength of the author is his ability to relate enough of the concrete detail to give a feel for things, but never so much as to bog us down or even seriously challenge us. Perhaps most importantly, he likes and admires John Adams (not always—is it usually?—the case with us professionals and our subjects), and he gets his readers to share some of his obvious delight in Adams. He accomplishes this often by just quoting from Adams' plentiful supply of endearing statements or witty comments; often he does it by showing us Adams' talent for ironizing about himself, his genuine affection for his family and his gift for friendship, and his admirable sense of duty, which led him to spend many more of his prime years away from his family and friends than with them.

McCullough clearly looks up to Adams and wants us to do so as well, but this does not blind him to Adams' flaws, or at least to reporting what others took these flaws to be. He admits Adams made a series of foolish mistakes when he served as Vice President, not least when he pressed for a "high tone" for the new government and its officers, favoring titles akin to those in use at the English Court. For this mistake, Adams earned from his detractors the title "His Rotundity," not exactly the form of address he had in mind. McCullough is not so besotted by Adams, in other words, that he misses all the "warts."

Let us also give McCullough a cheer or two at least for his genuine and contagious enthusiasm for the great figures of the founding era. He is quoted as saying: "Who were these people? I don't think we can ever know enough about them." Amen, say I, a long-time admirer of John Adams and others of his era.

McCullough gives us here the right standards for measuring his book: Does he allow us to know "who these people," or this person, John Adams, was? Does he convey what it is about them that makes them worthy of such enthusiasm? It is, unfortunately, when he is measured against his own standards, and not those of the professionals, that McCullough falls short in a number of important ways. Let me mention three.

MUCH OF ADAMS' greatness—along with that of so many of his late-eighteenth-century countrymen—derives from his prominence as a political thinker and writer. We hear a good deal from McCullough about Adams' living quarters preceding the Revolution, but we do not learn about the fact that he authored the *Novanglus* essays, probably the best statement of the colonial constitutional position produced during the conflict with Britain. We do learn that there was some sort of conflict, but we leave the book not very knowledgeable about what it was. We also learn that Adams published an influential brief, *Thoughts on Government*, as the soon-to-be states turned to the task of constitution-making in 1776, but McCullough does not tell us what is unique or specially characteristic of Adams' position, beyond some rather trite observations on checks and balances. McCullough gives a bit more space to Adams' magnum opus, the *Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States*, but once again, we learn little from his discussion of it beyond the fact that Adams favored checks and balances.

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

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

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According to McCullough, the *Defense* "remained at heart a lawyer's brief for what he had said in his *Thoughts on Government*," despite the fact, unnoted by McCullough, that the *Defense* made such modifications in Adams' earlier position that a leading scholarly survey of his thought is titled *The Changing Political Thought of John Adams*. McCullough never tells us enough about Adams' political thought to understand how his *Defense* contributed mightily to the perception, so widespread in the 1790s, that he had been corrupted by his time in England. Something about the *Defense* obviously offended in a way that his *Thoughts* had not. By failing to think about what it might be, McCullough ignores one of the defining aspects of Adams' life and work. In this respect, C. Bradley Thompson's recent study of Adams' political thought, *John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty*, is far superior.


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McCULLOUGH MAKES a stronger attempt to present Adams as a political actor than as a political thinker. He does especially well in his account of what may have been President Adams' finest hour, his search for a way to avoid war with France. This was a delicate and difficult policy, for his own Federalist party, led by Alexander Hamilton, hungered for such a war, while Jefferson's Republican Party was inclined to impugn the sincerity of every pro-peace move he made. In other words, he had to achieve his goal with no appreciable base of support.

Yet it must be said that McCullough is only intermittently successful at presenting Adams the statesman, or even at presenting events and issues concretely enough to enlighten the reader about the happenings of Adams' career. For example, the first great battle of the 1790s occurred over Assumption—Hamilton's proposal that the federal government assume the debts incurred by the states during the Revolution. Nobody reading McCullough's book would come away with any understanding of what were the real issues in this debate. McCullough dutifully reports on the controversy that surrounded Adams' diplomatic service in France—how Franklin and others thought Adams particularly unsuited to diplomacy. But McCullough himself does not investigate closely enough either what Adams did or what he should have done to give us any clear idea of whether this episode represented a failure or a success of Adams as statesman.

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Finally, McCullough contributes less than he might have toward understanding John Adams as a person—no small defect in a biography. McCullough shows us Adams acting, he quotes him speaking, he reports what others said of Adams' character, but he stays remarkably near the surface of the man. How to understand Adams' devotion to public service? What to make of his alacrity in leaving Abigail and his children so often and for so long? (Compare here the cold Mr. Jefferson's very different behavior.) Was he really vain, as many (then and now) have alleged? Did his vanity cloud his political judgment? What sort of "self" was he? It is not psychobiography that is needed, but more sustained and probing analysis of character. It can be done better than McCullough has here. For instance, a little book by Peter Shaw called *The Character of John Adams* gives us more about our hero in its 300 pages than McCullough does in his 750.

WHEN ALL IS SAID and done, these deficiencies appear to be just the obverse of some of the virtues of this book, especially its accessibility to the general reader. To have done better, McCullough would have had to jeopardize the very thing that makes the book so appealing to a wide public. A better book would have been more challenging. It would have required both author and reader to grapple more profoundly with more facts and situations, ideas and actions, more analysis and less narration. It would have required that McCullough's book not be what it is: a summer book, well suited for vacation—that is to say, beach reading. Adams deserves, and requires, more than that. But if even a fraction of McCullough's readers are lured to more challenging writing on what is truly America's "greatest generation," then his book will have deserved its considerable success.

BRIEFLY NOTED

DAVID'S SECRET DEMONS: MESSIAH, MURDERER, TRAITOR, KING. By BARUCH HALPERN. *Eerdmans. 492 pp. $30.*

This book is, on the one hand, a witty and spirited defense of the historicity of the biblical figure of David. This is no small feat in a scholarly world populated by an ever more vocal group of "minimalists" who would reduce the figure of David to a literary invention of the post-exilic period. On the other hand, the book is also a demolition of any theological use of the material. David looms large in biblical tradition in spite of his modest and rather brutal beginnings. In Baruch Halpern's desire to flesh out the historical David, he gives us a character who is Messiah-King, but also Murderer-Traitor. Having no interest in the canonical story, Halpern pieces together his own rendition of who David really was (or, in the case of the adultery with Bathsheba and the revolt of Absalom, how his "handlers" saw him). In every instance, the name of the game is political self-interest. There is much to be learned from this carefully researched book, but at the same time the reader should be aware that it is also an excellent exemplar of what Hans Frei documented in his *Eclipse of Biblical Narrative.* For a more compelling portrait of David that is both historical and theological, one should consult the recent book of Yair Zakovitich, *David: From Shepherd to Messiah* (1995, Jerusalem [in Hebrew]).

— Gary Anderson

FRANCIS OF ASSISI: A REVOLUTIONARY LIFE. By ADRIAN HOUSE. Foreword by Karen Armstrong. *Paulist. 336 pp. $28.*

Of the making of biographies of St. Francis of Assisi there can never be too many. Despite what some might take to be the implication of the Preacher ("Of the making of books there is no end; and much study is a weariness of the flesh"), no matter how many biographies of St. Francis might appear, and no matter what perspective they might adopt (criti-

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cal, hagiographical, soberly historical, etc.), the man himself has a way of winning out over his biographer. Adrian House, for many years the publisher of HarperCollins in London, spent five years working on this biography, and he proves to be no exception to the rule. Although certainly not the best biography of Francis and decidedly not the worst, this account seems unable to avoid certain liberal clichés of the genre (for example, the author wonders how so evangelical a Christian as Francis could possibly counsel his disciples to obey the hierarchical Church). But because he is both fair and historically scrupulous, House makes sure that the winning personality and intense holiness of the man from Assisi shines through. For example, the author notes how much Francis insisted that prayer and preaching go together: "The preacher must grow hot within before he speaks words that are cold in themselves," as Francis put it to his followers. And as to the martyrdom that Francis longed for but which never came, House somberly points out that Francis' sacrifice would not be a swift, summary execution like Christ's crucifixion on Calvary, but would resemble Jesus' agony in the Garden of Gethsemane on the night of his arrest, "though drawn out over years, not hours," as the author arrestingly puts it.

— Edward T. Oakes, S.J.

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

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FRANK FURNESS: ARCHITECTURE AND THE VIOLENT MIND. By MICHAEL J. LEWIS. *Norton. 273 pp. $45.*

A well researched and illustrated account of the tempestuous life and mercurial career of Philadelphian Frank Furness (1839-1912), one of America's best and most idiosyncratic nineteenth-century architects, designer of the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts, the University of Pennsylvania Library, the Pennsylvania Railroad's Broad Street Station, and scores of banks and churches. The burden of the book is to show how Furness' architecture was both significant in its own right and the product of a particular (and not entirely attractive) personal sensibility working at the moment of meeting between "muscular Christianity" and triumphant American industry. Two problematic and interrelated twentieth-century legacies of this period of American architecture are foreshadowed in Furness' career: the rise of "signature architecture" as commercial advertisement, and the corre-

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sponding primacy of charisma within the culture of architecture. Furness employed the young Louis Sullivan, who in turn mentored Frank Lloyd Wright. Lewis writes of this thread of influence as follows: "In Furness, Sullivan found someone who would express in architecture the same stream-of-consciousness reverie offered by Walt Whitman, the same worship of 'spontaneous me.' This doctrine Sullivan passed on to his pupil Frank Lloyd Wright. He also passed on another principle, probably unknowingly, as one passes on an infection. This was the image of the architect as a form-making maverick, duty-bound not to his client [nor, n.b., his community] but to his own conception of architecture, supremely egotistic, invoking his own authority rather than history's. . . . Before Furness, no one touted this image of the American architect as a maker of personal form. After Sullivan and Wright, it became a kind of convention." Just so.

— *Philip Bess*

TEMPORAL AND ETERNAL. By CHARLES PÉGUY. Translated by Alexander Dru with a Foreword by Pierre Manent. *Liberty Fund. 165 pp. $10 paper.*

This beautifully produced volume, first published in English in 1958, is a collection of some of Péguy's most important prose writings. The book reveals that Péguy was a philosopher and critic of great insight as well as a distinguished poet, dramatist, and Christian apologist. The centerpiece is a somewhat abridged translation of Péguy's greatest prose masterpiece, "Notre Jeunesse" or "Memories of Youth" (1910). In that work, Péguy reconsiders the Dreyfus Affair in light of the degeneration of the Dreyfusite "mystique," the heroic defense of a Jewish captain wrongly accused of treason, into a "politique" of anti-liberal, anti-Christian, and anti-patriotic demagogy promoted by French radicals after 1902. Péguy's work not only chronicles the degeneration of the Dreyfusite struggle into an illiberal assault on the rights of the Church and believers, but exposes the pretenses of an "intellectual party" that "believes in nothing, not even in atheism" and "despises heroes and saints equally." Péguy's thought transcends the left-right dichotomy and exposes equally the sterility of the bourgeois Church and the tyranny of left-wing intellectuals. This patriot and Christian, this admirer of heroes and saints, inspired such diverse thinkers as Bernanos and Mounier as well as

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the Catholic republicanism of Charles de Gaulle. The second essay, "Clio I," contains beautiful reflections on the sacredness inherent in civic community. Like so many of Péguy's writings, this work entails a sustained reflection on the relation between nature and grace, the temporal and the eternal. Péguy explores the mutual dependence of the two realms and reminds Christians that they too belong to a city, to a human "communion." These meditations renew the dialogue between paganism and Christianity, the "two highest cultures that humanity has ever known," two cultures that are "infinitely superior . . . to everything modern." In Péguy's view, the clerical or "devout party" was in part responsible for the "de-Christianization" of the modern world precisely because it had succumbed to a spiritualism that did not take seriously the dignity of the created order. In his introduction, the French political philosopher Pierre Manent locates Péguy's greatness in his concreteness, in his opposition to the spirit of abstraction. Péguy's life and thought were an endless engagement with the dignity and the destiny of "three capital communities," the civic community, the Christian Church, and the Jewish people. Beginning with particular concerns such as the Dreyfus affair, Péguy opens his readers to the only questions that really matter.

— Daniel J. Mahoney

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





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THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION. By MICHAEL IGNATIEFF. *Anansi. 170 pp. $12 paper.*

Writing in the liberal tradition associated with, above all, Isaiah Berlin, Ignatieff takes the opportunity of Canada's distinguished Massey Lectures to bring together the central themes of his long-considered reflections on human rights. Ignatieff's intelligence and basic decency are everywhere on display, as is a certain awkwardness about his being a Canadian and a liberal. About being Canadian because, although born in Canada, he has spent almost the entirety of his adult life outside Canada at institutions such as Princeton and Harvard. He reassures his Canadian audience by taking conventional swipes at the supposedly inferior political culture of the U.S. and by declaring that Canada is "the place on earth that, if I needed one, I would call home." In tension with the substance of his argument is that, as a good liberal, he does not need a place to call home. Such tensions, if not contradictions, abound in these

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essays, making Ignatieff the kind of good liberal who is determined not to let muggings by reality turn him into a conservative of any kind. He carefully protects his credentials as a liberal, even as he acknowledges the damage done by liberal policies with respect to, for instance, marriage and family life. Always he positions his argument against conservative critiques, which he nonetheless fairly represents, because conservatives want to "turn back the clock," and Ignatieff is convinced that there is no alternative to continuing the troubled "gamble" on a "rights culture" that, unloosed in the 1960s, must be played out to the end. As one might expect, he addresses at length the troubled future of Canada as a nation. Where others see the unraveling of Canadian nationhood, Ignatieff proposes that the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedom proposes a way in which mutual respect and inclusivity among Canada's three nations—Quebecois, English, and aboriginal—can be a model to be emulated by other multiethnic and multinational societies around the world. *The Rights Revolution* is marked by intelligence, decency, and a hopefulness that some will dismiss as wishful thinking. Against those who doubt that there will be a nation called Canada twenty-five or fifty years from now, Ignatieff advocates a "solution" based on the acceptance of the fact that there is no solution other than continuing on a course of improvised accommodations within a context of shared rights rather than shared roots, beliefs, or the playing out of interest politics. His is an honorable, if not convincing, effort to undergird with intelligent argument a politics premised upon the habits of niceness for which Canadians are noted. In a world of generalized nastiness, niceness is not to be scorned, even if Ignatieff's wan hopes for the improbable nation that is Canada are finally an exercise in decency laced with desperation.

THE BIBLE AND HOMOSEXUAL PRACTICE: TEXTS AND HERMENEUTICS. By ROBERT A. J. GAGNON. *Abingdon. 519 pp. $49.*

Thirty or even ten years ago, leaders in church, synagogue, and society who are not themselves homosexual never thought they would be required to discuss, or even think about, the subject with such intensity. But homosexuality, with the now familiar debates over same-sex unions and the ordination of gay and lesbian clergy, has become a flash point in wars cultural and theo-

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— ROBERT H. BORK



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logical. Gagnon of Pittsburgh Theological Seminary renders an invaluable service to those who would defend traditional Christian and Jewish teaching, while also countering some of the dubious advocacy scholarship on what biblical texts "really mean," and responding to sometimes novel arguments in today's debates. Impressive also are the distinguished scholars who endorse the book, thus risking the wrath of what may be the most vicious censorship lobby of our time.

BUILDING A HEALTHY CULTURE: STRATEGIES FOR AN AMERICAN RENAISSANCE. Edited by DON EBERLY. *Eerdmans. 543 pp. $35.*

So what is the alternative to the pathologies of American culture, both elite and popular? With this book we have in one place mostly persuasive answers by people who have thought long and hard about that question, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mary Ann Glendon, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Leon Kass, Charles Krauthammer, Michael Medved, David Popenoe, Robert Royal, and Christopher Wolfe. "You conservatives are always complaining, but what's your positive proposal?" For the next time you hear that, you might want to have *Building a Healthy Culture* at hand.



FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS FOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS. By EDMUND G. SEEBAUER and ROBERT L. BARRY. *Oxford University Press. 269 pp. $35.*

In most professional guilds, "ethics" is a hot topic, but it too often means no more than covering yourself and your company in the event of legal liability. This book is something very different. It really is an intelligent and eminently readable introduction to ethics in the great tradition (the dedication is to Aristotle and Aquinas!), with very practical application to the everyday problems encountered by engineers and scientists in sundry fields. (An instructor's manual is also available.)

THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT. Edited by P. A. WOODWARD. *University of Notre Dame Press. 315 pp. $34.95.*

This is philosophical ethics at a very high level in very spirited exchange, indeed combat. The question of double effect is whether it is licit to do something that is good or morally indifferent even if one knows (although not intends) it will also have an evil effect. Lined up on different sides of the debate are heavyweights such as Michael Walzer, G. E. M. Anscombe, Thomas Nagel, and Philippa Foot. Intellectually rigorous and intense.

KNOWING THE TRIUNE GOD. Edited by JAMES J. BUCKLEY and DAVID YEAGO. *Eerdmans. 312 pp. $29 paper.*

Essays by the editors and others making the case that knowing the triune God cannot be separated from the communal practices—sacramental, moral, intellectual—of the Church. Yeago, a Lutheran, and Buckley, a Catholic, keep the discussion on a thoroughly ecumenical plane.

THE POLITICS OF THE CROSS: THE THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL ETHICS OF JOHN HOWARD YODER. By CRAIG A. CARTER. *Brazos. 254 pp. $10.99 paper.*

Most of what pass for "radical" Christian theologies are downright tame when compared with the arguments of the late Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder. In his desire to assert uncompromisingly the lordship of Jesus and the normativity of his life, Yoder startles and disturbs. He also fails to convince many thoughtful and committed Christians. But he represents a stream of thinking about Christian discipleship that should be engaged, if not embraced. *The Politics of the Cross* offers a reliable overview of Yoder's work, but the place for such an encounter to begin is with Yoder's own *The Politics of Jesus.*

VACLAV HAVEL: THE INTELLECTUAL CONSCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. By JAMES W. SIRE. *InterVarsity. 135 pp. $14.99.*

As a dramatist, anti-Communist dissident, and philosopher president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel deserves this tribute, although he possibly might be put off by its uncritical enthusiasm. It is not entirely uncritical, however, since the author is distressed at Havel's continuing to resist the decision for Jesus to which he, the author, is convinced Havel's thought and life should necessarily lead.

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RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE: LIVING WITH OUR DEEPEST DIFFERENCES. Introduction by Martin E. Marty. *Norton. 205 pp. $13.95 paper.*

The American Assembly was established by Dwight D. Eisenhower at Columbia University in 1950. The present book is part of a larger project called "Uniting America: Toward Common Purpose." In these pages we have called attention to the project's meeting on "Religion in Public Life," held in March 2000 (see FT, August/September 2000). The present book includes the final report from that meeting, plus several essays developed in connection with the project. It is a remarkably well-balanced consensus statement, reflecting the thought of a wide range of thinkers, and should serve as an important historical marker in the American understanding of religion in public.

INSIDE THE NATION OF ISLAM. By VIBERT L. WHITE, JR. *University Press of Florida. 272 pp. $24.95.*

Subtitled "a historical and personal testimony by a black Muslim," this book provides useful inside information about Minister Louis Farrakhan and his movement, although the genre is that of the exposé. White, who was once close to the leadership of the Nation of Islam and is a professor of African-American studies at the University of Illinois, contends that Farrakhan is a manipulator and demagogue who is largely in it for the money. He makes a believable case.

RELIGION, PLURALISM, AND PUBLIC LIFE. Edited by LUIS E. LUGO. *Eerdmans. 383 pp. $28 paper.*

Essays by a wide range of scholars on the legacy and continuing pertinence of Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), a Dutch politician and religious thinker who proposed a Calvinist understanding of Christian public responsibility that some thinkers argue works in tandem with, and is a necessary complement to, Catholic social doctrine.

THE SECOND SPRING OF THE CHURCH IN AMERICA. By GEORGE A. KELLY. *St. Augustine's. 195 pp. $25.*

Taking his title from Cardinal Newman's famous address, a veteran priest and skilled polemicist goes inveighing against what has gone wrong with the Catholic Church in this country since the Council and tells us what can be done about it. Vintage Kelly, and a bracing critique and proposal.

BETWEEN CROSS & RESURRECTION: A THEOLOGY OF HOLY SATURDAY. By ALAN E. LEWIS. *Eerdmans. 490 pp. $30.*

Holy Saturday seems to be something of a blank between Good Friday defeat and Easter victory, notes Lewis, who taught theology at Austin Presbyterian in Texas. Working within the Reformation tradition, but drawing also on Catholic and Orthodox sources, he helps the reader hear the voice of Saturday's silence. The style is academic but accessible, and frequently elegant. Lewis finished the book as he knew he was dying of cancer.

THE POSTMODERN BIBLE READER. Edited by DAVID JOBLING ET AL. *Blackwell. 380 pp. $29.95 paper.*

There is smart smart and then there is dumb smart. Here is a treasury of mostly very smart and very dumb academic self-pleasurings stimulated by postmodernism's encounters with biblical literature. There are big names such as Umberto Eco, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida, along with a host of imitators playing word games with post-humanism, Marxist analysis, queer theory, liberation theology, and whatnot. Designed for course adoptions, this reader will have little appeal for people who get to choose for themselves what they read.

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

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THE PUBLIC SQUARE

A Continuing Survey of Religion and Public Life

Richard John Neuhaus

Religious Freedom in a Time of War

It was a mighty battle and alleluias ascended when, in the late 1990s, religious freedom was institutionally ensconced as a goal of U.S. foreign policy. It would not have happened without the heroic labors of people such as Nina Shea, Paul Marshall, Abe Rosenthal, Michael Horowitz, and Representatives Frank Wolf and Chris Smith. And, let it be admitted, Arlen Specter in the Senate. In 1998, the International Religious Freedom Act was passed by Congress, creating a desk in the National Security Council, an office in the State Department, and an independent commission, all charged with making sure that—along with political, economic, and military concerns—those responsible for making policy would make religious freedom a priority. In 1999 the State Department issued its first and comprehensive *Annual Report on International Religious Freedom.*

To be sure, not everybody was suddenly converted to the importance of religious freedom. In the mandarin world of foreign policy experts, a good many "realists" viewed, and still view, this initiative as an unwelcome intrusion that distracts attention from the cold calculations of power that should guide our thinking about world affairs. The more perceptive, however, recognize that, whatever their personal disposition toward the "soft" phenomenon called religion, it has become an increasingly "hard" factor in the global reconfiguration of power relationships.

There is a justifiable anxiety that in the current war against terrorism religious freedom is once again being put on a back burner as the U.S. cuts deals with some of the most notorious violators—China, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, for example—in order to secure cooperation and gain momentary tactical advantages. Such maneuverings are understandable. Religious freedom is not and cannot be the only priority in foreign policy, especially in a time of war. But those who worked so hard to make it a priority are justifiably worried that this great achievement could be undermined by the foreign policy establishment's habits of facile expediency. The religion factor will be and should be vigorously debated in the months ahead. That debate does not pit "realists" against "idealists," but is, rather, a debate about the hard reality of religion in defining, more and more, the lines of conflict in politics among nations. The war against terrorism is—more than it is politic for world leaders to say in public—also a war of religion.

To understand what this necessary debate is about, it is necessary to keep in mind the long and scrambled history of religion in our foreign policy. The International Religious Freedom Act has an impressive pedigree. The history is very nicely laid out by Leo P. Ribuffo of George Washington University in a new book resulting from conferences held by the Ethics and Public Policy Center and published by Rowman & Littlefield, *The Influence of Faith: Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy.*

America's understanding of itself as a new thing on the world scene (recall the words *novus ordo seclorum* on the Great Seal) gave rise to a powerfully moral, often moralistic, and sometimes explicitly religious vision of its mission among the nations. At times, American "exceptionalism" meant remaining aloof from the conflicts generated by the corrupt interests of morally lesser nations; at other times, America's "manifest destiny" called for waging wars of the righteous against the forces of darkness—notably of Protestant righteousness against Catholic darkness, as in the case of Mexico, Cuba, and the Philippines. The story runs through Woodrow Wilson's expansive mission to "make the world safe for democracy,"

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Eisenhower's World War II "crusade in Europe," and the long years of cold war struggle against "godless communism." In the Vietnam War, the moral consensus was shattered, seemingly beyond repair, until, quite suddenly, it reasserted itself in response to the attacks of September 11. Once again, we are in a war portrayed as a conflict between, to use Reinhold Niebuhr's phrase, the children of light and the children of darkness.

A Mission Vindicated

This history of America's world mission is usually treated condescendingly by scholars, and Ribuffo's account is not untouched by such conventional condescension. But in the century past that sense of mission has also been dramatically vindicated, notably in the defeat of Hitler and of what now almost everybody agrees was the evil empire of Soviet communism (never forgetting that, when Ronald Reagan spoke of the evil empire, the *bien-pensant* establishment was unanimous in condemning his reckless offense against the dream of "peaceful coexistence"). Nor is it evident in retrospect that U.S. action in Vietnam did not contribute to containing the expansionist ambitions of communism, although there is no end in sight of debate over that intervention. So also, President Bush's strongly moral construal of today's war against terrorism is, I believe, justified and, we must hope, will be vindicated.

Intellectuals are inclined to think that they are certified as intellectuals by virtue of their capacity to complexify, and the messiness of history is such that any conflict provides ample opportunities to highlight evidence contrary to the general truth. In the present war and the larger story of which it is part, I continue to believe that America is—on balance and considering the alternatives—a force for good in the world. And I continue to be impressed by how many otherwise sensible people criticize that proposition as an instance of uncritical chauvinism rather than the carefully nuanced moral judgment that it is.

A very smart ethicist from Harvard asks me, "Why does America have to have a mission in the world any more than Luxembourg has to have a mission in the world?" Which is yet another occasion for observing that there is smart smart and then there is dumb smart. America's unparalleled influence in the world is attended by unparalleled responsibility; responsibility entails moral accountability; and moral accountability is defined by purpose. Some call it a mission, a word that secularists associate with zealotry but others understand to mean determination. The International Religious Freedom Act is part of that history of determined resolve, as is the American commitment to advance the cause of human rights across the board. Religious freedom is the first of human rights, for it is religion that grounds the dignity of the human person in his relation to an authority that transcends temporal powers.

What Counts as News

The 1998 act did not introduce a new factor into U.S. foreign policy, but reflected renewed urgency about a dangerously neglected factor. There is also the sheer fact of the dramatic growth in religious persecution, mainly, but not only, of Christians. Christians were and are systematically persecuted, chiefly in Communist and Muslim countries. The list is long and includes China, Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Iraq, and Sudan. Using rigorous criteria, Paul Marshall estimates that 200 to 250 million Christians are relentlessly persecuted for their faith, while 400 million others live "under non-trivial restrictions on religious liberty." The 1998 act passed because a remarkable coalition of Jews and Christians was prepared to do battle not only with the foreign policy mandarins but also with oldline liberal churches and secular human rights organizations who complained that concern for persecuted Christians is an instance of "special pleading." That complaint overlooks the fact that all speaking out for human rights—whether for Buddhists in Tibet or Jews in the former Soviet Union—is special pleading for those who cannot plead for themselves.

It is true that the media generally ignore or downplay religious persecution. For people in the news business, the news business is big news. A journalist jailed in Iran is likely to get more attention than two million Christians killed or enslaved in Sudan. Justified outrage is expressed at Islamist laws requiring women to wear veils, but much less notice is paid the fact that in some countries conversion to Christianity by a Muslim is punishable by death. After all, why would anyone want to convert to Christianity? Exotic religions, such as Tibetan Buddhism, get a modicum of respect, but one would not want to be found pleading the cause of Baptists or Catholics. To the mind steeped in the mythology of secularism—and, while some still deny it, the antireligious bias of the major media has by now been documented beyond reasonable doubt—Baptists, Catholics, and others who are assertively Christian represent the religious oppression from which the enlightened are only tenuously liberated. I exaggerate but slightly. It is true that in the last five years more attention has been paid to religious freedom by human rights groups and the media, but the general pattern is still one of

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indifference and incomprehension. The persecution of religion, and especially the persecution of Christians, simply does not fit the secular story line of oppression by religion. Liberal opposition to the 1998 act and the campaign for religious freedom was solidified by the sure sign of great evil afoot, namely, the support of the cause by the "religious right."

Four Scenarios

This picture is changing, however, and it is reasonable to think that the change will accelerate. An essay by the estimable Samuel Huntington in *The Influence of Faith* recounts the ways in which, for more and more governments in the world, religion is the chief source of, or threat to, their legitimacy. Contrary to secularist expectations in the West, we are witnessing what is aptly described as the desecularization of world history. States seek to control religion, if necessary through repression and persecution, precisely because religion is becoming more important. Christianity in particular is, around the world and in almost all its forms, the carrier of democracy and political liberalization. Huntington cites a Chinese government publication that, taking note of the Church's role in the collapse of Soviet communism, pointedly concludes: "If China does not want such a scene to be repeated in its land, it must strangle the baby while it is still in the manger." And strangling religion is precisely what the Chinese regime is determined to do.

But, of course, it is the war with Islamically inspired terrorism that is most forcefully changing the perception of religion, and of religious persecution, in world affairs. Huntington asks, What can be done? and proposes four possible answers. First, the U.S. and others who share its purpose can employ their resources in pressing the concerns mandated by the 1998 act and related human rights agreements. But Huntington is skeptical. "Some of these measures might make some difference; a few could be counterproductive; most are likely to accomplish little in promoting progress toward religious liberty." "Second," he writes, "if religious persecution is in part a consequence of the power and importance of religion as a source of identity, legitimacy, and conflict, then logically religious persecution might be reduced if religion became less important in the lives of people." But he acknowledges that it is doubtful that states can do much to make that happen, and trying to make it happen would likely increase religious persecution, which, in turn, might increase the importance of religion in people's lives. Remember Tertullian on the blood of the martyrs.

The third possibility that Huntington entertains is that, since religious freedom is mainly a Western and Christian cause, and since religious freedom is most egregiously violated by non-Christian, mainly Islamic and Chinese, societies, the answer is for non-Christians to become Christians. But such a mighty missionary initiative, he writes, would likely provoke an equally mighty resistance, including increased persecution of Christians. "Religious liberty would come about only if Christianity were victorious in a global war of religions." So Huntington is left with the fourth scenario, which is encouraging tendencies in non-Christian religions that are supportive of religious freedom, in the hope that the "ecumenical personality" of such religions will prevail over their "darker personality." "Moving in this direction would at best be a long, slow process, but it may be the only practical one." "Religious liberty," he concludes, "is an issue where it is difficult to be optimistic without being utopian."

I am not optimistic by disposition and I am anti-utopian by conviction, but I am inclined to a somewhat more hopeful set of possibilities. Whether or not some efforts are "counterproductive"—and the law of unintended consequences is always hard at work—it is a great and necessary thing, and a thing necessary to American greatness, that this country be the champion of human rights, and of religious freedom in particular. History is not the inevitable march of progress, but there can be progress in history, and the last half century's widespread promulgation of the belief that there are universal human rights is an instance of progress. We will have been defeated if we acquiesce in, or are perceived to have acquiesced in, the claim that the promotion of that belief is no more than an instance of the "cultural imperialism" of the West.

As for a decline in religious influence, Huntington is probably right in thinking that is neither likely nor desirable. For better and for worse, the indicators are almost all in the other direction. But a vibrant expansion of Christianity need not mean "a global war of religions." A longer historical perspective is required. In his 1990 encyclical *Redemptoris Missio* (The Mission of the Redeemer) John Paul II spoke of the third millennium as "a springtime of Christian evangelization." In the same encyclical he declared that "the Church imposes nothing; she only proposes." When the Chinese dictatorship is replaced by a more humane regime—and one may reasonably think it is more a matter of when than if—the Christian proposal could have a world-transforming effect in aligning that society with the cause of human dignity. That is not optimism, and certainly not utopianism. It is a reasonable hope that may or may not be vindicated.

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Islam is the great question for this century, and perhaps beyond. Christians need not abandon their evangelizing mission by joining with others in trying to create a dialogue with Muslims in the hope of eliciting Islamic support for human rights, including religious freedom. But, of course, whether or not that is possible must be answered by those who credibly speak from the heart of Islamic faith and practice. The aim of the current war is to demonstrate decisively that the murderous global ambition of the political ideology called Islamism has no future whatsoever. Once that is demonstrated, Muslim leaders will be free to search for a usable past that can help in constructing, also for Islam, a more sustainable future. Meanwhile, and it may be a very long meanwhile, the United States must be, and must be seen to be, the uncompromising champion of human rights, including the first and the font of all rights, which is religious freedom.

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JEWS AND CHRISTIANS: ATTENTION MUST BE PAID

Over the years, many readers have said how much they appreciate this journal's attentiveness to Jewish-Christian relations. It must be admitted, however, that a good many others have indicated their puzzlement about that. My own reflection on Jews and Judaism in Christian America comes out of a complicated mix of theology, sociology, political philosophy, and autobiography. Perhaps an autobiographical word may be permitted here. I was born and reared in the Ottawa Valley of Ontario, Canada, and my childhood world was that of a German Lutheran working class in which the "others" were French-speaking Catholics and the Anglo-Scot establishment that ran almost everything. There were several apparently well-to-do Jewish families in the small town of Pembroke, involved in clothing and furniture businesses, but none of us really knew them.

I was told in catechism class that the Jews were responsible for killing Jesus, which is why they had had such a hard time through the centuries. They brought the curse on themselves, we were told, when they cried out, "Let his blood be on us and on our children." (This was before the widespread awareness of what had happened in the Holocaust.) No big deal was made of this, and it was not joined to any overt animus against Jews. It was simply stated as one of the unhappy facts of history. There were sometimes statements that in today's climate would be deemed anti-Semitic. For instance, trying to get a lower price on a purchase was regularly called "jewing" somebody down. I mentioned that to a twenty-something editor the other day. She had never heard the expression. But I cannot say that the few passing references to Jews and Judaism in my childhood—and they were no more than passing references—made much of an impression on me, except to make me suppose that it must be unfortunate to be born into the troubled history of the Jewish people.

Then, in the late 1950s, Rabbi Sol Bernards came to speak at Concordia Seminary, St. Louis. Working for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, Bernards was going around the country, much in the manner of an itinerant preacher, alerting people to a new thing under the sun, "the Jewish-Christian dialogue." I was immediately hooked, and "the dialogue," as it is commonly called, has been an integral part of my life and thought ever since. Not too many years later, when I was pastor of a black parish in Brooklyn, I came to know Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, and we formed a fast friendship, first in shared activism against the Vietnam War and later in countless hours of intense theological and philosophical conversation—usually in his smoke-filled office (he with his cigar and I with my pipe) high in the tower of Jewish Theological Seminary up on Morningside Heights. More than twenty-five years after his death, Heschel—or Father Abraham, as some of us called him—is widely acclaimed as the most important American Jewish thinker of the twentieth century. Heschel and I disagreed strongly about what Jews and Christians, qua Jew and qua Christian, must disagree about, namely, the person and work of Jesus in the purposes of the God of Israel. It was always disagreement in the service of truth, and within friendship and civility bounded by a shared acknowledgment of covenantal accountability.

Among most Christians and Jews, it is fair to say, the Jewish-Christian dialogue is viewed as something of a curiosity carried on by people who are "interested in that kind of thing." I am convinced that it is critical to our common future, and to the future of the American experiment. It must be admitted, however, that the dialogue is often banal and something of a bore. In 1989, I wrote with Rabbi Leon Klenicki *Believing Today: Jew and Christian in Conversation.* In that book Rabbi Klenicki offers withering comments on what he calls the "tea and sympathy" aspect of the dialogue. For many years there was, for instance, the annual Brotherhood Week, sponsored by the National Conference of Christians and Jews. The idea was that you would take somebody to lunch whom you otherwise had no reason to talk to all year round. I recall an early dialogue experience in Kansas City. The speakers were a rabbi, a

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Catholic priest, and myself (then a Lutheran pastor). The priest wound up the proceedings with some observations of the "only in America" genre. There are many important differences between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, but what unites us is stronger than what divides us, he opined. On what unites us I expected him to say something about our common devotion to the God of Israel and the covenant with Abraham. But he drew a different lesson from the dialogue. "When we scratch beneath the surface of our differences," he triumphantly concluded, "we discover that we're all good Americans."

In many years of working with Catholics and Protestants of all varieties, I am not sure that I have ever heard a word that could fairly be described as anti-Semitic. For most Christians, and especially for the evangelical Protestants now increasingly prominent in our public life, the attitude toward Jews and Judaism is entirely benign. It is simply that it is no big deal. For Jews, a small minority in an overwhelmingly Christian society, the relationship with Christians is necessarily a very big deal indeed. Therefore, it should be a big deal for Christians as well. Not only because a decent respect is owed to the more than five million Americans who are Jews, but also because the anxieties and cultural influence of Jews are a major factor in creating a new conversation about the future of "Christian America." I should add, however, that while American Jews typically worry a lot about the Christian majority, in my experience most Jews show slight interest in the Jewish-Christian dialogue. That is a curious phenomenon best addressed by Jews.

There is a genuinely new thing happening, and it is connected to the "only in America" theme. Only in America and only today is there a sustained and intellectually rigorous engagement between Christians and Jews—albeit a small minority of both—about what it means to be a Christian and what it means to be a Jew, and what it means to be Christians and Jews together. In Europe before the Holocaust there was—with the exception of a few individual dialogues such as that between Franz Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy—slight motivation for such an engagement; and after the Holocaust there were not enough Jews left for such an engagement. In Israel, there is not the critical mass of Christians necessary for authentic dialogue, and the Palestinian Christians native to the area are politically traumatized and, to put it gently, disinclined to dialogue. So it is "only in America" after all.

What is happening here, for the first time in two thousand years, for the first time since the apostle Paul pondered the continuing "mystery" of Living Judaism, for the first time since the Church condemned Marcion as a heretic in the second century, for the first time since so many things in our tortuously entangled relationship, is that believing Jews and Christians are encountering one another on a footing of civil equality in a shared exploration of the way through history of the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Jesus. This is a new thing, and a thing of inestimable importance to all who care about the future of Judaism and Christianity. It is also of importance to Muslims and people of other religions and of none, as we think about the future of an American experience in which civil tolerance and religious devotion are not enemies but allies. These two concerns converge and reinforce one another. While the spiritual and theological encounter between Jew and Christian is immeasurably more important, civil amity is no little consideration, and is indispensable to the encounter concerning higher and deeper things.

It is fair to say that, apart from small special interest publications expressly devoted to the subject, this magazine pays more attention to the Jewish-Christian connection than any other in the country or, to my knowledge, in the world. Many readers love it, some are puzzled by it, and perhaps there are a few who dislike it. Never mind, we will continue to pay attention, in the hope that the circle of the attentive, both Jewish and Christian, will one day be greatly expanded.

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HOME SCHOOLING AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

When it got seriously underway in the mid-1980s, many thought home schooling was little more than another gesture of disgruntlement on the part of "the religious right." Today, it is estimated by some that two million children are being home schooled, and the movement is beginning to look like that great thing ever chased by liberals, the wave of the future. In the *Atlantic*, Margaret Talbot sympathetically reviews Mitchell Stevens' study of the phenomenon, *Kingdom of Children* (Princeton University Press), and notes some odd twists. For instance, in the 1960s it was leftist thinkers such as Ivan Illich, Paul Goodman, and A. S. Neill (of Summerhill fame) who promoted, under the banner of "unschooling," the revolt against standardized education. Through circuitous routes, the idea caught on among conservative Christians worried about the militant secularism promoted by the public schools, and mainly among evangelical Christians who, unlike Catholics, did not have a school system of their own.

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In home schooling, women are the chief teachers, and one may think that their decision to stay at home with the kids is a protest against regnant feminisms. Talbot's essay suggests it's a bit more complicated than that. "Deeply immersed in these values as they were, however, the women Stevens interviewed were hardly immune to the more mainstream ideals of womanhood shaped in part by liberal feminism. Like their contemporaries who had chosen to combine outside careers with the raising of children, they felt the attractions of using their minds and education in systematic, diligent ways; of possessing a sense of purpose independent from their husbands'; and of avoiding the tedium of housecleaning. The daily life of, say, the stereotypical 1950s housewife, trussed up in an apron and a short strand of pearls, seemed pallid and irrelevant to them, too. They wanted, as several women told Stevens, to be recognized as more than 'just moms.' Home schooling was in some ways the perfect solution; a souped-up domesticity with higher stakes and more respect." The home-schooling movement may also assist another feminist goal, getting dads to assume more responsibility. Talbot writes: "Moreover, fathers are actively encouraged to help their wives in whatever way the wives find useful, since the job of training young minds is regarded as both singularly important and singularly demanding. Christian home schoolers are 'refreshingly explicit about the human costs of raising children,' Stevens found. 'They devote considerable energy trying to explain why children "need" full-time mothers, and they also are careful to celebrate the doing of that work.'"

Necessary Tensions

Talbot discusses the work of Christian Smith and David Sikkink published in these pages ("Is Private Schooling Privatizing?" April 1999), which shows that home schooling families are at least as involved in civic activities and the building of "social capital" as those who send their kids out for education, and she ends with this thought: "I don't think we need worry much about their socialization in the narrow sense, either. With the exception of a few wackos in the Idaho panhandle, home-schooling parents are not bent on isolating their children, and most home-schooled kids make friends through the Scouts or church groups or volunteering. Indeed, in a study conducted a few years ago the sociologists Christian Smith and David Sikkink found that home-schooling families are actually more enmeshed in their communities than public school families. They are more likely, for example, to have voted in the previous five years, participated in an ongoing community-service activity, or gone to the public library. And the few psychological studies that have looked at categories such as 'self-concept' and sociability have detected no problems and some advantages for home-schooled kids. It would be ill-advised to set much store by such studies, given the difficulty of measuring something like self-concept, but at least they don't raise any alarms."

But Talbot knows there are other concerns. "More difficult, I think, is the question of whether home schooling poses any sort of a problem for society; a threat to social cohesion, for example, or a brain drain from the public schools. Smith and Sikkink's study suggests that there is little reason to worry that home schooling diverts people from civic life. What may be more worrisome is the prospect that home schooling will attract new recruits motivated mainly by disenchantment with the quality of their public schools. There is some evidence that recent converts to home schooling fit this profile. In a Florida state survey conducted from 1995 to 1996, for example, 'dissatisfaction with public schools' edged out 'religious' motivations for the first time as the leading reason for home schooling."

Home schooling creates tensions, Talbot admits, but that may be for the good. "Secular liberals may not much care for the particular forms of social capital that evangelicals and fundamentalists build, but build them they do. And if one shares the worry that the American citizenry is growing more selfish and monadic, the home schoolers' brand of civic participation is no small thing. Of course, one might argue that the home schoolers' activism is too narrow and self-interested to count as social capital. But that may be too narrow a way of thinking. As Smith and Sikkink argue,

> American democracy thrives on the widespread participation of its citizens in a host of *different* kinds of associations that mediate between the individual and the state, often even when those associations are not manifestly political or liberal. . . . [T]he experience of association and participation itself tends to socialize, empower, and incorporate citizens in ways that stimulate democratic self-government, even if they involve some particularity and conflict in the process.

"Christian home schoolers," Talbot concludes, "embody a coherent, living critique of mainstream education and child-rearing that can be bracing, a model of carefully negotiated, mildly irritating separateness, of being in but not of modern consumer society. For the rest of us, the tensions that creates may be the most useful thing about them."

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WHILE WE'RE AT IT

■ President Bush's August 9, 2001 speech on embryonic stem cell research, his first major address to the nation, was an unprecedented moment of presidential pedagogy on the beginnings of human life and the moral obligations attending such life. On that almost all pro-lifers agreed. As for his actual decision about federal funding for stem cell research, however, there has been sharp disagreement. Stem cells and Congressman Whatshisname, who may have had something to do with the death of his lover, were the hot items in the news until September 11, when the subject was abruptly changed. But even in a time of war, the world goes on. In this issue, we are pleased to offer an uncommonly lucid and persuasive account by Dr. Maureen L. Condic of what is involved in the stem cell debate. Next month we hope to have a comprehensive analysis of the various, and often strongly conflicting, arguments now being advanced about the future of embryonic stem cell research, and the alternatives to it.

■ Sales figures for the apocalyptic "Left Behind" books by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins flew off the charts long before September 11, and now their flight must be measured in light years. Little noticed, however, is that Muslims have also cashed in on millennial excitements occasioned by the year 2000. *The Day of Wrath* by Saudi theologian Sifr al Halawi is especially popular. It mixes conspiracy theories, UFOs, and standard Muslim and Christian apocalyptic scenarios in depicting the final cosmic battle over the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. According to Richard Landes of the Center for Millennial Studies, the story has a Zionist coalition of Christians and Jews, led by al-Dajjal (Islam's Antichrist figure), sparking a united Muslim assault on Israel and on the U.S., the other "twin tower" of Western evil. The problem with such apocalyptic enthusiasms, whether Christian or Muslim, is not, as some commentators would have it, that some believe too fervently. The problem is with what they believe so fervently.

■ Coming out against the war on terrorism, the United Methodist Board of Church and Society declared that "war is not an appropriate means of responding to criminal acts against humanity," and urged that the U.S. rely on the United Nations to resolve the problem. The statement continues, "We continue to say 'no' to war and encourage our leaders to respond cautiously." To respond cautiously to their saying 'no'? To wage war cautiously? The United Methodist in the White House surely deserves clearer counsel from his church.

■ You know about the automatic grape juice dispensing machine for Protestant communion services. Nor have you been kept in the dark about those odious electric votive "candles" in too many Catholic churches. I was expecting next the microwave crematorium. But here is a promotion from an outfit called Belltron. It asks the priest to imagine he has a funeral at ten o'clock in the morning but then discovers that there are neither altar boys nor organist. No problem. Belltron has "Incenser," which at the push of a button lights and attends to the charcoal. As for the music, there is "Sanctuary Musician," which provides recorded organ accompaniment for the funeral Mass, and, finally, there is "Model 4 Carillon," which sounds a tolling bell for the entrance and exit of the casket. The promotion piece concludes, "Now with all that time saved, have that second cup of coffee." Coming soon, "Autopriest." Then you can just go back to bed.

■ For some reason the press coverage suggested that it was a small step toward the eventual—and, as some would have it, inevitable—recognition of same-sex marriage. In fact, as Philip Horgan points out in the *Catholic Register* of Toronto, the October 2, 2001 decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia is a decisive setback to that goal. Legal jargon notwithstanding, the decision should interest nonlawyers too. Writing for the Court, Justice Ian Pitfield declared: "Under Canadian law, marriage is a legal relationship between two persons of the opposite sex. The legal relationship does not extend to same-sex couples. Marriage was defined by common, or judge-made, law. Judges should only change common law in incremental steps. A change to define marriage as the legal union of two individuals, regardless of sex, is not incremental. The change would have broad legal ramifications and would require, at the least, rules to govern the formation and dissolution of same-sex unions. Any permitted changes to the common law of marriage must be made by legislation. Parliament may not enact legislation to change the legal meaning of marriage to include same-sex unions. Under s. 91(26) of the Constitution Act, 1867, Parliament was given exclusive legislative jurisdiction over marriage, a specific kind of legal relationship. By attempting to change the legal nature of marriage, Parliament would be self-defining a legislative power conferred upon it by the Constitution rather than enacting legislation pursuant to the power. Parliament would be attempting to amend the Constitution without recourse to the amendment process provided

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by the Constitution Act, 1982. Alternatively, Parliament would be attempting to enact legislation in respect of civil rights exclusively within the legislative authority of the province. 'Marriage,' as a federal head of power with legal meaning at confederation, is not amenable to Charter scrutiny. One part of the Constitution may not be used to amend another." (The reference to the Charter has to do with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.) A few other statements in the ruling are worth noting: "The importance of the essential character of marriage to Canadian society is a matter of common sense, understanding, and observation," Pitfield wrote. "There is nothing that should compel the equation of a same-sex relationship to an opposite-sex relationship when the biological reality is that [the] two relationships can never be the same. That essential distinction will remain no matter how close the similarities are by virtue of social acceptance and action. No means exist to equate same-sex relationships to marriage, while preserving the fundamental importance of marriage to the community." Both here and in Canada other efforts are underway to have the courts usurp the political process in redefining marriage, but now, at least in Canada, they will have to overcome the cogent reasoning of the Supreme Court of British Columbia.

■ There were, as you might expect, papers and more papers at the annual meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR). The irrepressible curiosity of researchers, combined with tenure track ambitions, came up with a number of findings you might want to file for future use. For instance, religion on the Internet is not a substitute for traditional religious participation, but is used by the most religiously committed to complement and reinforce such participation. And a couple of researchers at Georgetown University have determined that Catholics who have an image of Mary in their home are more likely to name their children after saints. (Don't mock. We're talking the *scientific* study of religion here.) Another paper documents that ELCA Lutheran clergy are more liberal than those of any other mainline Protestant body, although they tend to keep their politics out of the pulpit. Finally, evangelicals in Canada continue to grow, while the number of mainliners and Catholics has stabilized. Across the board, there is a significant uptick in Canadian young people going to church weekly, except in Quebec, where thirty years ago Catholic clergy and politicians joined hands and happily jumped into the deep end of secularization's very deep pool. Even in Quebec, however, there is an increase in church weddings and funerals. Maybe Quebec, too, has touched bottom.

■ A friend suggested a possible connection, so I checked it out. Sure enough, the attack that turned back the Ottoman Empire at the gates of Vienna in 1683 began on September 11. The relief of the Siege of Vienna was led by a united German and Polish army under Charles of Lorraine and Jan Sobieski, and marked the end of Muslim ambitions to conquer Christian Europe, the "abode of the infidel." The coincidence of September 11 attacks more than three hundred years apart may be nothing more than coincidence. On the other hand, Osama bin Laden and his supporters were very explicit in their obsession with the Ottoman Empire and their determination to wreak revenge for humiliations suffered at the hands of the West. At the least, the symmetry of dates is yet another reminder of the long and complicated history of which the present conflict is part.

■ During the century past, evangelical Protestants in this country fell willy-nilly into the cultural habits of contraception and divorce, and even, until turned around in the late seventies, supported the abortion license decreed by the infamous *Roe* decision of 1973. Evangelicalism's subsequent embrace of what John Paul II calls "the culture of life" includes increasingly frequent statements of appreciation for Natural Family Planning (NFP)—not to be confused with the much pilloried "rhythm method." Sam and Bethany Torode have a new book coming out soon from Eerdmans, *Open Embrace: A Protestant Couple Rethinks Contraception.* An excerpt appears in the mainline evangelical magazine *Christianity Today.* They write: "Some readers may ask, 'What's the difference between natural and artificial birth control? Don't couples who use either means have the same goal in mind?' The fundamental difference between spacing children by NFP and by artificial methods of contraception is that periodic abstinence (prudent self-control) preserves the integrity, symbolism, and sacramental wholeness of each sex act. The one-flesh union is neither diminished nor compromised. Elisabeth Elliot, one of the few well-known evangelicals to espouse NFP, explains: 'The distinction that became so clear to me is the difference between the deliberate interruption of the transmission of life during the fertile period, and the responsible use of the natural rhythms which are imminent in the reproductive system. In other words, the difference between impeding a natural process, or making legitimate use of the natural disposition which God the Creator has built into the reproductive system.'" The authors report: "We have never heard a Christian parent say, 'You know, I really regret having that fifth child' or 'I wish I hadn't had any children at all.' We have only heard regrets from those who chose not to have more children, and sorrow from those who

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are physically unable to have any. We have read many stories from Christian couples who gave up artificial contraception—none regret it." They conclude with this: "Completely self-giving love between spouses is never sterile. It cannot be contained in just two bodies. It overflows, spilling into love for others. For married couples, this love finds expression in its openness to participating with God in the creation of new life. It's time for us, as Christians, once again to embrace childbearing with joy, as a gift, and fertility as a mystery to be reverenced."

■ There are many arguments against designating certain actions as "hate crimes." People should be punished for what they do, not for what they think. Granted, the law takes into account factors such as "malicious intent," but, if you're beating somebody up, it may reasonably be assumed that your intentions are not benign. And how do we distinguish "hate" from intense dislike, ignorant bigotry, or rational hostility? Do we really want government thought-police presuming to make a psychological diagnosis of why you rammed your neighbor's car? It's against the law to deliberately ram your neighbor's car, and that's that. Plus, "hate crimes" make doing bad things to some people subject to greater punishment than doing bad things to other people, which clearly violates equal protection. A sociologist friend points out another factor. Interracial crimes are twelve times more likely to be black-on-white than white-on-black, which means, he says, that hate-crimes laws will disproportionately penalize black criminals. Hey, you take your arguments where you can get them.

■ To the ancient Greeks it seemed that everybody outside their beloved *polis* didn't know how to speak. They all seemed to be saying "bar, bar," and so they were called barbarians. George McKenna of the City University of New York says that something similar has happened with liberalism, which has become not so much a theory of government or cluster of doctrines but an ethnic group. In "Why They Help Them Lie," published in the *Human Life Review*, McKenna explains why liberal ethnic solidarity requires right-thinking (i.e., left-thinking) people to go along with the mendacities of pro-abortion advocacy. He reminds us that it was not always so. "The surprising thing is that many liberals did disagree, at least at first. In 1971 Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy was writing constituents that 'the legalization of abortion is not in accordance with the values which our civilization places on human life.' Wanted or unwanted, Kennedy wrote, 'human life, even at its earliest stages, has certain rights which must be recognized—the right to be born, the right to love, the right to grow old.' Even in 1976, three years after *Roe v. Wade*, Kennedy was insisting that abortion 'is not a legitimate or acceptable response to any problem of society,' adding that 'unwanted as well as wanted children must be unfailingly protected.' As late as 1977 the Rev. Jesse Jackson was demanding that funding for abortion be cut and the money spent on 'human needs' instead of a 'federal policy of killing.' And, closer to present memories, Al Gore and Bill Clinton were firmly pro-life in the early 1980s. None of these politicians has ever offered an explanation for why he changed his views, beyond saying that his views 'evolved.' This is rare for converts. Usually they are only too anxious to tell us what led up to their change of heart. Dr. [Bernard] Nathanson, for example, has written and spoken at length about the ultrasound pictures of life in the womb that turned him around. But the reverse-converts say nothing about any experience, thought, or revelation that turned them around. So what made them convert? I suppose that if we gave truth serum to the Democratic politicians I just quoted, their answer would be that they worried about challenges in primary elections (which bring out liberal ideologues) and a drying-up of campaign funds (which come from wealthy ideological liberals). But that still would not answer the question of why *they*, the ideologically liberal voters and Democratic contributors, are so angrily determined to link liberalism with 'abortion rights.' The real answer, I think, is that, whatever the philosophical merits of the pro-life position, whatever its doctrinal compatibility with liberalism, pro-life has become identified with the 'outsiders'—the strangers, the barbarians, the people who talk funny."

■ To judge by some accounts, religious orders for men in the Catholic Church are on the ropes, and some are. But according to the Catholic Research Center, an independent agency, the facts are, all in all, encouraging. There are 258 religious communities for men approved by the Church, with 225,136 members engaged in sundry ministries around the world. Between 1966 and 1999, 23 percent of the older communities have increased their membership, but the real news is with the twenty-five new religious communities, which are growing rapidly. In addition to the officially approved communities, there are more than a hundred growing communities awaiting approval. The report, written by Dr. Patrick A. Metress, quotes Father Benedict Groeschel, a founder of the Franciscan Friars of the Renewal: "Religious life always comes back to life when people are willing to accept the reforming power of the Holy Spirit," and the data suggest that that is precisely what is happening now. For more information, write the Catholic Research Center, P.O. Box 12522, Burke, Virginia, 22009.

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■ The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod (LCMS) goes back to 1847 and practices "close" communion (not, mind you, "closed" communion). The LCMS also has a more or less congregational polity, which means that any local church can submit memorials or proposals to the national convention. Grace Lutheran Church in Queens Village, New York, submitted the following to last summer's convention. "Memorial 3-45 TO INCLUDE COMPANY OF HEAVEN IN COMMUNION FELLOWSHIP: Whereas, the LCMS only communes those who are members of the LCMS and are in fellowship with it; and Whereas, Jesus and many of the saints in heaven were on earth long before the establishment of the LCMS; and Whereas, during the Lord's Supper we celebrate the holy meal 'with angels and archangels & with all the company of heaven' (LW pp. 146-48); therefore be it RESOLVED, That we make all the company of heaven honorary members of the LCMS, even if they were not Lutheran in life, so that we are not breaking our own rules when we come to the Lord's Table; and be it further RESOLVED, That we declare Jesus the Christ to be an honorary member of the LCMS so that in His second coming He will not be turned away from a Lutheran altar." The memorial was not adopted. Moreover, it is reliably reported that many delegates made it emphatically clear that they were not amused.

■ Frankly, Stanley Kurtz is able to muster more generosity toward Alan Wolfe's *Moral Freedom: The Impossible Idea That Defines the Way We Live Now* (Norton) than I can. It will be remembered that Wolfe argues in that book that the nineteenth-century achievement of economic freedom, followed by the twentieth-century achievement of political freedom, have now produced freedom's fulfillment in moral freedom. Writing in *Policy Review*, Kurtz says that Wolfe's analyses are sometimes brilliant, even if his sociological research is badly skewed, and he is taken with Wolfe's ingenious turning of Tocqueville on his head. He is taken with it, but by no means convinced. Kurtz writes: "Assuming that moral freedom's opponents face certain extinction, Wolfe paints conservative social critics such as William Bennett and Gertrude Himmelfarb as the doomed aristocrats of the present. The analogy is questionable. Aristocratic privilege was a part of a complex and interlocking total social system. Once feudal bonds between the aristocracy and the peasantry had been swept aside, restoration became impossible short of a radical counterrevolution. Tocqueville, for example, singled out America's legal rejection of primogeniture as a structural key to democracy's inevitable triumph. Without the ability to concentrate wealth, power, and title in the first-born son, an indispensable social prerequisite of aristocracy had effectively been destroyed. The social underpinnings of contemporary cultural conservatism are by no means subject to that sort of all-or-nothing choice. And this raises an interesting possibility. Wolfe is describing the triumph of a surprisingly moderate and palatable form of moral freedom—a new cultural framework slowly pushing out its antiquated predecessors. But what if many of the redemptive elements of moral freedom touted by Wolfe are actually rooted in moral traditions that have not died and cannot die without taking moral freedom to the grave also? In that case, the conservative social critic is no doomed aristocrat, but a permanent and necessary fixture of the new social order. And that, in turn, would mean that our contemporary culture war, rather than being a decisive struggle from which moral freedom will emerge the victor, with traditional morality the vanquished, is actually the signature feature of this new moral era—an era in which moral freedom and moral traditionalism will alternately reconcile, merge, and vie for dominance. Perhaps instead of the dawning of the age of moral freedom, we are witnessing the onset of a permanent and inconclusive culture war." I think that's about right. Although I believe we witnessed "the onset" of the culture war in the early twentieth century and, as James Q. Wilson has argued, its "great interruption" during the Depression and World War II. The great resumption of the culture war began in the 1960s and, as Kurtz indicates, its end is nowhere in sight. Or at least it wasn't until September 11, and that reported sighting is still much in dispute.

■ Here is a long, about three thousand words, interview with Father Donald Cozzens, author of the controversial book *The Changing Face of the Priesthood* (see the review essay by Msgr. Earl Boyea, "Another Face of the Priesthood," in FT, February 2001). This is the opening question by *U.S. Catholic*: "You talk about the challenge for priests to be loyal men of the Church on the one hand, and their own person on the other. What's the tension in that challenge?" Cozzens: "This challenge for priests is similar to what any individual faces when working for a large institution or company." You can stop reading right there, although I read it all. Everything that follows logically flows from the assumption of similarity between working for a large company and ordination into the priesthood of Christ and His Body, the Church. The interview is bereft of any reference to prayer, grace, faith, union with Christ's eucharistic sacrifice, or the call to holiness. In both vocabulary and substance, Fr. Cozzens' reflections can be found in any pop psychology book or management manual picked up at Barnes & Noble. Is the Church also a human institution? Of course. Are

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there similarities with a corporation? To be sure. But for every similarity there are a dozen dissimilarities. The question is whether seminarians and priests believe that the Church is what she says she is. It is not a matter of toeing "the company line," as the interview has it. Nor is it a matter of being faithful to the Church "on the one hand" and to oneself "on the other." There is no on the one hand and on the other hand. At ordination the priest places both hands into the hands of the bishop and pledges, in radical abandonment to the grace of God, nothing less than his all. The question is and always has been the question put by Our Lord, "When the Son of Man returns, will he find faith on earth?" (Luke 18:8)

■ John C. Maxwell, described as a *New York Times* best-selling author, publishes with Thomas Nelson, an evangelical house. He has written *The 21 Indispensable Qualities of a Leader, The 21 Most Powerful Minutes in a Leader's Day, The 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership,* and his latest, *The 17 Indisputable Laws of Teamwork.* Only seventeen? Apparently the infallibility machine is running down. Maxwell, a former pastor, is featured in a *Publishers Weekly* special on books that combine religion and self-help, reflecting "a uniquely American approach to religion and spirituality—faith should *work*, it should achieve results." It's tempting to sneer. Remember Adlai Stevenson's quip about Norman Vincent Peale, "I find Paul appealing and Peale appalling." It turns out that Stevenson didn't read either, nor much of anything else. Popular religion is, more often than not, vulgar; vulgar being but another word for popular. It is not fastidiousness but honesty to point out that popularity does not excuse hype, which is exaggeration, which is falsehood. Although there is no denying that hype, too, "works." Not, however, in the service of truth.

■ For purposes of perfect whimsy, following Josef Pieper's counsel that leisure is the basis of culture, I take time out for Nigel Rees' *"Quote . . . Unquote" Newsletter.* Never does the indulgence go unrewarded. From the present issue is this, which is, perhaps, by Hilaire Belloc: "There were the Scots who kept the Sabbath and everything else they could lay their hands on. Then there were the Welsh who preyed on their neighbors. Thirdly there were the Irish who never knew what they wanted but were willing to fight for it anyway. Lastly there were the English who considered themselves a self-made nation, thus relieving the Almighty of a dreadful responsibility." Yes, I know, since September 11 the English have been stalwart friends, but surely a little joshing is permitted. Anglophobia is something else. Anglophobia is disliking things English more than is absolutely necessary.

■ She comes from a strictly, if somewhat confusedly, observant Jewish family, as she tells it, and when Hanna Rosen was appointed religion reporter for the *Washington Post,* she wasn't quite prepared for other religious worlds. This from a conversation about evangelicalism at the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington: "I now find myself, moreover, a religion reporter. I wrote about evangelicals a little bit at the *New Republic,* mostly contemptuously and without much understanding. When I first heard the former California Congresswoman Andrea Seastrand, I thought that her descriptions of her apocalyptic visions of California and the Second Coming were absolutely off the wall. But after a year of spending a lot of time in the evangelical world, I've come to think it's the *Washington Post* newsroom that's crazy. I now have the feeling that everyone is an evangelical, that I could get on any plane in America and ask the person sitting next to me, 'When did you accept Jesus Christ?' and he or she wouldn't even blink. Back in my newsroom, however, no one will believe me when I tell them that 44 percent of Americans are biblical creationists. They think it's time to transfer me off my beat."

■ The reason we no longer have "freak shows" at county fairs, opined my friend the late Christopher Lasch, is not because we have become more sensitive to the afflicted but because our society will no longer tolerate freaks. Some twenty years ago, "wrongful life" suits were being brought in our courts on behalf of children who were somehow malformed and would have been aborted had the parents been alerted by the doctors involved. Under relentless protest from organizations for the handicapped, such suits seem to have disappeared here, but France is catching up. The country's highest court of appeal, the *Cour de Cassation,* has awarded damages to a mentally retarded boy because he had not been aborted. His "right not to be born" was violated, said the court. An intriguing metaphysical puzzle, that: a being capable of possessing a right not to be. What was really declared in this case, of course, is a parental right not to be burdened. Yves Richard, a lawyer representing the medical profession and critical of the decision, observed, "The ruling means that the handicapped have no place in our society." Just as Kit Lasch said.

■ Martin E. Marty complains about economist Robert J. Samuelson, who says it is "moral self-indulgence" to rant against economic inequality. Americans, Samuelson writes, don't care that much about inequalities. They do care about everyone having a chance to improve himself. If the poor are less poor, it doesn't matter whether the rich get richer. As Samuelson puts it, "Reducing inequality matters

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only if we reduce poverty." Marty demurs: "Isaiah, Jeremiah, Amos, and a host of others in the book *Who's Who in Israel* certainly would be classified, then, in the 'morally self-indulgent group.' Next time you read them, remember: They live with illusion." It is my wont to take Marty very seriously and so, while I do not have a copy of *Who's Who in Israel*, I do have a copy of the Old Testament. For the life of me, I didn't find a prophetic reference to equality. Equality does come up in the New Testament. For instance, there are the vineyard workers in Matthew 20 who complain against the generous householder who made the latecomers "equal to us who have borne the burden of the day." And then there is reference to equality of goods in 2 Corinthians 8 where Paul is urging a generous contribution to the collection for the saints in Jerusalem. The Apostle goes on to say, "The point is this: he who sows sparingly will also reap sparingly, and he who sows bountifully will also reap bountifully. Each one must do as he has made up his mind, not reluctantly or under compulsion, for God loves a cheerful giver." Now, if only Marty could help us think through a non-compulsory and cheerful public policy for the equal (or more equal) distribution of wealth, we would all be greatly in his debt. True, being in Marty's debt does smack of inequality, but then, we are all enriched by his more than equal achievements. As for the economics lesson, Samuelson is right: we do better for everyone by focusing not on equality but on the expansion of opportunity.

■ Oakland, California, is getting a new cathedral. That's where Jerry Brown is mayor. Designed by European architect Santiago Calatrava, the cathedral will be in the shape of "hands joined in prayer." Big hands, 180 feet high, costing $78 million. The building is orthogonal, it says here, in the spirit of Buddhist and Hindu temples. Chairs will be arranged around the altar, with the intention that liturgical "performances" will be "center-stage." "My ambition," says the architect, "is to give Oakland's cathedral a universal character independent of the Catholic Church. Pluralism is universality." Others persist in claiming that catholic, as in Catholic, means universal. According to the official Catholic directory, Jerry Brown is not Bishop of Oakland.

■ *Modern Liturgy* is a monthly magazine that, reflecting the fact that "modern" is no longer in vogue, has changed its name to *Ministry & Liturgy*. In the current issue, the editor advocates a rite of general absolution, as distinct from individual confession and absolution. He writes, "Until we can shift the pendulum more toward the Vatican II vision of the Church as people of God, it is unlikely that our pastoral practice will change significantly regarding the celebration of the sacrament of penance." That "vision" of Vatican II, as distinct from the teaching of Vatican II, has, in fact, significantly changed the celebration of the sacrament, reducing it to virtual desuetude in many parts of the Church. But it is heartening that the editor recognizes that the pendulum is swinging in the other direction, even if, to paraphrase the Bard, *Modern Liturgy* by any other name smells like modern liturgy.

■ Why do some people desire euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide? That's the question studied in a major article in the British medical journal the *Lancet*. The researchers did in-depth interviews with people suffering with HIV-1 and AIDS in Canada, and came up with this answer: "Participants desired euthanasia or assisted suicide because of disintegration and loss of community, which combined to create a perception of loss of self." The sick and helpless said, in various ways, "I am no longer who I was," leading to the conclusion, "I should be allowed to die with my dignity intact." How do people know that they are who they were unless they are told? That's where "loss of community" comes in. Dare I ask, not to stir guilt but to prompt action, When was the last time you visited someone who is really sick? It may be among the most concrete and effective ways to counter the culture of death, letting those who are very ill, perhaps terminally ill, know that, for you, they are.

■ Here's another long story, this one in the *Los Angeles Times*, about Catholic theologians who say they will not ask for a "mandatum," as prescribed in the bishops' guidelines for implementing *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* (From the Heart of the Church), which is the Pope's call for revitalizing Catholic higher education. As usual, the protest is all about the threat to academic freedom. This line is an insult to intelligence, and it is long past time for its retirement. The requirement of *Ex Corde* is extremely modest, namely, that Catholic theologians promise not to teach *as Catholic doctrine* what is not Catholic doctrine. Obviously, they can, and should, deal with objections to Catholic doctrine in the classroom, and there is nothing to prevent them from discussing their own difficulties with such doctrine. It is a simple matter of honesty. They promise not to present their own views, or the views of those who reject Catholic doctrine, as though such views are, or are compatible with, the teaching of the Catholic Church. The rub comes not with academic freedom, but with the ambition of the academic theological guild to be a "parallel Magisterium." The conclusion of the *LA Times* story is revealing. About a protesting theologian at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles we are told, "And he said he will not let his

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opponents drive him away. 'I'm not going to leave the Church to them,' [the professor] said." The question is who authoritatively defines what is and is not the teaching of the Catholic Church. The Church answers that it is the Magisterium—meaning the bishops, with and under the Petrine ministry exercised by the Bishop of Rome. In other words, and not to put too fine a point on it, those whom the professor calls "them." Yes, theologians have an important role in clarifying and developing the ways in which the Church teaches, as indeed do all the faithful (*sensus fidelium*). But if one asks what it is that the Catholic Church authentically teaches, the answer comes from the Magisterium. The negative reaction to *Ex Corde* among some academic theologians is most importantly driven, I believe, not by concerns about academic freedom but by anger and disappointment over the failure of the theological guild to establish itself as a parallel, and necessarily competing, Magisterium. Nobody's freedom is violated by a promise to be honest about what the Church teaches. The protestors against *Ex Corde* run a serious risk of bringing the great good of academic freedom into disrepute by leading people to suspect that those who invoke academic freedom are really claiming a license to teach dishonestly by presenting as Catholic teaching what they think should be Catholic teaching. For the sake of the integrity of the Church's teaching, but also for the sake of the integrity of the academy, the protestors should give up their resistance to taking a simple pledge of honesty. The academic guild is not a parallel Magisterium. That's settled now. It's time for those who claim to teach Catholic theology to get over their disappointment and get on with their job of teaching Catholic theology.

■ Professor Gilbert Meilaender of Valparaiso University has, as usual, a good point. He notes that *Lutheran Forum*, an independent magazine, is committed to healing the breach of the sixteenth century between Rome and the Reformation but is sharply critical of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod (LCMS) for its position on close communion (limiting reception of Holy Communion to those who are united in faith, life, and worship), the ordination of women, and centralized authority in the Church. Meilaender writes: "I am far from thinking that all is well within the LCMS, and perhaps one can articulate reasons why these rather 'Catholic' positions are unpersuasive when articulated by any church other than the Roman Catholic Church. Even if that is true, however, it is not obvious. It needs arguments, and those might seem to be the arguments better suited to *Lutheran Forum*'s self-understanding." Meilaender asks, "Does not Missouri's support of Catholic teaching and practice [on these matters] in fact keep the breach from widening?" Then there is the matter of authority in the Church. "This is an issue that has troubled Missouri since its founding, and I doubt whether any easy solution is likely to be found. But, on the other hand, if rapprochement with Rome, were it ever to come, would involve acceptance of a Petrine office in the Church, what possible interest could *Lutheran Forum* have in supporting the deep-seated congregationalist tendencies within the LCMS? At first sight, at any rate, this seems counterintuitive." I believe it is the case that, to paraphrase Meilaender, Catholic positions are only convincing when articulated by the Catholic Church, but that is an argument for another day. Lutherans who understand themselves to be "evangelical catholics" are to be found in both the LCMS and the larger Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA). The ELCA is involved in formal theological dialogue with the Catholic Church, while the LCMS is not. At the same time, the ELCA is in full communion with bodies such as the United Church of Christ which emphatically reject Catholic (and traditional Lutheran) teachings on the three questions mentioned, as well as much else. From time to time, the suggestion has been made, also from within the LCMS, that there should be two Lutheran-Catholic dialogues, one with the ELCA and similarly liberal groups and one with the LCMS, but so far that has not happened. It is all very confusing. With the ELCA there is ecumenism without much theological substance, and with the LCMS there is theological substance without much ecumenism. So what are Lutherans who think of themselves as evangelical catholics to do? There is, I believe, an answer to that question, but that, too, is for another day.

■ Robert McAfee Brown died the other day at age eighty-one. He was a decent and exceedingly likable man. Senior readers will remember the name, once very prominent on the American religious scene. When we were friends many years go, as still now, it seemed to me that Bob personified what was meant by the Protestant mainline. The son of a Presbyterian minister, he went to Amherst, then Union Theological in New York; taking time out to serve as a navy chaplain in World War II, he returned to his studies as a Fulbright scholar at Oxford for two years before completing his doctorate at Columbia. He taught at Union before going to Stanford—where he and Michael Novak shared the limelight as academic stars—and ended his career at the Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley. He made a big mark in ecumenism, being invited as an observer to the Second Vatican Council. In 1962, *Time* magazine dubbed him the "Catholics' favorite Protestant." His writings on the Council paralleled in the Protestant track the liberal

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interpretation advanced by Father Francis Murphy (alias Xavier Rynne) and, joined with his work for the election of John F. Kennedy in countering anti-Catholic prejudice, made him a key player in the religious, cultural, and political "acceptance" of Catholics, if not Catholicism, by the American establishment. The message was that Catholics were fast becoming, or had become, pretty much like the rest of "us." It is hard to appreciate today the degree to which mainline Protestantism, forty and still twenty years ago, spoke for the American "us." Other comparable figures of the time—Eugene Carson Blake, John Bennett, William Thompson—are long dead and forgotten. William Sloane Coffin is still with us, showing up for rallies of marginal leftisms. I'm not entirely sure how a Missouri Synod Lutheran pastor from Brooklyn still in his twenties fell in with that crowd, but I did. I was in the mid-sixties co-chairman, along with Fr. Daniel Berrigan and Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, of Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam, which went big time with the embrace of the Protestant establishment and was to become the largest sustained organization of the antiwar movement. In that connection I came to work with, and admire, Bob Brown. Already by the late sixties, however, fissures opened up in what was called The Movement, and I have written about that at greater length in *America Against Itself* (Notre Dame). I had taken the "wrong" position on liberalized abortion law, and my insistent cautions against the anti-American turn taken by antiwar activists were not welcome. It's a long story, but the upshot is that, by the eighties, Bob was heavily into promoting liberation theology in support of the Sandinistas and other "liberation struggles" in Central America and elsewhere, and we found ourselves on the opposing sides of almost every issue in public dispute. It did not help that I was sympathetically disposed toward the evangelical Protestant insurgency in American life that gained momentum in the seventies. In the world of the old establishment, that was the most mortal of mortal sins. One can hardly exaggerate the degree to which that world was defined, and the remnants of it are still defined, by the modernist vs. fundamentalist battles of the first part of the twentieth century. Sympathy for the "fundies" was consorting with the enemy; alliance with them, on anything, was treason. The odd thing, not untouched by poignancy, is the way that Bob Brown and others of the ancien régime continued to think of themselves as the center, even as their influence waned, their constituencies disappeared, and their institutions fell into demoralized disarray. The declension of what used to be called the Protestant mainline—and the ways in which that resituated Catholicism and evangelicalism in American life—is a story of many parts. One way of telling the story would be to begin with an account of the life and times of Robert McAfee Brown. *Requiescat in pace.*

■ Our symposium on Darwin and conservatism ("Conservatives, Darwin, and Design," FT, November 2000) has occasioned a continuing debate in other forums, including a fine article by Marc D. Guerra of Assumption College in Worcester, Massachusetts, published in *Religion and Liberty*. Guerra writes: "Near the end of his essay in FIRST THINGS, [Larry] Arnhart celebrates the remarkable recent advances of science in the areas of neurobiology and genetics. In light of these advances, Arnhart warns that 'if conservatism is to remain intellectually vital, [it] will need to show that [its] position is compatible with this new science of human nature.' But what does Arnhart think Darwinism has to say to these new sciences? If there really are no natural limits on human beings, if nature really is in a constant slow state of flux, how can a Darwinian, even a morally serious Darwinian, oppose something such as the 'new science' of human cloning? A self-conscious Darwinian such as E. O. Wilson realizes that cloning is simply the next stage of human 'modification.' Faithful to the spirit of his Darwinism, Wilson looks forward to the day when cloning or 'volitional evolution' will allow scientists to alter 'not just the anatomy and intelligence of the species but also the emotions and creative drive that compose the very core of human nature.' Less consistent Darwinians such as Arnhart choose to remain blissfully unaware of this fact. Consequently, they fail to recognize that what they offer is not so much up-to-date moral guidance as the ultimate moral justification for the 'brave new world.'"

■ The new issue of *Ecumenical Trends* arrived a week after September 11. The featured article begins with this: "April 23 to 25, 2001, the North American launch of the Decade to Overcome Violence of the World Council of Churches (2001-2010) was celebrated. The event occurred at the Scarritt-Bennett Center in Nashville, Tennessee, a retreat and education center associated with the United Methodist Church. The lovely setting, with its peaceful garden, dormitories, dining halls, and chapel used in former days as a college campus for Methodist missionaries, offered a gentle location for an encounter together with the tasks of ecumenical engagement with violence and the need to move past violence to something more, something better in our world." In view of a world now at war, one might be tempted to say something sardonic, such as, "It was a nice idea." But in fact the WCC's version of overcoming violence is not very nice at all. For almost four decades now, its way of

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overcoming violence consisted in serving as an apologist for the violence of the Soviet Union against its own people and others, cheering on sundry "liberation struggles" in Central America and elsewhere, and excoriating the West for its militarism, imperialism, and capitalist exploitation. The report says that the Nashville meeting "served to ground the Decade in worship and spirituality, one of the methodologies recommended for the Decade." Better worship and spirituality than throwing bombs, although one must wonder what worship and spirituality mean when they are employed as "methodologies." Supporters of the Decade are urged to take a "Vow of Nonviolence," promising to promote peace "by accepting suffering rather than inflicting it," and "by refusing to retaliate in the face of provocation and violence." A personal vow of pacifism has, of course, honorable precedent, but the notion that it can or should be imposed upon the politics among nations is a piece of sickly sentimentality, a proven formula for abandoning the duty to protect the innocent by punishing those who would harm them. I expect this may be the last you will hear about the Decade to Overcome Violence. A veteran of the old-fashioned ecumenism that works at advancing Christian unity says this program is the last gasp of the World Council of Churches. I don't believe it. The organization seems to have a bottomless source of last gasps.

■ Worried about your daughter at college? You probably should be, and she may very well be worried about herself. That's the gist of an eighty-six-page report by the Institute for American Values, *Hooking Up, Hanging Out, and Hoping for Mr. Right*, based on interviews with a thousand college women on campuses across the country. Their parents were sexually liberated and they are now paying the price. Linda J. Waite of the University of Chicago says, "Both intellectually rigorous and highly readable, this report points out how today's adults are failing young people in their journey toward adulthood." Miss Manners (Judith Martin) draws from the report the conclusion that "impropriety is not as much fun as it was cracked up to be." In this connection, impropriety is a very delicate, even fastidious, term. For information, write the Institute for American Values at 1841 Broadway, New York, New York 10023.

■ No, it was not much of a relief when Anna Quindlen gave up her column in the *Times*, since she was replaced by Maureen Dowd, who seems at least equally determined to reinforce the sexist stereotype that women columnists major in the catty, dumb, and inconsequential. But readers do send me from time to time Quindlen's column in *Newsweek*. In this one she writes: "One of the most dispiriting moments in my almost half century career as a Catholic was the Sunday just before the last presidential election when our pastor, with barely disguised distaste, informed us from the pulpit that he had been told to read a letter from the archbishop. This said in part: 'In the coming election, in addition to issues of basic human rights, there will also be addressed the question of parents' rights to decide how their children are to be educated.' After delivering the free advertisement for school vouchers and, by extension, the Republican candidates, Father was expected to dust the dirt of lobbying off his hands and move seamlessly to transubstantiation. It was impossible not to think of the money changers in the temple, and how an enraged Christ threw them out, or to remember that the separation of church and state grew out of a desire, not so much to protect government from religion, but to protect religion from government." One can imagine the pastor's undisguised distaste if he mentions the Church's teaching on, say, abortion, the unlimited right to which Ms. Quindlen devoutly supports. As for the government protecting religion, that presumably includes religion's duty to teach about the rights of parents in education, a right which is, almost in the precise language used by the archbishop, also enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If the Republicans are helped by his words, one might expect Anna Quindlen to wonder why the Democrats do not support this human right. But that would be to undermine the above-mentioned sexist stereotype she does so much to uphold.

■ "[Garry] Wills is right in his fierce insistence that the contemporary Catholic Church, or at least the papacy, is indeed disastrously caught up within 'structures of deceit.' Any sane and loyal Catholic needs to say so." Adrian Hastings, an influential Catholic theologian in England, said so in the June 22, 2001 issue of the *Times Literary Supplement* where he reviewed Wills' *Papal Sin: Structures of Deceit*. I have sometimes wondered, What if this were the last thing I wrote? Would I want to be judged by this review, or essay, or commentary? It seems likely that the review of Wills was the last thing Adrian Hastings, who died on May 30, wrote. It is a pity. He made valuable contributions over the years, especially in his studies of Christianity in Africa. On Hastings' bill of indictment in the review, in agreement with Wills, are the rule of priestly celibacy, the decision regarding the possibility of ordaining women to the priesthood, and the 1998 statement on the Holocaust, *We Remember*. I agree that the last was, to put it gently, inadequate. But evidence of a "structure of deceit"? Hardly. The chief complaint, however, is against Paul VI's 1968

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encyclical on human sexuality, *Humanae Vitae*, which is, says Hastings, "the greatest single disaster of the modern papacy." Many thinkers, including non-Catholics who sense no obligation at all to agree with the pope, believe *Humanae Vitae* to have been massively vindicated as a prophetic witness to developments that have issued in what now is widely acknowledged to be "a culture of death." Hastings says that the "structures of deceit" are rooted in "the principle that popes never make mistakes." It is true that popes are not in the business of criticizing other popes, but of course popes can and do make mistakes. Popes, and this Pope most certainly, know that, as "any sane and loyal Catholic" knows that. Obviously, Adrian Hastings knew it, even if he was inclined to think that every papal decision with which he disagreed was a mistake. It is deeply regrettable that what may be his last published words were—I will not say an act of deceit, since that implies deliberate intent, but they were as false and slanderous as the book that occasioned them. It should be remembered that he frequently had better words than his last. Adrian Hastings. *Requiescat in pace.*

■ In the English town of Luton, Mohammed Abdullah, a twenty-two-year-old accountant, says, "There are people leaving all the time. Not just in Luton, but all over Britain. We, as Muslims, don't perceive ourselves as British Muslims. We are Muslims who live in Britain. All we want to do is go to Afghanistan to defend the honor and sanctity of Islam." The British government has said that such people, if they returned to Britain, would be tried for treason. According to the *Daily Telegraph*, a poll of five hundred British Muslims between the ages of twenty and forty-five found that "an overwhelming majority—91 percent—believed the war was between the Christian West and Islam, while 98 percent would not fight for Britain. In marked contrast, 48 percent said they would fight for bin Laden or for Islam." One wonders why there have not been comparable polls of the Muslim population here. Perhaps because pollsters fear comparable findings. They might be surprised. But they, and we, will not know unless the questions are asked.

■ In issue after issue, Mr. Dale Vree, editor of the *New Oxford Review*, has been indulging himself in a dither by devoting I don't know how many pages to dissecting, dicing, splicing, and pounding what he takes to be my views on "universal salvation." In the most recent issue he quotes my statement, "I have no need, interest, or intention of engaging in extended public polemics with Mr. Vree." To which he responds, "In my mind's eye I could just see him brush the mosquito off his tuxedo as he typed that." Oh, dear. Perhaps my words were a bit dismissive, but I really did not intend to upset him so. Despite his determined misconstrual of what I have written, and despite his going on about the most alarming implications of what, in fact, I do not believe, let the record show that Mr. Vree has prompted a sometimes interesting discussion of an important question. Let the record also show that I have not worn a tuxedo since college, which was a very long time ago. Finally, let the record show that I do so take Mr. Vree seriously.

■ I confess to being quite blithe in the face of all the talk about how electronics is going to put publications such as this out of business. Since every sensible person who talks about it admits that nobody knows for sure, or even for near-sure, blitheness would seem to the appropriate disposition. We do get reports on how our website (www.firstthings.com) is doing, and I admit to being amazed. The site gets, on average, about 130,000 "hits" per day, which is about forty-seven million per year. According to the technical experts, a hit is defined as "an action on the website, such as when a user views a page or downloads a file." It is the more remarkable, at least to me, because the website contains just the issues of the journal (except for the current issue) and is not regularly updated with news items or commentary as many other websites are. User sessions average 8.9 minutes, which suggests that many people are doing some serious reading. About 90 percent of the hits are from the U.S., with Canada, the UK, and Australia following in order. But then there is this odd thing that the most active city is Vienna, Virginia (38,072), followed by Golden Valley, Minnesota (4,340), with huge Los Angeles, for instance, accounting for only 479 user sessions. (The numbers are for an average day.) The explanation, I am told, is that major Internet connections are routed through places such as Vienna and Golden Valley. As I say, I don't understand much about all this, but it's good to know that so many are finding the website useful. Now if only we could get 10 percent of those forty-seven million to subscribe. I'd even settle for 5 percent. I've just been reminded that many of those hits would be by return visitors. So let's allow that, on average, they visit ten times a year, making 4.7 million different visitors. I'd be delighted if we could add even 1 percent of them to our subscriber base. Not, mind you, that we begrudge the cheapskates who read the journal (although not the current issue) for nothing. And we are greatly gratified that so many are using the website's search engine for the writing of term papers and the such. Imagine from what other sources they might be getting their information. All in all, the website must be judged a smashing success.

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■ Herbert Muschamp has a very long reflection in the *New York Times* on the good that may come from the destruction of the World Trade Center. Nineteen days after the attack he writes, "As we have now tragically learned, the erosion of religious authority is not universal." Muschamp's beat is architecture, and his cause is "progressive" architecture. "Progressive architecture," he writes, "is an oppositional tradition. It unifies through periodic conflicts with prevailing norms." Don't spend too much time trying to parse that. He quotes Thomas Friedman, also of the *Times*, who says the present conflict does not reflect a clash of civilizations but a clash between people with "a modern and progressive outlook and those with a medieval one." As for the World Trade Center, Muschamp writes that it was "retrogressive architecture"; more precisely, it was Rockefeller Republicanism. His last line: "The most we can say about New York's season in retrogression is: Good! We've got that out of our system. Now let's move on." Too bad about the thousands who died, of course.

■ In the sixties and its squalid aftermath, it was not unusual to see young people wearing the Stars and Stripes on the seat of their pants. After September 11, at least here in New York, many are wearing the flag as a bandanna on their heads, obviously intended as a sign of respect. Styles of patriotic expression vary widely. Planned Parenthood of Virginia is handing out, in return for a donation, red, white, and blue condoms. Said a spokespersonage: "Offering patriotic condoms will hopefully stem the increase of unintended pregnancies while letting Americans display their colors proudly." A number of comments come to mind, all of them quickly banished lest they compromise my desire that all be saved.

■ I hereby blow any chance I may have had of winning the Templeton Prize. Over twenty-nine years it has been awarded to many worthy people, including Mother Teresa, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and my friends Chuck Colson and Michael Novak. It used to be called the Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion. That is now changed to the Templeton Prize for Progress Toward Research or Discoveries about Spiritual Realities. The release says that "an added descriptor will include: research in love, creativity, purpose, infinity, intelligence, thanksgiving, and prayer." From Mother Teresa to Oprah Winfrey. Some progress.

■ "Save the trees. Shoot woodpeckers." That bumper sticker is brought to mind by the report that the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka has taken a "pro-life" turn. Family planning programs, he says, have sharply reduced the number of potential army recruits. "We would have the extra ten thousand troops needed to finish off the ethnic war if it had not been for family planning." With the environment, as with the culture of life, getting part of the message right is not good enough.

■ Here's another article on "clergy burnout." Don't get me wrong. I'm not unsympathetic, and there are many reasons why clergy become wearied, exhausted, dispirited, and find themselves on the precipice of despair. But I also recall the words of an elderly Catholic bishop in California: "In my experience, most of the clergy who complain about burnout were never on fire in the first place."

■ The world marveled, and rightly so, at the outpouring of sympathy and practical help prompted by the terrorist attacks of September 11. Planned Parenthood of New York immediately joined in with an offer of free abortions for women affected. Some thought the offer was, as it is said, inappropriate. It might be argued, however, that it was entirely in the spirit of a day remembered for the killing of innocent human beings—albeit on the side of the problem rather than the solution.

■ Damien Hirst, thirty-five, is the most prominent of a generation known as the Young British Artists. He has distinguished himself by, among other things, exhibiting parts of sheep, sharks, and cows in formaldehyde. The centerpiece of a new exhibit at the Eyestorm Gallery in London was a collection of half-full coffee cups, ashtrays with cigarette butts, empty beer bottles, candy wrappers, and newspaper pages strewn about the floor. The morning after a VIP preopening party, a cleaning man tossed it out. Said Emmanuel Asare, "As soon as I clapped eyes on it, I sighed because there was so much mess. It didn't look much like art to me. So I cleared it all in bin bags, and I dumped it." Said Heidi Reitmaier of the gallery, "It's an original Damien Hirst," adding that its sales value is in "six figures." The gallery PR person, Alison Smith, suggested that Asare's act might have a deeper meaning. "It could encourage debate about what is art and what isn't, which is always healthy." And the debate might be even healthier if it were posed in terms of what is and isn't trash. Hirst thought the episode extremely funny, as well he might. The exhibit has been reassembled and is on sale to any fool who doesn't get the joke.

■ The Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs has issued a detailed report, "World Population Monitoring 2001," that debunks the claims of those, including the UN Population Fund, who blame the world's ills on population growth. The report notes that dire

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predictions about the consequences of population growth have been disproved in the past, and argues that will likely be the case even if, as is by no means certain, world population rises to 8.9 billion by 2050. "From 1900 to 2000, world population grew from 1.6 billion persons to 6.1 billion. However, while world population increased close to four times, world real gross domestic product increased twenty to forty times, allowing the world to not only sustain a four-fold population increase but also to do so at vastly higher standards of living." As to the connection between population growth and nonrenewable resources, the report says, "During recent decades new reserves have been discovered, producing the seeming paradox that even though consumption of many minerals has risen, so has the estimated amount of the resources as yet untapped." Famines still happen, but they are caused not by the lack of food but by people being denied access to food because of "political instability, economic inefficiency, and social inequity." You probably knew all this, but then, you are you.

■ It is not only among the spiritual entrepreneurs of Protestant "megachurches" that it is assumed that the "strangeness" of Christianity should be tempered to attract "seekers" in what is said to be a post-Christian society. Among the results of this trimming is "entertainment worship," an oxymoron, if not a blasphemy. All too many Catholic priests and song leaders as well have bought into the idea that their job at the Mass is to orchestrate a "celebration of the people of God"—meaning the celebration of ourselves. The pathology is diagnosed with scathing wit by Thomas Day in his marvelous little book, *Why Catholics Can't Sing*. "Angels and Archangels: The Worship of Heaven and Earth" also proposes a radically different understanding of worship. Written by Robert Louis Wilken, a church historian at the University of Virginia and regular contributor to these pages, it appears in *Antiphon: A Journal for Liturgical Renewal*. Wilken writes: "In the Vulgate the first verse of Psalm 138 reads: *In conspectu angelorum psallam tibi* ('In the presence of angels I will sing to you'). *In conspectu angelorum*: What a thrilling phrase to find in the psalms, one to be inscribed on the mind and burned into the heart. These words disclose a startling truth: when we come before God to offer our praise and adoration we do so in the company of angels and archangels and the whole company of heaven. In the liturgy earth joins heaven to glorify God." Wilken concludes with this: "The greatest gift the Church can give our society is a glimpse, however fleeting, of another city. But we can only do that if our worship is self-consciously, confidently, and unmistakably oriented to God. If someone wanders in off the street as we pray, he should sense that there is a double Church, as Origen put it: the one that is seen and the other that is unseen. Indeed if the visitor does not feel uncomfortable, out of place and out of step, something is terribly wrong. The visitor should experience a little vertigo, because something is going on that is beyond his ken. Yet one would hope, as he listens to our faint voices and feeble songs, that he would also hear, if only as an echo in the distance, the thunderous sound of the heavenly host singing, 'Holy, Holy, Holy.'" Those are the beginning and opening paragraphs. For the rest of it you'll have to write the Society for Catholic Liturgy, P.O. Box 594, Mundelein, Illinois 60060.

■ We will be happy to send a sample issue of this journal to people who you think are likely subscribers. Please send names and addresses to FIRST THINGS, 156 Fifth Avenue, Suite 400, New York, New York 10010 (or e-mail to frth@kable.com). On the other hand, if they're ready to subscribe, call toll free 1-877-905-9920, or visit www.firstthings.com.

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

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

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